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· Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of the County ofBurlington
10-945
Ruling Below: Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of County of Burlington, 621 FJd 296
(3rd Cir. 2010), cert. granted 131 S.Ct. 1816 (U.S. 2011).
In March of2005, plaintiff Albert Florence's vehicle was stopped by a New Jersey state trooper.
The officer discovered a bench warrant for Florence issued for failure to pay a fine. Florence
presented the officer with a letter showing this fine had been paid. The officer arrested Florence
and took him to a county jail where Florence underwent a strip search and visual inspection.
Florence was held at the county j ail for six days until he was transferred to a correctional facility
in the county in which the warrant was issued. He underwent a similar search at this facility and
was placed with the general prison population until he was taken before a magistrate judge the
following day. The judge immediately ordered Florence's release upon discovery the warrant
had been dismissed. Shortly after his release, Florence filed suit against the facilities, among
other municipal entities. Florence asserted numerous constitutional claims including a Fourth
Amendment challenge to the strip search procedure. The District Court concluded that the
blanket strip search policies failed the balancing test under Bell v. Wolfish and found for
FloreilCe. In 2010 the Third Circuit reversed, holding that the blanket strip search policies were
justified in light of the security risks presented at the facilities and that deference was owed to
prison officials in such security matters.
Question Presented: Whether the Fourth Amendment permits a jail to conduct a suspicionless
strip search whenever an individual is arrested, including for minor offenses.
Albert W. FLORENCE

v.
BOARD OF CHOSEN FREEHOLDERS OF the COUNTY OF BURLINGTON;
Burlington County Jail; Warden Juel Cole, Individually and officially as Warden of
Burlington County Jail; Essex County Correctional Facility; Essex County Sheriff's
Department; State Trooper John Doe, Individually and in his capacity as a State Trooper;
John Does 1-3 of Burlington County Jail & Essex County Correctional Facility who
performed the strip searches; John Does 4-:5 Essex County Correctional Facility; Essex
County Sheriff's Department, Appellants in 09-3603 Board of Chosen Freehold~rs of the
County of Burlington; Warden Juel Cole, Appellants in 09-3661.
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed September 21, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
This interlocutory appeal requires us to
decide whether it is constitutional for j ails to

strip search arrestees upon their admission to
the general popUlation. Although the
question is one of first impression for this
COUli, the Supreme COUli's decision in Bell
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v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60
L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), and the many cases that
followed it inform our analysis.

In Bell, the Supreme Court rejected a Fourth
Amendment challenge to a policy of visual
body cavity searches for all detaineesregardless of the reason for their
incarceration-after contact visits with
outsiders. The Court applied a balancing test
and concluded that the visual body cavity
searches were reasonable because the
prison's security interest justified· the
intrusion into the detainees' privacy.
Since Bell was decided, ten circuit courts of
appeals applied its balancing test and
uniformly concluded that an anestee
charged with minor offenses may not be
strip searched consistent with the Fourth
Amendment unless the prison has
reasonable suspicion that the anestee is
concealing a weapon or other contraband.
Things changed in 2008, however, when the
en banc Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed its prior precedent and held
that a jail's blanket policy of strip searching
all arrestees upon entering the facility was
reasonable even in the absence of
individualized suspicion. A year later, the en
banc Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
also reversed its prior precedent and upheld
a blanket policy of strip searching all
anestees before they enter San Francisco's
general jail population.
.
Confronted with a clear dichotomy between
the en banc decisions of the Ninth gnd
Eleventh Circuits on the one hand and the
numerous cases that preceded them on the
other, we must determine which line of
cases is more faithful to the Supreme
Court's decision in Bell.
1.

A.

We begin with the facts sunounding the
arrest and detention of lead Plaintiff Albert
Florence. On March 3, 2005, a New Jersey
state trooper stopped the car in which
Florence was a passenger and anested him
based on an April 25, 2003 bench wanant
from Essex County. The warrant charged
Florence with a non-indictable variety of
civil contempt. Though Florence protested
the validity of the wanant by insisting he
had already paid the fine on which it was
based, he was arrested and taken to the
Burlington County Jail (BCJ).
According to Florence, he was subjected to a
strip and visual body-cavity search by
conections officers at BCl During the jail's
intake process, Florence was directed to
remove all of his clothing, then open his
mouth and lift his tongue, hold out his arms
and tum around, and lift his genitals. The
officer
conducting
the
search
sat
approximately arms-length in front of him,
and directed Florence to shower once the
search was complete. Florence was held at
BCJ for six days.
During Florence's sixth day at BCJ, the
Essex County Sheriff s Department took
custody of him and transported him to the
Essex County Correctional Facility (ECCF).
Florence alleges that he was subjected to
another strip and visual body-cavity search
upon his anival at ECCF. As described by
Florence, he and four other detainees were
instructed to enter separate shower stalls,
strip naked and shower under the watchful
eyes of two corrections officers. After
showering, Florence was directed to open
his mouth and lift his genitals. Next, he was
ordered to tum around so he faced away
from the officers and to squat and cough. .
After donning ECCF-issued clothing and
visiting a nurse, Florence joined the general
jail population until the following day, when
the charges against him were dismissed.
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After his release, Florence sued BCJ, ECCF,
and various individuals and municipal
entities (collectively, the Jails) under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. While Florence asserted
numerous constitutional claims, the only
claim germane to this appeal is his Fourth
Amendment challenge to the strip search
procedures at BCJ and ECCF.
B.

On March 20, 2008, the District Court
granted Florence's motion for class
certification, defining the plaintiff class as:.
All arrestees chm'ged with nonindictable offenses who were
processed, housed or held over at
Defendant Burlington County Jail
. and/or Defendant Essex County
Correctional Facility from March 3,
. 2003 to the present date who were
directed by Defendants' officers to
strip naked before those officers, no
matter if the officers term that
procedure a "visual observation" or
otherwise, without the officers first.
articulating a reasonable belief that
those arrestees were concealing
contraband, drugs or weapons[.]
Florence v. Ed of Chosen Freeholders of
the County of Burlington, 2008 WL 800970,
at *17 (D.N.J. Mar. 20, 2008).

Following discovery, the parties filed cross
motions for summary judgment. In
reviewing the motions, the District Court
first considered whether the intake
procedures at each facility rose to the level
of a "strip search." Florence v. Ed of
Chosen Freeholders of the County of
Burlington, 595 F.Supp.2d 492, 502
(D.N.J.2009). To resolve this question, the
District Court reviewed the Jails' written
search policies as well as the deposition

testimony of correctional officers and the
wardens at each facility. Ultimately, the
District Court concluded that, while there
were facts in dispute-such as whether nonindictable male arrestees at BCJ were
required to lift their genitals during the
search-these disputes were immaterial
because even the undisputed procedures of
instructing arrestees to remove all of their
clothing and subject their naked bodies to
visual inspection "rose to the level of a strip
search" under the Fourth Amendment. Id at
502-03 ("Whatever the case may be, a
discrepancy of this sort does not necessarily
provide a genuine issue of material fact. . . .
'It's just common sense. Take off all your
clothes. You're strip[ ] searched. '" (quoting
Plaintiffs' counsel».
The District Court found that BCl's
"blanket" strip search policy "entails a
complete disrobing, followed by an
examination of the nude inmate for bruises,
marks, wounds or other .distinguishing
features by the supervising officer, which is
then followed by a supervised shower with a
delousing agent." The Court found that
ECCF utilized similar strip- search and
supervised-shower procedures; however, the
ECCF procedures were slightly more
intrusive because "Essex officers carefully
observed the entire naked body of the
inmate, including body openings and inner
thighs." Having thus defined the Jails'
respective search policies, the District Court
concluded that the procedures failed the Bell
qalandng test and observed that "blanket
strip searches of non-indictable offenders,
performed without reasonable suspicion for
drugs, weapons, or other contraband, [are]
unconstitutional." Based on this holding, the
District Court granted the Plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment on the unlawful
search claim, b'ut denied the Plaintiffs'
request for a preliminary injunction. The
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Court denied Defendants' cross-motion
which sought qualified and Eleventh
Amendment immunity.
Following the decision, the Jails moved the
District Court to certify its summary
judgment as an appealable order pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The District Court
agreed that the order "involve [d] a
controlling question of law as to which there
is· substantial ground for difference of
opinion," and we granted permission to
appeal. The District Court certified the
following question for our review: "whether
a blanket policy of strip searching all nonindictable anestees admitted to a jail facility
without first
articulating reasonable
suspicion violates the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution as applied to
the
States through the Fourteenth
Amendment."
"In
reviewing
an
interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), this court exercises plenary review
over the question certified."
II.

The Fourth Amendment protects "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons ..
against umeasonable searches and
seizures." To enforce this guarantee,
government officials are limited to only
those searches which are reasonable.
Reasonableness
under
the
Fourth
Amendment is a flexible standard, "not
capable of precise definition or mechanical
application," Bell, 441 U.S. at 559, 99 S.Ct.
1861. "In each case it requires a balancing
of the need for the particular search against
the invasion of personal rights that the
search entails."
Detention in a coneetional facility "canies
with it the circumscription or loss of many
significant rights." "The curtailment of
certain rights is necessary, as a practical
matter, to accommodate a myriad of

institutional needs and objectives of prison
facilities, chief among which is internal
security." Because privacy is greatly
curtailed by the nature of· the prison
environment,
a
detainee's
Fourth
Amendment rights are likewise diminished.
While the Supreme Court has "repeatedly
held that prisons are not beyond the reach of
the Constitution[,] "it has also emphasized
that the judiciary has a "very limited role" in
the administration of detention facilities,
Indeed, detention facilities have been
described as "unique place[s] fraught with
serious security dangers," the management
of which "courts are ill equipped to deal
with[.J"Therefore, authorities are entitled to
considerable latitude in designing and.
implementing prison management policies.
As the Supreme Court cautioned in Bell:
"[p]rison administrators . . . should be
accorded wide-ranging deference in the
adoption and execution of policies and
practices that in their judgment are needed
to preserve internal order and discipline and
to maintain institutional security." In·
addition
to
pnson
administrators'
"professional expertise," separation of
powers and federalism concems support
"wide-ranging deference" to the decisions of
prison authorities.
A.

Having explained the general standards that
govem our inquiry, we tum to the Supreme
Court's pathmarking decision in Bell v.
Wolfish. Although there are factual
differences between Bell and the instant
case, they are sufficiently similar to wanant
a detailed review of Bell.
In Bell, pretrial detainees and convicted
prisoners confined at the Metropolitan
Conectiorial Center (MCC)-a federally
operated short-term custodial facility-filed
suit challenging numerous prison practices
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and conditions of confinement. Although the
pnmary purpose of MCC was to house
pretrial detainees awaiting trial on federal
criminal charges, the facility also housed:
witnesses in protective custody, .contemnors,
inmates
awaiting
sentencing
or
transportation to federal prison, inmates
serving relatively short sentences, and
inmates lodged under writs of habeas corpus
issued to ensure their presence at trial. The
population at MCC was quite transient, with
50% of its inmates spending fewer than 30
days at the facility and 73 % of the
population spending fewer than 60 days at
MCC.
Among the conditions of. confinement
challenged by the inmates at MCC was the
policy of strip and visual body-cavity
searches after contact visits with outsiders.
Under that policy, all persons housed at
MCC-regardless of the reason for their
detention-were "required to expose their
body cavities for visual inspection as a part
of a strip search conducted after every
contact visit with a person from outside the
institution." For males, this required
"lift[ing] [the] genitals and bend[ing] over to
spread [the] buttocks for visual inspection."
"The vaginal and anal cavities of female
inmates also [were] visually inspected."
Inmates were not touched by officers during
the searches.
The district court in Bell upheld the strip
searches but held the visual body cavity
searches unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the
.Second Circuit affinned, finding that the·
"gross violation of personal privacy inherent
in such a search cannot be outweighed by
the government's security interest in
maintaining a practice of so little actual
utility."
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that
the visual body-cavity searches were

reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. As
a preliminary matter, the Court assumed
without deciding that both convicted
prisoners and pretrial detainees retain some
Fourth Amendment rights upon commitment
to a correctional facility. It then explained
that, in each case, the test of Fourth
Amendment . reasonableness requires "a
balancing of the need for the particular
search against the invasion of personal rights
that the search entails," and instructed courts
to consider four factors in assessing
reasonableness: "the scope of the- particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is
conducted, the justification for initiating it,
and the place in which it is conducted."
In applying the balancing test to the search
policy, the Supreme Court cited MCC's dual
objectives of detecting and deterring
smuggling of weapons and other contraband,
recognizing that "[s]muggling of money,
drugs, weapons, and other contraband is all
too common an occurrence." The Court
upheld the policy despite the absence of any
evidence of smuggling problems at MCC as
the record contained only one instance
where an inmate was caught with
contraband in a body cavity. Neverth~less,
the Court found the lack of evidence
supported the prison's interest in the policy
because it was "more a testament to the
effectiveness of this search technique as a
deterrent than to any lack _of interest on the
part of inmates to secrete and import such
items when the opportunity arises." .
Significantly, Bell included just one
sentence discussing the scope of the privacy
intrusion, in which the Court stated that it
"d[id] not underestimate the degree to which.
these searches may invade the personal
privacy of inmates." And though it
acknowledged that correctional officers may
sometimes conduct the searches in an
impermissibly abusive fashion, the Supreme
Court did not address that issue; rather, it
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limited its review to the policy as a whole,
"deal[ing] . . . with the question whether
as
visual
body-cavity
inspections
contemplated by the MCC rules can ever be
conducted on less than probable cause
grounds." The Court answered that question
in the affirmative. Moreover, the Court
rejected the district court's consideration of
alternative, less-intrusive means of detecting
contraband. Even assuming the availability
of such alternatives, the Court deferred to
MCC's choice of security procedure because
it had not been shown to be "irrational or
unreasonable."
B.

In the years following Bell, ten circuitcourts
of appeals applied the Supreme Court's
balancing test to strip searches of individuals
arrested for minor offenses and found the
searches unconstitutional where not
supported by reasonable suspicion that the
arrestee was hiding a weapon or contraband.
In general, these courts concluded that the
extreme invasion of privacy caused by a
strip andlor visual body-cavity search
outweighed the prison's minimal.interest in
searching an individual charged with a
minor crime shortly after arrest. The critical
factor in balancing the competing interests
was the belief that individuals arrested for
minor offenses presented a relatively slight
security risk because they usually are
arrested unexpectedly whereas the contact
visits in Bell may have been arranged
specifically for the purpose of smuggling
weapons or drugs.
Recently, the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits,
sitting en banc, reversed their prior
precedents and held that Bell authorizes a
policy of blanket strip searches' for all
arrestees entering the general population of a
jail.

In Powell [v. Barrett], the Eleventh Circuit
reviewed a policy of strip searching all
arrestees' at the time of intake implemented
by the Fulton County Jail in Georgia. The
policy required that all persons entering the
jail's general population be strip searched
regardless of the crime charged and without
any individualized suspicion. Powell, 541
FJd at 1301. The booking process required
groups of 30 to 40 arrestees to enter a large
shower room, simultaneously remove all of
their clothing, place it in boxes and then
shower. "After the group shower each
arrestee either singly, or standing in a line
with others, is visually inspected front and
back by deputies. Then each man takes his
Clothes to a counter and exchanges his own
clothes for a jail jumpsuit." The Eleventh
Circuit discussed in great detail the facts and
circumstances surrounding the searches at
issue in Bell, .which demonstrated the high
level of intrusiveness that the Supreme
Court countenanced as reasonable. The
Eleventh Circuit also noted the paltry record
of body-cavity smuggling at MCC as
evidence of the significant deference
provided to prison administrators by the
Court in Bell. In light of these points, the
Eleventh Circuit determined that most courts
(and its own prior precedent) misinterpreted
Bell to require reasonable suspicion for strip
searches of minor offenders. It opined that
the decisions requiring reasonable suspicion
failed to give appropriate deference to the
judgments of prison administrators and
ignored the fact that in upholding visual
body-cavity searches, the Supreme Court in
Bell
neither required individualized
suspicion of smuggling nor differentiated
the degree of suspicion required based on
the type of offender.
The Powell court also disagreed with the
majority view that security interests at the
time of intake are less important than those
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arising after an inmate's contact visit with
an outsider, describing "an inmate's initial
entry into a detention facility" as "coming
after one big and prolonged contact visit
with the outside world." The court asserted
that .the "need for strip searches at all
detention facilities, including county jails, is
not exaggerated. " Citing other cases, the
court noted the problem of gang violence in
prisons and observed that gang members
might "coerce, cajole, or intimidate lesser
violators into smuggling contraband into the
facility." In light of these security concerns,
the Eleventh Circuit held that "a policy or
practice of strip searching all anestees as
part of the process of booking them into the
general population of a detention facility,
even without reasonable suspicion to believe
that they may be concealing contraband, is
constitutionally permissible" at least where
the search is no more intrusive than the
search in Bell.
Like the. Eleventh Circuit in Powell" the
Ninth Circuit in Bull v. City and County of
San Francisco reversed prior precedent and
upheld the San Francisco Sheriffs policy
authorizing strip searches of all anestees
before they are placed in the general
population of a county jail. Bull, 595 FJd at
966. In rejecting its prior requirement of
reasonable suspicion for anestee strip
searches, the Bull court relied on much of
the same reasoning as the Eleventh Circuit
in Powell, including its view that decisions
interpreting Bell v. Wolfish to require
reasonable suspicion to strip search minor
offenders were analytically flawed. The
Ninth Circuit concluded that "the scope,
manner, and justification for San Francisco's
strip search policy was not meaningfully
different from the scope, manner, and
justification for the strip search policy in
Bell." Based on the record presented, the
justification for searching anestees at the
time of intake was even higher than the
justification for the. post-contact visit

searches in Bell because San Francisco had
amassed a record demonstrating "a
pervasive and serious problem with
contraband inside San Francisco's jails" as
well as instances of contraband smuggled
within body cavities.
C.

Mindful of the newly-minted circuit split we
have described, we proceed to apply Bell's
balancing test to the question certified for
interlocutory appeal in this case. The Jails
rely heavily on Powell in support of their
argument that strip searches satisfy the
reasonableness standard of Bell. They argue
that the searches serve the valid prison
interests of "eliminating weapons and drugs
from the jail environment, serving to
mitigate gang violence and preventing
disease," and that these concerns apply to
indictable and non-indictable anestees alike.
On behalf of the Plaintiff class, Florence
counters that the District Court properly
applied Bell, and that we should adopt the
reasonable suspicion requirement applied by
the majority of our sister circuits. Florence
also challenges the legitimacy of the gang,
health, and contraband concerns as
justifications for the strip search of nonindictable arrestees as unsupported by the
record and argues that there are less
intrusive alternatives to satisfy the Jails'
security interests.
Like the Supreme Court in Bell, we assume
detainees maintain some Fourth Amendment
rights against searches of their person upon
entry to a detention facility. To determine
whether the strip search procedures at BCJ
and ECCF violate the FOUlih Amendment,
we first consider the scope of the searches at
Issue.
We have previously recognized that a strip
search constitutes a "significant intrusion on
an individual's privacy." Here, the strip
132

search policies require the arrestees to
undress completely and submit to a visual
. observation of their naked bodies before
taking a supervised shower. We do not
minimize the extreme intrusion on privacy
associated with a strip search by law
enforcement officers; however, the searches
at issue here are less intrusive than the visual
body-cavity searches considered by the
Supreme Court in Bell. In fact, they are
closer· to the strip searches upheld. by the
lower court in Bell.
The searches were also conducted in a
similar manner and place as those in Bellby correctional officers at a detention
facility. The policies governing strip
searches at BCJ require that they be
conducted "in private . . . under sanitary
conditions . . . [and] in a professional and
dignified manner." Moreover, the searches
are relatively brief, such that between the
search and supervised shower, an arrestee is
not required to remain naked for more than
several minutes. Because the scope, manner,
and place of the searches are similar to or
less intrusive than those in Bell, the only
factor on which Plaintiffs could distinguish
this case is the Jails' justification for the
searches.
Detention facilities are "unique place[s]
fraught with serious security dangers." We
have recognized that New Jersey jails, like
most correctional facilities, face serious
problems caused by the presence of gangs.
The Jails cite three specific security interests
to justify strip searches: (1) the detection
and deterrence of smuggling weapons, drugs
or other contraband into the facility, (2) the
. identification of gang members by observing
their tattoos, and (3) the prevention of
disease, specifically Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA). Of these
three, the potential for smuggling of
weapons, drugs, and other contraband poses
the greatest security threat.

is self-evident that preyenting the
introduction of weapons and drugs into the
prison environment is a legitimate interest of
concern
for
prison
administrators.
Prevention of. the entry of illegal weapons
and drugs is vital to the protection of
inmates and prison personnel alike.

It

Like the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts
of Appeals, we conclude that the security
interest in preventing smuggling at the time
of intake is as strong as the interest in
preventing smuggling after the contact visits
at issue in Bell. We reject Plaintiffs'
argument that blanket searches are
unreasonable because . j ails have little
interest in strip searching arrestees charged
with non-indictable offenses. This argument
cannot be squared with the facts and law of
Bell. First, the Bell court explicitly rejected
any distinction in security risk based on the
reason for detention. Instead, the security
risk was defined by the fact of detention in a
correctional facility.
Second, Bell did not require individualized
suspicion for each inmate searched; it
assessed the facial constitutionality of the
policy as a whole, as applied to all inmates
at MCC. MCC housed pretrial detainees,
convicted inmates, and even non-offenders
held as material witnesses, all of whom were
included in the plaintiff class.
We also disagree with Plaintiffs' contention
that the risk that non-indictable offenders
will smuggle contraband is low because
arrest for this category of offenses is often
unanticipated. Even assuming that most such
arrests are unanticipated, this is not always
the case. It is plausible that incarcerated
persons will induce or recruit others to
subject themselves to arrest on nonindictable offenses to smuggle weapons or
other contraband into the facility. This
would be especially true if we were to hold
that those incarcerated on non-indictable
133

offens~s

are, as a class, not subject to search.
For that reason, we agree with the concern
expressed by the Eleventh Circuit in Powell
that gang members would be likely to
exploit an .exception from security
procedures for minor offenders.
A similar risk was recognized· by the
Supreme Court in Block v. Rutherford,
where the Court upheld a prison policy
denying contact visits to, pretrial detainees
regardless of the crime charged. 468 U.S.
576, 589, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 82 L.Ed.2d 438
(1984). In Block, the district court permitted
the denial of contact visits for high risk
detainees, but required the jail to provide
visits for pretrial detainees "concerning
whom there is no indication of drug or
escape propensities." The Supreme Court
rejected the lower court's characterization of
a blanket ban on contact visits as
disproportionate to the risks posed by low
level detainees. In doing so, the Court
reasoned that inmates would likely take
advantage of any gap in security: "[i]t is not
umeasonable to assume, for instance, that
low security risk detainees would be enlisted
to help obtain contraband or weapons by
their fellow inmates who are denied contact
visits."
It is also important to note that the
opportunity for smuggling during. the
contact visits in Bell was low. As described
by the district court in that case, "inmates
and their visitors are in full view during the
visits and fully clad. The secreting of objects
in rectal or genital areas becomes in this
situation. an imposing challenge to nerves
and agility." Despite these obstacles to an
inmate obtaining contraband from a visitor
and hiding it in a body cavity, the Supreme
Court still found that MCC's interest in
detecting and deterring this low risk of
smuggling outweighed the privacy intrusion.
If it is reasonable to assume that a prisoner
will try to arrange for a visitor to deliver

. contraband during a contact VISIt, it is
equally reasonable to assume that a detainee
will arrange for an accomplice on the
outside to subject himself to arrest for a nonindictable offense to smuggle contraband
into the facility. Thus, the Jails' interest in
preventing smuggling at the time of intake is
just as high as MCC's interest after the
contact visits in Bell.
The Plaintiff class argues that the Jails
cannot rely on an interest in preventing
smuggling because they have not presented
any evidence of a past smuggling problem
or any instance of a non-indictable arrestee
attempting to secrete contraband. It is true
that the Jails' justifications for strip searches
would be stronger if supported by evidence
regarding discovery of contraband on
indictable and non-indictable offenders
during intake, and the incidence with which
gang members are arrested for nonindictable offenses. Nonetheless, our
interpretation of the Supreme Court's
decision in Bell leads us to conclude that the
Jails are not required to· produce such a
record.
In Bell, the single instance of attempted
smuggling did not undermine MCC's
justification for the search. Quite to the
contrary, the Court considered the absence
of a record to be evidence of the policy's
successful deterrent effect. Likewise here,
strip searches at the time of intake also have
significant deterrent value. If non-indictable
offenders were not subject to automatic
search it would create a security gap which
offenders could exploit with relative ease.
The Bell court did not require a record of
smuggling to justify MCC's interest in
preventing it (in fact, there was no time for a
long history of smuggling to have developed
as the Bell plaintiffs filed their case only
four months after MCC opened). The
Supreme Court declared that "[s]muggling
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of money, drugs, weapons, and other
contraband is all too common an
occurrence" at detention facilities. In
addition to the sole instance of smuggling in
the.record, Bell relied upon cases concerning
other detention facilities for the proposition
that inmates attempt to secrete items in their
body cavities.
Finally, we also find significant that the
Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized
that cOUlis must defer to the policy
of prison
administrators.
judgments
Moreover, we have stated that "deference is
especially appropriate when a regulation
implicates prison security." This emphasis
on ,deference further
supports the
proposition that the absence of evidence of
smuggling at a paliicular correctional
institution does not demonstrate the
umeasonableness of a policy implemented
to prevent smuggling. A detention facility
need not suffer a pattern of security breaches
before it takes steps to prevent them where
those steps are neither "ill'ational [n] or
umeasonable. "
Plaintiffs assert that the Jails' interest in
preventing smuggling could be achieved
through means less intrusive than strip
searches. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to the
Body Orifice Scanning System (BOSS
Chair), "[a] non-intrusive scanning system
designed to· detect small weapons or
contraband metal objects concealed in oral,
anal, or vaginal cavities," a security method
already used by ECCF. In Bell, the Supreme
Court rejected the district court's reliance on
·the less-intrusive means of metal detection
in evaluating searches at MCC. The COUli
found metal detection to be less effective
than the visual search procedure and
deferred to the prison administrator's
decision to use the visual search method.
Florence's argument regarding the BOSS
Chair fails for the same reasons. Aside fi.-om
the fact that there is no evidence regarding

the efficacy of the BOSS Chair in detecting
metallic objects, it would not detect drugs
and
other
non-metallic
contraband.
Accordingly, the decision not to rely
exclusively on the BOSS Chair is not
umeasonable.
As asselied by the Jails, a blanket policy
will help to avoid potential equal protection
concerns in the strip search process as it
removes officer discretion in selecting
which all'estees to search. The potential for
abuse in a "reasonable suspicion" scheme is
high,
partiCUlarly
where
reasonable
suspicion may be based on such subjective
characteristics as the arrestee's appearance
and conduct at the time of all'est. Subjecting
all all'estees to the same policy promotes
equal treatment.
In sum, balancing the Jails' security interests
at the time of intake before arrestees enter
the general population against the privacy
interests of the inmates, we hold that the
strip search procedures described by the
District Court at BCJ and ECCF are
reasonable. Accordingly, we will reverse the
District Court's grant of summary judgment
on Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment strip
search claim and remand for fuliher
proceedings consistent with this opinion.9
POLLAK, District Judge, dissenting.
I.

I respectfully disagree with the court's
opinion. I think Judge Rodriguez's decision
should be affirmed, and I would expressly
predicate the order of affirmance on his
comprehensive,
finely
crafted,
and
characteristically thoughtful opinion.
II.

In upholding as constitutional strip searches
of persons detained on non-indictable
offenses and with respect to whom there is
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no individualized ground for suspicion that
they may be bringing contraband into a
detention facility, the court finds the en bane
opinions of the Eleventh Circuit, Powell v.
Bm'fett, 541 F.3d 1298 (l1th Cir.2008), and
of the Ninth Circuit, Bull v. City and County
of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th
. Cir.2010), persuasive. For my part, I find
greater wisdom in Judge Barkett's dissent in
Powell and Judge Thomas's dissent in B1;lll.
Judge Thomas's Bull dissent frames the
issues this way:
The majority sweeps away twentyfive years of jurisprudence, giving
jailors the unfettered right to conduct
.mandatory, routine, suspicionless
body cavity searches on any citizen
who may be arrested for minor
offenses, such as violating a leash
law or a traffic code, and who pose
no credible risk for smuggling
contraband into the jail. Under its
reconfigured regime, the majority·
discards Bell's requirement to
balance the need for a search against
individual pnvacy and instead
blesses a uniform policy of
performing body cavity searches on
everyone arrested and designated for
the
general
jail
population,
regardless of the triviality of the
. charge· or the likelihood that the
arrestee is hiding contraband.
The .rationale for this abrupt
precedential departure is founded on
quicksand. Indeed, the govemment's
entire argument is based on the
logical fallacy cum hoc ergo propter
hoc-happenstance implies causation.
The
government
argues
that
contraband has been found in the San
Francisco
jails.
Thus,
the
govemment reasons, individuals who
are arrested must be smuggling

contraband into the jail. Therefore
the govemment concludes it must
body cavity search everyone who is
arrested, even those who pose no risk
of concealing contraband, much less
of trying to smuggle contraband into
the jail.
This reasoning finds no support from
the record in this case. Although
there is evidence of some arrestees
attempting to conceal· contraband
during their arrest, there is not a
single documented example of
anyone doing so with the intent of
smuggling contraband into the jail.
More importantly, for our purposes,
ther.e is not a single example of
anyone from the class defined by the
district court who was found to
possess contraband upon being strip
search. Not one.
Bull; 595 F.3d at 990.

In his District Court opinion, Judge
Rodriguez makes a point which gives
special cogency to Judge Thomas's "Not
one":
[I]t is worth noting that neither
county submits supporting affidavits
that detail evidence of a smuggling
problem specific to their respective
facilities.
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 595
F.Supp.2d 492,513 (D.NJ.2009).1

Judge Barkett's Powell dissent sums up the
issues with special force:
Like the majority, I recognize and
appreciate the deference due to jail
administrators as they fulfill their
charge of ensuring security in jails,
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· not only for the jail officials but also
for the inmates. At the same time,
"convicted prisoners do not forfeit
all constitutional protections by
reason of their conviction and
confinement in prison." This
principle applies with at least as
much force to individuals detained
prior to their trial on petty
misdemeanor charges such as failing
to pay child support, driving without

a license, or trespassing. These
protections, such as the right to be
free from degrading, humiliating,
and dehumanizing treatment and the
right to bodily integrity, include
protection against forced nakedness·
during strip searches in front of
others.
Powell, 541 F.3d at 1315.
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"High Court to Examine Strip Searches
for Minor Offenses"
CNN
April 4, 2011
Bill Mears
A New Jersey man who says he was
subjected to two humiliating strip searches
over unpaid traffic fines will have his appeal
heard by the Supreme Court, an important
test of police detention powers in the post
9/11 security-conscious environment.
The justices Monday accepted Albert
Florence's -petition, and will hold oral
arguments in the fall.
At issue is a challenge to a county's rules
allowing routine,
suspicionless
strip
searches of everyone arrested for even minor
offenses, regardless of the circumstances.
Florence was a passenger in his family's
sport utility vehicle when it was stopped by
a New Jersey state trooper in March 2005.
His then-pregnant wife was driving and their
4-year-old daughter was in the back seat as
they headed to dinner with Florence's
mother-in-law.
Since Albert Florence was the registered
owner, the officer ran his identification and
discovered a bench warrant for failure to pay
a fine. He had already paid the money, and
carried a letter attesting to that fact, since he
claimed he had been stopped -on several
previous occasions.
Neveliheless, Florence this time was
handcuffed and arrested, and then taken to
the jail in Burlington County, in the southern
part of the state.
Court records show Florence was subjected
to an invasive strip and visual body-cavity
search. He was then held for six days in the

county lockup before being transferred to a
Newark correctional facility, where he was
SUbjected to another identical search before
being placed m the general prison
population.
The next day a judge freed Florence,
confirming what he had insisted all _along,
that the fine had been paid.
He then sued, but a federal appeals cOUli in
Philadelphia last year ruled the search policy
proper.
In the appeal to the -Supreme Court,
Florence's lawyers wrote, "Strip searches
deprive an individual of the most tangible
protection of his intimate personal privacyhis clothing .... It is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment for jail officials to
engage in the deep intrusion into personal
dignity of a strip search of every single
individual admitted into the facility, no
matter what the circumstances."
They also pointed out that Florence's
alleged offense, failure to pay a fine, is not
considered a criminal offense in the state
and would not normally result in
incarceration. His family said their efforts to
free Florence were thwarted by repeated
bureaucratic run-arounds.
State officials in their reply drew a
distinction between a strip search policy for
those initially arrested and for those later
entering the general prison population. Such
"intake" searches m'e justified, said the state,
when applied consistently to every inmate
and for proper reasons, including "both
138

· health threats and the increasing need to
identify gang members upon their entry into
the institution."
Federal courts before the September 11,
2001, attacks had been at odds over the
constitutionality of strip searches. The
Constitution's Fourth Amendment protects
"unreasonable
searches
and
against
seizures. "
The Supreme Court in 1979, in what is.
called the Bell precedent, upheld the kind of
search Florence had undergone for those
prisoners who had contact visits with
outsiders. Using a balancing test, the justices
said the prison's security interest justified
intrusion into the inmates' privacy.
But subsequent appeals courts have found
those arrested for minor offenses may not be
strip searched unless authorities have a
"reasonable suspicion" that the person may
be concealing a weapon or contraband such
as drugs.

In 2008, however, appeals courts in Atlanta
and San Francisco found searches of every
inmate coming into the prison population are
justified, even without specific suspicions.
Those opinions were the first of their kind
since the 9/11 attacks and, along with
Florence's case, now give the high court the
chance to clarify an issue that a number of
civil and human rights proponents have tried
to highlight.
Local jails in New Jersey at the time of
Florence's arrest were subject to federal
monitors after allegations that minority
motorists and their. passengers were being
unfairly targeted for police stops and arrests.
Stops of that nature are not at issue in the
current appeal. Florence, who is AfricanAmerican, is not alleging any racial
discrimination by the state or individual
officers.
The case is Florence v. Board of Chosen
Freeholders of the County of Burlington,
New Jersey (10-945).
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"N.J. Man and 2 Counties Battle over
Constitutionality of Blanket Strip-Searches for All
Inmates"
The Star-Ledger
April 24, 2011
Jason Grant

[A] strip-search and, to a lesser extent, the
strange
and
somewhat
confounding
circumstances that surrounded [Albert]
Florence's six-day detention in 2005 have
led to a potential landmark civil rights case
to be argued this fall before the U.S.
Supreme Court.

***
The case of Albert W. Florence against
Essex and Burlington counties stands ona
precipice: ... Legally, the Supreme COUli's
ruling is expected to set clear national law ..
. on an issue that has split the country's
federal appeals courts: Whether detention
facilities can. strip~search a noncriminal
offender without having a "reasonable
suspicion" that the person might be
concealing something.

***
On one hand, Essex and Burlington counties
will argue that the Supreme COUli should
continue with its recent trend of giving more
deference to detention facility officials to
run their houses as they see fit. Essex and
Burlington will contend that safety is
paramount and ·that anyone who enters the
four walls of their jails and prisons must be
strip-searched, no matter the circumstances,
in order to pinpoint gang members through
spotting their tattoos, identify and prevent
the spread of staph infections, and, most
notably, prevent the smuggling in of
weapons, drugs or other contraband.

On the other hand, attorneys for Florence
will argue the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, which protects citizens
again unwarranted searches and seizures,
calls for a different balancing of the rights of
the government against the intrusion into
one's privacy. As Susan Chana Lask, the
civil rights attorney who has handled
Florence's case for six years, said recently,
"How reasonable does everyone think it is to
get hauled off to jail for a traffic ticket and
get strip-searched?"
Lask argues vehemently that what happened
to Florence could "happen to anyone" and
that those accused· of being noncriminal
offenders should be treated differently than
murder suspects and other alleged serious
criminals. A proper balancing under the
Fourth Amendment, Lask says, calls for
detention facilities to make a "reasonable
suspicion" determination before stripsearching a low-level offender. Plus, Lask
says, "there's a practical fix, which is to
physically
separate
the
noncriminal
offenders (in the facilities) from the
murderers and the rapists."
Meanwhile, the stakes for Essex and
Burlington counties are particularly high.
While Florence at first brought his case
individually, his lawsuit was later certified
as a class actio~ by the federal trial cOUli,
which rUled in Florence's favor, finding his
strip-searches to be unconstitutional. That
means if Florence wins at the Supreme
. COUli, the class of previously strip-searched
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noncriminal offenders at the Essex and
Burlington jails-a group that has been
. estimated to be 10,000 people-can ask for
damages, usually in the range of $1,000 to
$2,000 a person, lawyers say.
The Traffic Stop

On March 3, 2005, a state police officer in
Burlington County pulled over Florence's
wife, April, for driving 82 mph in a 65-mph
zone. The police officer ran the vehicle's
registration and arrested Albert Florence, the
passenger, after learning that there was an
Essex County warrant for his arrest,
according to court records and state police
spokesman Stephen Jones.
Suddenly, Florence was on his way to the
Burlington County Correctional Facility,
even though he quickly gave officials a
piece of paper that bore "a raised seal from
the State of New Jersey" and showed "that
all judgments against plaintiff were satisfied
and no warrant existed against him,"
according to his lawsuit.
Indeed, the warrant for Florence had been
dismissed in 2003, court filings show and
the lawyers in the case say.

***
.Once incarcerated, Florence ... spent five to
six days in the Burlington County jail as a
"holdover" inmate, waiting to be transferred
to Essex County. At a sparsely attended
news conference organized earlier this
month by Lask, Florence described the first
strip-search he endured-the one done in
Burlington-as a "horrible moment." He
was ordered to "while nude, open his mouth,
lift his tongue, hold his arms out, tum fully
around, and lift his genitals," said his
lawsuit complaint.
.. ; To top it off, [Florence] said, he was
eventually transferred to the Essex County

Correctional Facility,where he said he
suffered an even worse strip-search than the
one in Burlington.

***
Florence only stayed a day in Essex County
before he saw a magistrate judge who
quickly released him based on the warrant
having been dismissed.
At the trial level, one issue hotly contested
before U.S. District Court Judge Joseph H.
Rodriguez was whether Florence was, in
fact, strip-searched-or instead was only
subjected to "clothing exchanges" linked to
mandatory inmate showers. Several jail
officers testified that they didn't consider
Florence'.s treatment to be a strip-search,
said J. Brooks DiDonato, a veteran lawyer
who is defending Burlington County. But
Judge Rodriguez disagreed.

***
I~

The Beginning

** *
According to cOUli and police records, and a
Burlington County filing in his lawsuit,
. Florence had a serious confrontation with
the law in 1997. Documents obtained by The
Star-Ledger from the Maplewood Police
Depmtment, and interviews with a
Maplewood official, reveal that on Dec. 18,
1997, Florence was arrested and accused of
speeding off from a traffic stop in a 1994
Honda Accord "that was used as a weapon
to attempt to' injure" a Maplewood police
officer.
Court filings and police repOlts show that
Florence was charged with criminal offenses
including aggravated assault, obstruction of
the administration of law, eluding/failure to
stop, and possession of a weapon (the Honda
Accord) for unlawful purpose.
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A Burlington County court filing also says
that, on or about May 4, 1998, Florence in
turn pleaded guilty to the lesser indictable
offenses of hindering prosecution and
obstruction of the administration of law. He
served probation after the plea, according to
the court filing, and he may have been
ordered to pay fines.

Writing for the majority, Judge Thomas M.
Hardiman said that a blanket strip-search
policy had an important "deterrent effect."
He added, "It is plausible that incarcerated
persons will hiduce or recruit others to
subject themselves to. alTest on nonindictable offenses to smuggle weapons or
other contraband into the facility."

The Burlington legal brief says that on April
25,2003, an arrest warrant was issued on the
hindering-prosecution charge, but four days
later, Florence satisfied the requirement of
his probation and the warrant was dismissed.

Jonathan Turley, a well-known George
Washington University constitutional law
professor, said the court's argument about
people getting arrested for low-level
offenses and smuggling in contraband for
others struck him as particularly "fancifu1."
He also said the "small percentage" of
inmates
who
"actually
introduce
contraband" by hiding it in their bodies
means that "claims of imminent threats
aren't supported by the data."

***
'Reasonable Suspicion'

The Supreme Court issue ansmg from
Florence's lawsuit is one that appeared
settled for many years Under a 1979 decision
called Bell v. Wolfish. Then-Associate
Justice William Rehnquist wrote in Bell that
a visual body-cavity search of a detained
person was warranted after the inmate had
contact with an outside visitor, regardless of
why the person was incarcerated.
After Bell was decided, 10 U.S. appeals
courts interpreted Bell to meari that a
detention facility could not strip-search a
person brought in on minor offenses, unless
the facility had a "reasonable suspicion" that
the person was concealing something.
Since 2008, though, at least three U.S.
appeals courts have now disagreed with that
view of Bell, including the 3rd Circuit Court
of Appeals in Philadelphia, which last year
heard Florence's case and decided that a jail
had a powerful interest in keeping its
premises free of weapons and drugs. The
court ruled that all people introduced to the
general popUlation of a facility can be stripsearched.

But the Burlington lawyer, DiDonato, said
people smuggling contraband in their bodies
into jails is "a far more commonplace
incident than most people could imagine."
He sees safety in jails and prisons as
paramount, he said. "If I were admitted to
the general population of a facility for an
offense like an unpaid fine," DiDonato said,
"I would want to be sure that the people I
was sharing a cell with had been stripsearched-whether'! . was rightfully or
wrongfully incarcerated." .
Phillips, the Supreme Court litigator for
Essex County, who has argued more cases
before the high court than any other private
practitioner alive, contends that physically
separating the noncriminal offenders in
. facilities from those accused of serious
crimes "would be an administrative
nightmare for most places" and could mean
"doubling the costs."

***
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"No Crime, but an Arrest and Two Strip-Searches"
New York Times

March 7,2011
Adam Liptak
Albert W. Florence believes that black men
who drive nice cars in New Jersey run a risk
of being questioned by the police. For that
reason, he kept handy a 2003 document
showing he had paid a court-imposed fine
stemming from a traffic offense, just in case.
It did not seem to help.

In March 2005, Mr. Florence was in the
passenger seat of his BMW when a state
trooper pulled it over for speeding. His wife,
April, was driving. His 4-year-old son,
Shamar, was in the back.
The trooper ran a records search, and he
found an outstanding warrant based on the
supposedly unpaid fine. Mr. Florence
showed the trooper the document, but he
was arrested anyway.
A failure to pay a fine is not a crime. It is,
rather, what New Jersey law calls a
nonindictable offense. Mr. Florence was
nonetheless held for eight days in two·
counties on a charge of civil contempt
before matters were sorted out.
In the process, he was strip-searched twice.
"Tum around," he remembered being told
while he stood naked before several guards
and prisoners. "Squat and cough. Spread
your cheeks."
The treatment stung. "I consider myself a
man's man," said Mr. Florence, a finance
executive for a car dealership. "Six-three.
Big guy. It was humiliating. It made me feel
less than a man. It made me feel not better
than an animal."

The Supreme Court is likely to decide this
month whether to hear Mr. Florence's case
against officials in New Jersey over the
searches, and there is reason to think it will.
The federal courts of appeal are divided over
whether blanket policies requiring jailhouse
stdp-searches of people arrested for minor
offenses violate the Fourth Amendment.
Eight courts have ruled that such searches
are proper only if there is a reasonable
suspicion that the arrested person has
weapons or contraband.
The more recent trend, from appeals courts
in Atlanta, San Francisco and Philadelphia,
. is to allow searches no matter how minor the
charge. Some potential examples cited by
dissenting judges in those cases: violating a
leash law, driving without a license, failing
to pay child support.
Although the judges in the majority in Mr.
Florence's case,the one heard in
Philadelphia, said they had been presented
with no evidence that the searches were
needed, they nonetheless ruled that they
would not second-guess corrections officials
who said they feared that people like Mr.
Florence would smuggle contraband into
their jails.
The most pertinent Supreme Court decision,
Bell v. Wolfish, was decided by a 5-to-4 vote
in 1979. It allowed strip-searches of people
held at the Metropolitan Correctional Center
in New York after "contact visits" with
outsiders.
On the one hand, such visits are planned and
may provide opportunities for smuggling
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contraband in a way that unanticipated
arrests do not. On the other, as Judge Marvin
E. Frankel of Federal District Court in
Manhattan wrote in the case in 197'7, contact
visits take place in front of guards. "The
secreting of objects in rectal or genital areas
becomes in this situation an imposing
challenge to nerves and agility," Judge
Frankel wrote.
The recent decisions allowing strip-searches
of all arrestees have said they were
authorized by the Supreme Court's Bell
decision. In the Atlanta case, Judge Ed
Carnes said that new inmates enter facilities
there after "one big and prolonged contact
visit with the outside world."
In Mr. Florence's case, the majority used
,interesting reasoning to justify routine stripsearches.
"It is plausible," Judge Thomas M.
Hardiman wrote, "that incarcerated persons
will' induce or recruit others to subject
themselves to arrest on nonindictable
offenses to smuggle weapons or other
contraband into the facility."

Mr. Florence's lawyer, Susan Chana Lask,
said that would make' sense if her client were
"Houdini in reverse"-a master of becoming
incarcerated 'though blameless, in the hope

of passing along contraband t6 confederates
waiting for him inside.
In his dissent in Mr. Florence's case, Judge
Louis H. Pollak, a former dean of Yale Law
School, was also skeptical of the majority's
theory. "One might doubt," he wrote, "that
individuals would deliberately commit
minor offenses such as civil contempt-the
offense for which Florence was arrestedand then secrete contraband on their
persons, all in the hope that they will, at
some future moment, be arrested and taken
to jail to make their illicit deliveries."
In urging the Supreme Court not to hear Mr.
Florence's case, officials from Burlington
County, N.J., allowed that "perhaps
petitioner's frustration is understandable."
But jails are dangerous places, the brief said.
"It might even be argued that those arrested
on nonindictable or other 'minor' offenses
would be particularly anxious," the brief
reasoned, to make sure that everyone around
them was thoroughly searched.
Mr. Florence)s son has drawn a lesson from
what he saw from the back seat in 2005. "If
he sees a cop and we're together," Mr.
Florence testified in 2006, "he still asks,
'Daddy, are you going to jail?'"
'

***
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Smith v. Louisiana
10-8145

Ruling Below: State v. Smith, 45 So. 3d 1065 (2010) cert. granted, 10-8145,2011 WL 2297807
(U.S. June 13,2011).
Juan Smith was convicted of five murders and sentenced to life in prison in 1995. The results of
that trial were used in a second trial where Smith was convicted for additional, separate murders
and sentenced to death. Smith is now arguing that the prosecution in the first trial failed to tum
over potentially exculpatory evidence to the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland. The
Louisiana Supreme Court denied Smith post-conviction relief without issuing an opinion.

Questions Presented: (1) Is there a reasonable probability that, given the cumulative effect of
the Brady and NapuelGiglio violations in Smith's case, the outcome of the trial would have been
different? (2) Did the Louisiana state courts ignore fundamental principles of due process in
rejecting Smith's Brady and NapuelGiglio claims?
Juan SMITH, Petitioner,

v.
Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent.
No. 10-8145
October Term, 2010
December 20, 2010
On Petition for a Writ of Celiiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]

***

on Morrison
Louisiana.

Road

in

New

Orleans,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Procedural History

***
B. Statement of Facts·
Events Leading Up to Trial
On February 4, 1995, sometime in the
evening after 8:00 pm, Tangie Thompson,
her boyfriend, Andre White and her threeyear-old child were killed in their residence

Another seemingly unrelated. murder
occurred on March 1, 1995. On that evening,
sometime after 8:30 p.m., three armed
gunmen entered the home of Reba Espadron
on North Roman Street in New Orleans. Six
people were ordered by three armed black
men to lie on the floor. Five people were
shot multiple times and died as a result. Four
victims were found inside the home and .
another was found outside, toward the back
of the house. One of the victims, Shelita
Russell, was severely injured but conscious
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after the attack. She was interviewed by
police, and this interview was never turned
over to the defense. Ms; Russell died several
days after the offense as a result of her
wounds.
Reba Espadron and Reginald Harbor, who
were in a back bedroom of the house during
the incident, were not injured. Larry Boatner
also survived-he was not shot, but suffered
a laceration to his head when one of the
gunmen struck him on the head when he did
not comply with the gunman's demands. All
survivors were interviewed by the New
Orleans Police Department and provided
statements detailing the incident.
Larry Boatner told police that he opened the
door to the Espadron residence and saw
three mmed black men get out of a white
four-door car with a loud muffler and enter
the Espadron residence. The men demanded
money, and one man hit Boatner on the
head. The gunmen made the occupants of
Espadron's home lie down on the floor and
then started shooting. In an interview with
the police, Boatner described the guns used
by the perpetrators as an AK assault rifle, a
Tech-Nine handgun, and a silver handgun,
hqt could not supply any other information
on the guns or the perpetrators. In fact,
Boatner told police he was "too scared to
look at anybody," and thus could not
provide a more detailed description of the
assailants.
Phillip Young also survived the shootings,
but was identified as one of the perpetrators
of the shootings because he was unknown to
Reba Espadron and Larry Boatner. Young
was shot in the incident and was initially
unable to give police any information about
what had OCCUlTed due to his severe injuries.
Police recovered a beeper from Young, and
learned the message "187" had been sent to
Young's beeper from Kintaid Phillips'
address ShOlily before the murders. 187 is

the police code used for murder in
California, and is a commonly used slang
term for murder.
Police interviewed Michelle Branch, Phillip
Young's girlfriend, about her knowledge of
the Roman Street murders.' The Michelle
Branch interviews were never disclosed to
defense counsel. Ms. Branch told police that
Phillip Young used her car on March 1,
1995, the day of the Roman Street murders,
and that Young never returned with her car.
Ms. Branch described her car as a "light
yellow" LeBaron which at night "would '
look white." Michelle's car "didn't have a
muffler." Michelle also told police that she
had received phone calls telling her that
Kintaid Phillips was driving her car in the
Calliope Housing Projects after the Roman
Street shootings. Ms. Branch also told police
she heard rumors that Kintaid Phillips was
responsible for the Roman Street murders.
Pursuant to this information, police
conducted an extensive police investigation
into the Roman Street murders, wherein they
focused their attention on Kintaid Phillips
and his known associates, including
Donielle Bannister. However, neither Reba
Espadron nor Larry Boatner could identify
anyone from thirteen photographic line-ups
that included all known associates of
Phillips and Bannister.' Notably, Juan
Smith's photograph was never included in
the photographic line-ups as an associate of
Phillips and Bannister. Both the Morrison
Road and Roman Street cases stalled as,
police could not gather enough evidence to'
arrest the main suspects in either of the
cases.

***
While incarcerated for [an] attempted
murder charge, Robeli Trackling shared a
cell with Eric Rogers at the Orleans Parish
Prison. On May 19, 1995, Eric Rogers gave
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a police statement in which he stated that
Robert Trackling had confessed to Rogers
about his involvement in the MOlTison Road
and North Roman Street murders. The State
never disclosed Trackling's involvement to
the defense. Trackling was never charged
with the Roman· Street murders despite his
own admission' that he committed these
crimes. Instead, he entered into an
agreement with Assistant District Attorney
Rodger Jordan which provided Trackling
with a very favorable deal in exchange for
his testimony against Juan Smith in the
Morrison Road trial.
Even as the State concealed Tracking's
involvement in the Roman Street murders,
New Orleans Police Depmiment Detective
John Ronquillo developed a photographic
lineup that included Juan Smith based upon
Tracking's statement. Detective Ronquillo
presented the lineup to Reba Espadron, who
was unable to identify Juan Smith as one of
the perpetrators. A few days later, on June 7,
1995, an article appeared in the Times
Picayune that included a photograph of Mr.
Smith and Kintaid Phillips, stating they were
wanted for the Morrison Road murders.
Police approached Larry Boatner with a
photographic line-up containing Juan
Smith's
picture.
Boatner
ultimately
identified Mr. Smith from the photo line-up,
but the State failed· to disclose the true
circumstances that led to Juan Smith's
identification.
When Detective Ronquillo approached Mr.
Boatner with the photographic line-up, Mr.
Boatner was housed in a psychiatric wm'd at
Charity Hospital, where he was .being
treated for alcohol abuse. When Boatner
. viewed the line-up he knew that the
suspected perpetrator's photograph was
included. Boatner told staff at Charity
Hospital that he heard from friends that
police had identified the suspected killers in

the Roman Street murders, but that they
were not yet in custody. At the time Boatner
made the statement, only the New Orleans
Police Department knew Trackling had
implicated Juan Smith and Kintaid Phillips
for the crime; Boatner could only have
learned this information from Espadron,
who had been previously pressured by
Detective Ronquillo to identifY Juan Smith
as one of the perpetrators. Boatner was thus
pressured to identify someone he knew the
police believed was responsible.
The day he made the identification, Boatner
told medical staff that he felt confused,
overwhelmed and afraid. He also
complained that he was being harassed by
make
an
Detective
Ronquillo ,to
identification of the Roman Street
perpetrator.

***
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
1. There is a Reasonable Probability that the
. Cumulative Effect of the Brady, Napue and
Giglio Violations in this Case Would Have
Changed the Outcome of the Proceedings
A. The History of Brady Violations

III

Orleans Parish

***
In the instant case, much like the Corey
Miller and Shareef Cousin cases, prosecutor
conce(j.led
important
Roger
Jordan
eyewitness statements that were clearly
eXCUlpatory. In Mr. Smith,'s case, the State
failed to disclose information that the
testimony of its only eyewitness, Lany
Boatner, was false and riddled with
inconsistencies. The State also concealed
police interviews of several other
eyewitnesses stating that all of the gunmen
wore masks, evidence that was inconsistent
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with
Larry
Boatner's
eyewitness
identification
and
subsequent
trial
testimony. In addition, the prosecution
allowed several other witnesses to testify
falsely.
B. The Trial

***
At trial, Reba Espadron testified that she had
never seen Juan Smith before and that
throughout the shooting the only man she
had seen had his face covered, wore a hat to
cover his hair, and only revealed his eyes.
She stated that this gunman was holding a
"big handgun."
Detective John Ronquillo testified that on
June 28, 1995, at around 2:55 p.m., he
showed Larry Boatner a photographic lineup
at Charity Hospital. According to Ronquillo,
he met with Boatner for about fifteen
minutes. Ronquillo stated he did not force or
coerce Boatner to make the identification.
Ronquillo testified that he showed Boatner
the photographs aIid Boatner reportedly
immediately picked out Juan Smith's
photograph.
On cross-examination, Detective Ronquillo
agreed that Boatner was the only eyewitness
to have identified Juan Smith. Ronquillo
stated that Boatner was supposed to meet
with him at Reba Espadron's home on June
3, 1995 to view the line-up, but that Boatner
didn't show up. Ronquillo denied that
Boatner ever told him that friends had given
him information about who might have
committed the shootings. Ronquillo testified
that Boatner told him on June 28, 1995, that
he had seen Juan Smith's photograph in the
newspaper. Ronquillo believed it was the
June 4th Times Picayune.
Larry Boatner was the only witness who
could testify that Juan Smith was one of the

armed men responsible for the killings at
Roman Street. During the trial, Boatner
testified that he was· at the house on March
1, 1995. According to Boatner, Juan Smith
was the first man to enter the home, and
Boatner was positive that Mr. Smith was not
wearing a mask. Boatner testified that Juan
Smith was face-to-face with him while Mr.
Smith held a gun to Boatner's head. He
stated that he definitely saw Juan Smith's
face. Boatner stated that Mr. Smith ordered
him to get on the floor. When asked about
one of the other men who had a AK-47,
Boatner did not know whether that other
man was wearing a mask or not.
Boatner said he checked himself into
Charity Hospital to stop drinking on June
26, 1995. While at Charity Hospital, Boatner
met wi~h Detective John Ronquillo and one
'of the nursing staff members. Boatner
claimed that Detective Ronquillo showed
him a line-up and that he immediately
picked Juan Smith, claiming "I'll never
forget Juan's face, never." In the courtroom,
Boatner then identified Juan Smith as the
man who put a .9mm to his head, stating,
"like I say, I'll never forget him." Boatner
also stated that the armed gunman had a
mouth full of gold.
On cross-examination, Boatner stated that he
had told the police on March 1st "how his
hair was and I told him about the golds in
his mouth." He also recalled that the
gunman was heavy set. Boatner admitted
that in the photographic line-up he could not
see any gold in Mr. Smith's teeth.

***
. C. Post-Conviction Evidentiary Hearings

***
[During evidentiary hearings on Petitioner's
Brady, Napue, and Giglio claims] Frank
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Larre, Mr. Smith's trial lawyer, was shown
Petitioner's Exhibit 1 (in globo documents
obtained from the District Attorney's file in
Mr. Smith's case) as well as Petitioner's
Exhibit 2 (in globo documents obtained
from the New Orleans Police Depatiment).
Mr. Larre testified that he was not provided
these documents prior to or at any time
during the trial.
a. Eyewitnesses Dale Mims and Shelita
Russell
Mr. Larre testified he was never given a
police interview of eyewitness Dale-Mims in
which Mims stated that on the night of the
offense he heard multiple shotgun blasts and
then saw four black males wearing masks
and carrying rifles drive away in a white
four-door Buick Oldsmobile car. Mr. Larre
stated that he could have used this interview
to impeach Larry Boatner's testimony that
the men were not wearing masks and that he
was hit with a handgun.
On January 13, 2009, the State called Dale
Mims as a witness. Mr. Mims testified that
immediately after hearing gunfire he saw
two men run out of Reba Espadron's home
and get into a four-door white car. The car
then passed in front of Mr. Mims' house and
he saw three men inside it. He further
testified that at least two or maybe all three
men were wearing masks when they exited
the home.
On cross examination Mr. Mims gave
further details of what he recalled-that he
saw two men o'utside and when they passed
his house there were three men:

guns get in the car. Then I heard the
twelve gauge going off in the
background.
The defense called Detective Ronquillo to
testify regarding his interview with Dale
Mims shortly after the shooting. According
to Ronquillo, Mims told him all of the men
were wearing ski masks and carrying rifles.
He couldn't see any of the men's faces.
Defense counsel also testified he was never
given a police interview of another
eyewitnesses, Shelita Russell, who died later
at the hospital. Ms. Russell told the police at
the crime scene that she was in the kitchen
and that the first gunmen who entered the
house had a black cloth across his face. Mr.
Larre testified that he could have used Ms.
Russell's statement to impeach Larry
Boatner's testimony that Juan Smith was not
wearing a mask after identifying him as the
first person through the door.
b. Larry Boatner's
Statements to Police

Prior

Inconsistent

Mr. Frank Larre testified that the State never
provided him with multiple statements Larry
Boatner made to police, many of which
contradict his testimony at trial. Specifically;
the State never disclosed a statement made
the night of the murders that he could not
"supply a description of the perpetrators
other than they were black males"; his next
statement that he was "too scared to look at
anybody"; and his pretrial statement that he
could not identify any of the weapons other
than to state they were an "AK type assault
rifle, one Tech nine type handgun, and a
silver colored handgun.';

Q. There were three?
A. Yes. Like I said, the AKA'S
stopped shooting. I saw the two
guys, one on either side with the

Mr. Larre also testified as to how he would
have used these undisclosed police
interviews to suppOli Mr. Smith's defense
during his trial:
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Well, it would have totally
contradicted what Mr. Boatner was
testifying to under my cross
examination. It certainly was a
previous
statement
that
is
inconsistent to what he was saying in
court. It would have been very, very
exculpatory:
c. Circumstances Surrounding Boatner's
Identification of Petitioner
On January 13, 2009, Frank Larre testified
that he was unaware that Larry Boatner was
being harassed by an NOPD Detective into
making identification in the Roman Street
case, as indicated by notes in Boatner's
Charity Hospital records.
When Mr. Larre was questioned about how
this information might have changed his
actions at trial, he stated that he would have
attempted to locate witnesses mentioned in
the records, and, if unsuccessful, would have
attempted to introduce the Charity Hospital
records as "defense evidence showing that
the police had reports indicating that there
were claims of police harassment to identify
the witness."
Petitioner called Janie Mills as a witness on
January 14, 2009. At the time Larry Boatner
identified Mr. Smith, Ms. Mills was a
Psychiatric Technician at Charity Hospital
on the floor which housed Mr. Boatner. Ms.
Mills reviewed Mr. Boatner's medical
records and was able to identify the
handwriting and signature of the individual
who stated that Mr. Boatner was "being
harassed by an NOPD Detective Steve
Ruffilo to identify a suspected perpetrator or
perpetrators that were allegedly involved in
shooting incident last March." Ms. Mills
identified the individual as social worker
Anna Blossom. She further testified that Ms.
Blossom is now deceased.

d. Additional Evidence that Larry Boatner
Testified Falsely at Petitioner's Trial
At trial, Larry Boatner testified that he saw
Juan Smith's photograph on June 7, 1995,
on the front page of the Times-Picayune and
recognized him as one of the assailants. That
testimony bolstered his later identification of
Mr. Smith from a photographic lineup.
Detective Ronquillo'S notes and testimony
showed that Mr. Boatner claimed to have
seen Mr. Smith's photograph on June 4,
1995. Ronquillo also confirmed that Reba
Espadron told him on June 10, 1995, that
when she last spoke to Mr. Boatner on June
4,1995, he told her the same thing. In fact
Mr. Smith's photograph did not appear in
the newspaper until June 7, 1995, three days
after Mr. Boatner claimed he saw it.
In the hearing, Mr. Boatner testified that he
gave police a height and weight description
of the man he alleged was Mr. Smith.
During the. trial, however, Detective
Ronquillo testified at the trial that he never
gave a height or weight description he was
focused on the gun. Moreover, Detective
Archie Kaufman agreed that Boatner never
gave any description of height or weight.
Amazingly, Mr. Boatner testified at the
hearing that there may have been only two
men in the house. "I don't know how many
people was in there. But, I know at that time
it was two, for sure, like I said. It was Juan
. and someone else." In all of his police
interviews and at trial he testified to and
described three men.
e. The Confession of Robeii Trackling
On January 13, 2009, Petitioner called Eric
Rogers, a cellmate of Robert Trackling, to
whom Trackling confessed about his
participation in Roman Street. Rogers
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testified that after Trackling confessed to
him, Rogers made a statement to Detective
Byron Adams of the NOPD. Rogers stated
that before he gave his official, taperecorded statement, he was informally
interviewed by Detective Adams. In this
informal, unrecorded statement, Rogers
testified that he told police "Trackling told
me that him, Banister [sic], and McGee [sic]
had committed the crime." In fact, Rogers
stated that Trackling never mentioned Juan
Smith in his confession, nor did Trackling
tell Rogers that Short Dog was Juan Smith.
According to Rogers, after he gave police
this initial statement, Detective Adams
indicated that Juan Smith was involved in
the Roman Street incident and asked Rogers
to implicate Mr. Smith....
Rogers further testified that the first time he
had heard the name Juan Smith or Short Dog
was from Detective Adams, and that he did
not know either Juan Smith or Short Dog.
Nevertheless, because Detective Adams
offered Eric Rogers a reduced sentence in
his own offense, Rogers gave police a
statement that implicated Short Dog in the
Roman Street murders. Rogers testified that
he was never interviewed by Juan Smith's
lawyer about his knowledge of the Roman
Street incident.
Frank Larre was called by Petitioner on
January 13, 2009, and testified that the State
had not informed him that Robert Trac1ding
had confessed to Eric Rogers about his
participation in Roman Street. Mr. Larre
frniher testified as to how he would have
used Trackling's confession to further his
defense of Mr. Smith:
Well, I could use it to show that
some people said there were four
people, that there was a chaos going
on and nobody really knew what'
happened, especially since we have

witnesses that said that they had
masks on their faces. And,
obviously, since this guy' has
confessed, I would suggest that he
would know who was in the car and
who did the shooting, and he denies
that it was Short Dog.
Moreover, Mr. Larre "would have used it for
impeachment in cross examination."
f. Phillip
Condition

Young's

Improved

Medical

On January 13, 2009, Petitioner called
Barbara Riley, the head nurse at the Rehab
Institute of New Orleans at the time when
Phillip Young was receiving treatment at
that facility after the Roman Street incident.
Mrs. Riley remembered Phillip Young, and
testified that Young "did not speak" but was
able to communicate by shaking his head
yes or no when asked questions. When
questioned by the State about whether
Young suffered from amnesia, Ms. Riley
responded, "No, I recollect aphasia, a lack of
speech."

** *
On January 22, 2009, Petitioner called
Detective John Ronquillo, who verified that
he interviewed Phillip Young at the Rehab
Institute of New Orieans. Petitioner
presented handwritten notes to Detective
Ronquillo, which Ronquillo confirmed he
had written c1.uring the course of the
interview....
Mr. Larre testified that he was never
provided .with Detective Ronquillo's notes
regarding his interview with Phillip Young
during which Young indicated that Short
Dog was not responsible and did not go to
the house on the night of the offense. Mr.
Larre then described that he would have
used this information as indicating that an
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admitted participant in the offense "[d] enies
that Short Dog, who was alleged to have
been my client, participated in the robbery
and murder and did not shoot him."
In the instant case, the sum of the Brady and
Napue/Giglio violations completely changes
the lens through which the State's case
against Mr. Smith can be viewed. In light of
the Brady evidence, Larry Boatner's
testimony, which provided the only evidence
linking Mr. Smith to the. murders, is·
untrustwOlihy and unreliable. Not only is
Boatner's· testimony refuted by his own
undisclosed previous statements to police,
but it is also impeached by other undisclosed
eyewitness
statements.
FUliher,
the
suppressed evidence establishes that Phillip
Young, an alleged perpetrator in the offense,
asserted that Petitioner was not involved in
the offense. In withholding this information
from defense counsel, the State prevented
the defense from subjecting its case against
Mr. Smith to any meaningful adversarial
treatment. Because the suppressed evidence
was material and prevented the jury from
fully evaluating the integrity of the state's
case, Mr. Smith's conviction is unreliable
and should be reversed.
II .. The Louisiana State Coulis Ignored
Fundamental Principles of Due Process in
Rejecting Smith's Brady and Napue/Giglio
Claims
In the thirty years after Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 (1935)(per curiam), this Court
. identified an important class of due process
rights now commonly referred to as the
Brady doctrine. This series of cases has
uniformly condemned the prosecution's
presentation of evidence that is false, that is

known to create a false impression, as well
as the suppression of evidence that IS
favorable or exculpatory to the defense.

***
The Louisiana state courts have abdicated
their responsibility in failing to address the
. due process violations present in Petitioner's
case. After Petitioner's state post-conviction
petition was filed, four days of evidentiary
hearings were held at the order of the trial
court judge. During the evidentiary hearings,
Petitioner was able to present for the first
time celiain favorable evidence that· the
prosecution never disclosed either before or
during trial. Despite this, the trial court
orally issued its ruling denying relief at the
close of the fOUlih day:
BY THE COURT: I am ready to rule
in the case. I don't have to take any
time for this. I have been listening to
this for quite a while. I am denying
post-conviction relief.
The FOUlih Circuit Court of Appeal and the
Louisiana Supreme Court both declined to
review Petitioner's claims. All three state
courts denied Petitioner . relief without
making any factual findings or providing
any reasons for their ruling. As a result, the
suppressed
evidence
that
Petitioner
presented has· never received meaningful
consideration by the Louisiana state cOUlis.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, for the foregoing reasons, Mr.
Smith respectfully moves the Court to grant
review of this matter and reverse Mr.
Smith's conviction.
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Juan SMITH, Petitioner,
v ..
Burl CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondent.

No. 10-8145
March 21,2011
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Louisiana Supreme Court
Brief for Respondent in Opposition
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
STATEMENT
The Petitioner seeks to overturn convictions
of five counts of first degree murder based
on allegations that the state courts
disregarded this Court's decisions in Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959), and Giglio v.
United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), when
they denied. his application for state post
conviction relief. He points to particular
of
purported
evidence
incidences
suppression as the factual basis for his
claims, the aggregation of which he suggests
warrants the vacating of his convictions. He
bolsters this suggestion with a proposition
that any conviction out of the Orleans Parish
District Attorney's
Office mandates
reversal, particularly if a specific assistant
district attorney formerly employed with the
office tried the case. However, the
Petitioner's suggestions are unsubstantiated,
and the mere aggregation of individually
meritless suggestions cannot prove, as the
Petitioner claims, a cognizable violation of
Brady, Napue, or Giglio.
The Petitioner argues that this Court should
grant his Petition fora Writ of Certiorari
because the state courts summarily denied
his applications for relief. However, the state
district judge, who presided over the
Petitioner's trial; heard from ten witnesses
over a four day post-conviction hearing and

found, as a matter of law, that the Petitioner
failed to meet his burden of proving that his
convictions were obtained in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. Further,
although the Petitioner claims that the
Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
and the Louisiana Supreme Court "declined
to review [his] claims," in fact, those courts
did review, and summarily deni~d, his
applications for supervisory review, which
were appended with copies of the relevant
transcripts and exhibits. Considering the
unmeritorious nature of the Petitioner's
claims, the decisions of the state courts are
reasonable applications of decisions of this
Court and consistent with the usual course
of judicial proceedings. As such, the instant
petition should be denied.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[The Court recounted the entry of the
gunmen, the orders to lie on the floor, and
the shooting.]
. . . [When officers arrived,] Phillip Young,
one of the assailants, who was conscious but
unable to move, was lying face down in the
living room with Robert Simon lying
partially on top of him. When emergency
medical personnel arrived, they rolled
Robert Simon's body off of Phillip Young,
who was clutching a .25 caliber pistol in his
left hand. The EMS personnel pried the
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loaded and cocked weapon from Young's
grip. As the officers secured the premises,
they found Larry Boatner in: the bathroom.
He had not been shot bl1-t was suffering from
a severe head laceration. Officers Narcisse
and Lavasseur discovered the body of Ian
Jackson in the alley.
. . . Detective Ronquillo presented a
photographic lineup to Larry Boatner from
which Boatner identified Juan Smith as one
of the assailants.

***
REASONS
PETITION

FOR

DENYING

THE

The Petitioner claims that this Court should
grant his Petition, for a Writ of Certiorari
because (1) the state courts summarily
denied his applications for relief, which,
petitioner appears to contend, is inconsistent
with' the usual course of judicial
proceedings; (2) the State withheld material
information in violation of this Court's
holding in Brqdy v. Maryland; and (3)
prosecutors knowingly permitted Larry
Boatner to testify falsely at trial, in violation
of his due process rights.
I. The state courts' determinations were a
result of accepted ,and usual course of
judicial proceedings.
Petitioner is aggrieved because the state
district judge "orally denied relief . . .
without issuing a written opinion, making
any factual findings, or providing any
reasons for [his] ruling." However, the state
district judge, who presided o'ver the
Petitioner's trial, heard from ten witnesses
over a four-day post-conviction hearing and
found, as a matter of law, that the Petitioner
failed to meet his burden of proving that his
convictions were obtained in violation of the

Constitution of the United States. Further,
although the Petitioner claims that the
Louisiana Fourth Circuit COUliof Appeal,
and the Louisiana Supreme Court "declined
to review [his] claims" in fact, those courts
did review, and summarily denied, his
applications for supervisory review, which
were appended with copies of the relevant
transcripts and exhibits.
The rules of the Supreme Court of Louisiana
and the Louisiana Courts of Appeal provide
that a grant or denial of an application for
writs at the higher state courts rests within
the judicial discretion of the courts, which
may act peremptorily on an application. This
Court has recently noted, in the context of
federal habeas petitioners, that every federal
Court of Appeals has recognized that
"determining whether a state corui's
decision resulted from an unreasonable legal
or factual conclusion does not require that
there be an opinion from the state court
explaining the state cOUli's reasoning."
Accordingly, the summary denial of the
Petitioner's state court applications cannot
be said to be inconsistent with the usual
course of judicial proceedings.

II. The Petitioner's state post conviction
application was properly denied because the
Petitioner failed' to meet his burden of
proving that his conviction was obtained in
violation of Brady v. Maryland and its
progeny.
The Petitioner's claims that the State
withheld evidence seem to fall into three
categories: (1) the withholding of evidence
regarding eyewitness identification; (2) the
withholding of evidence of Phillip Young's
improved medical condition; and (3) the
withholding of evidence regarding Robert
Trackling's involvement in the murders.
Initially, the Petitioner fails to demonstrate
"a reasonable probability that, had the
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evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been
different. Further, viewing the undisclosed
evidence collectively, the Petitioner cannot
prove a Brady violation by the mere
aggregation of individually meritless claims.
To prevail on a Brady claim, a petitioner
must show that (1) the prosecution
suppressed or withheld evidence that was (2)
favorable to the accused and (3) material to
either guilt or punishment; and although the
Brady doctrine mandates disclosure of
certain evidence, it does not require the
prosecution to open its files to the defense.
However, the mere possibility that
undisclosed information might have helped
the defense or affected the outcome does not
establish the materiality of that information.
Rather, undisclosed information is material
only where the nondisclosure deprives the
defendant of a fair trial. As this Court has
stated, "[E]vidence is material only if there
is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the
result of the proceeding would have been
different." A "reasonable probability" is a
probability
sufficient
to
undermine
confidence in the outcome.

A. Withholding of Evidence Regarding
Eyewitness Identifications

i. Evidence Allegedly Undermining the
Credibility of Larry Boatner
The Petitioner claims that prosecutors
withheld favorable evidence that, if
disclosed before trial, could have been used
to undermine the credibility and reliability
of Lany Boatner's photographic and in court
identifications of the petitioner as the
shooter. ...

***

Aside from merely recording ... contentions
and highlighting his trial counsel's postconviction testimony that he was not
provided with any of the information in
question, the Petitioner makes no attempt to
argue the materiality of the complained-of
discrepancies or to articulate specifically
how the State's disclosure of the withheld
documents would have created a reasonable
probability of a different verdict. Instead, the
petitioner merely notes that Boatner was the
only eyewitness to the crime and
conclusorily presumes that Boatner's trial
testimony would somehow have been
"impeached" and "refuted" had the jury
been presented with such discrepancies,
leaving entirely to the imagination the form
that such impeachment and refutation would
take. Nevertheless, a· review of the
. petitioner's contentions, when measured
against the facts of the case, exposes the
fatal flaws present in argument that would
might tend to suppOli them.
a. Boatner's statement to Detective
Ronquillo on the night of the incident that he
could not supply a description of the
shooters
. First, the Petitioner contends that Lany
Boatner provided a statement to Detective
Archie Kauffman that indicated that Boatner
could not describe any of the perpetrators.
Subsequently, however, Boatner gave a
statement . . . that Boatner "could not
describe any of the subjects, other than the
subject who put the gun. in his face," who
had "golds in his mouth," and whom he in
fact later identified as the Petitioner.
The non-disclosure of this first statement,
petitioner alleges, rises to the level of a
Brady violation. However while testifying
during
the
post-conviction
hearing,
Detective Ronquillo stated that, while
Boatner had initially told him that he could
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not describe any of the perpetrators except
that they were black males, Boatner later
gave a formal recorded statement in which
he told Detective Kaufman: "I can tell you
about one [of the subj ects], the one who put
the pistol in my face." Although Boatner
emphasized that he could only describe that
one subject, he noted that the subject had
gold teeth. Boatner' s description very
closely matched that of the Petitioner.
Ronquillo attributed Boatner's initial
reluctance to provide a description to his
being "shook up" after the incident, . . .
Ronquillo noted, however, the accurate
description of the Petitioner Boatner had
earlier provided. Accordingly, the State's
of Detective
Ronquillo'S
disclosure
supplemental report would not have served
to impeach the credibility of Larry Boatner's
identification in that regard.
b. Boatner's statement to Detective
Ronquillo that he had been too scared to
look at anyone during the incident
Second, the Petitioner represents to this
Court that Boatner initially told Detective
Kaufman that he had been too scared to look
at anybody during the incident. Contrary to
the petitioner's mistaken reading of
Boatner's statement to Kaufman, Boatner
clearly indicated that he was too scared to
look at anybody after he and the other
victims had been ordered to the floor, which
does . not conflict with his statement and
testimony that he was able to see and
describe the petitioner prior to that moment.
Moreover, Boatner indicated that he was too
scared· to look at any of the perpetrators
other than the petitioner, whom he
encountered unexpectedly after opening the
front door and whose face he therefore could
not help seeing. These statements are
entirely consistent with Boatner's postconviction testimony, in which he explained
that he closed his eyes after being ordered to

the floor by the petitioner, and that he did
not open them "until the gunshots."
Therefore, because Boatner's statements and
testimony were consistent, non-disclosure of
the statements did not violate Brady.
c. Boatner's pre-trial statement that he could
not identify any of the weapons used
Third, the Petitioner's argument regarding
Boatner's description of the weapons used
during the crime also bears no fruit. Boatner
consistently described the petitioner as
carrying a handgun. In fact, at trial Boatner
testified, consistent with his police
statement, that the .9 mm gun the petitioner
carried was "a silver gun." When asked
whether it was a handgun, Boatner replied
affirmatively. He confirmed that fact on
.cross-examination at the post-conviction
hearing, stating that the gun in the
petitioner's hand was "a nine millimeter
chrome."
d. Charity Hospital records documenting
Boatner's complaint that he was being
harassed by a detective
Fourth, the Petitioner alleges that Boatner's
undisclosed Charity Hospital records show
that his photographic identification of the
Petitioner as a perpetrator was the product of
"harassment" by Detective Ronquillo earlier
that morning, and thus was unduly
suggestive and/or unreliable. However, he
provides no factual or legal support for his
unwarranted inferential leap that any
possible harassment by Detective Ronquillo
in
some
way
rendered
Boatner's
identification of the petitioner unduly
suggestive or otherwise affected its
reliability. He does not so much as specify
the nature of the supposed harassment as it
pe1iained
to
Boatner's
eventual
identification.
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At the pre-trial hearing on a motion to
suppress Boatner's identification, Boatner
himself testified that Detective Ronquillo
neither forced nor coerced him to make an
identification, nor promised him anything in
exchange for his identification, nor
suggested that he select the petitioner.
Hearing that testimony, the trial judge
denied
the
motion
to
suppress.
Subsequently, at the post-conviction
hearing, Boatner reiterated that testimony
and reaffirmed that he was not .visited by
detectives prior to the date ort which he
made his identification. Janie Mills, the
psychiatric aid who tended to Boatner
during his stay at Charity, also testified at
the pre-trial motion hearing, as. a defense
. witness, that Detective Ronquillo did not
suggest to Boatner whom he should select
from the photographic arrays. She further
testified at the post-conviction hearing that
Boatner did not appear to be distressed
while talking to detectives during his
identification. Detective Ronquillo testified
at the post-conviction hearing that he had no
recollection of visiting Boatner in the
.hospital prior to the date and time he made
his identification of the petitioner.
e.
Unidentified
records
allegedly
demonstrating that Boatner knew that police
had already identified the petitioner as a
perpetrator of the North Roman Street
murders
Fifth, the Petitioner alleges that, contrary to
his testimony at trial, Boatner made
statements to both Espadron and Detective
Ronquillo that he observed a pil)ture of the
petitioner in The Times-Picayune on June 4,
1995, when in fact that picture did not
appeal' in the paper until June 7, 1995. It is
true that the picture did not appear until June
7, 1995. It is also true that Mr. Boatner.
testified accurately and truthfully at trial that
he observed the picture in the paper on June

7, 1995. The significance, if any, of this
discrepancy is unclear, and the petitioner
makes no effort to illuminate it. To the
extent it might have served to call into
question the credibility of Boatner as a
factual witness, it is to be remembered that,
to a man who narrowly escaped a brutal
assault that left five of his friends dead, a
date would likely be· an inconsequential
detail in the face of once again being
confronted with the image of the man who
very nearly took his life. Nevertheless, it
was for a jury to judge Boatner's total
credibility, and nothing about his minor
discrepancy as to dates would hCj.ve
undermined confidence in the outcome of
the proceedings. Thus, the unidentified
records allegedly memorializing this
discrepancy were not subject to Brady.
f. Shelita Russell's pre-death statement that
the first gunman who entered the house
(identified by Boatner as the petitioner)
wore a mask
Sixth, the Petitioner argues that information
in a "daily" entry in Detective Ronquillo'S
supplemental police report noting Shelita
Russell's purported pre-death statement that
the first subject who entered the North
Roman Street residence had a black cloth
across his face, would contradict Larry
Boatner's
trial
and
post-conviction
testimony that the petitioner-who he
maintains was the first perpetrator to enterdid not have his face covered. The notation
in question reads, "Said-in kitchen saw
people barge in-one-black color across
face-first one through door-[No fmiher
statement]." The petitioner's trial counsel
testified at the post-conviction hearing that
had he been provided with Russell's
statement he would have used it to
"reinforce the fact that Mr. Boatner could
not have identified anyone," thus
undermining his identification of the
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petitioner. However, even if favorable, the
petitioner fails to
demonstrate the
materiality of Russell's statement. Had the
trial court admitted Russell's statement, the
petitioner must still show a reasonable
probability that its admission would have
served to discredit Boatner's testimony
regarding the petitioner's appearance to such
an extent that confidence in the outcome.
would be undermined.
. .. The jury could easily have taken into
account that Boatner was in immediate
proximity to the petitioner-unlike Russell,
who was cowering in a room at the back of
the house-when he entered the residence
and that the face of co-perpetrator Phillip
Young, who was left severely injured inside
the house, was not covered. Thus, the
petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the admission of Shelita
Russell's undisclosed statement would have
. resulted in the jury's discrediting Boatner's
testimony.
g. Statements by Reba Espadron and
neighbor Dale Minis to investigators
Seventh, the petitioner alleges that
undisclosed police and newspaper reports
show that Reba Espadron and neighbor Dale
Mims gave statements to police that they
observed four masked gunmen enter the
North Roman Street residence, which
contradicts LaITY Boatner's testimony that
three unmasked men perpetrated the crime.

***
. . . [Mims] told Detective Ronquillo that he
heard shots and looked out his front door,
whereupon he saw three black males armed
with AK-47s exit 2230 North Roman (where
the murders OCCUlTed), get into a white 4door Buick and drive off. He then heard a
shotgun blast and saw a fourth subject get

into another vehicle and also leave the
scene. Mims stated that all four men were
wearing ski masks covering their faces. At
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing,
Mims testified similarly, but acknowledged
that one of the three men he saw exiting the
house did not have a mask. He also admitted
that he did not see the men in question aITive
at or enter 2230 North Roman, nor did he
see them inside the residence. He also
recalled that the men wearing masks
removed them after they entered the Buick.
Detective Ronquillo's notes indicate that
Reba Espadron told Detective James Stewart
that" she observed only one of the
perpetrators, whom she described as being 5'
6" tall and slim with a "thing around his
face." At the petitioner's trial she testified
accordingly and further described him as
canying a "big gun" that he held with two
hands. Ronquillo testified at the postconviction hearing that the physical
description provided by Espadron did not
match the petitioner. Moreover, the gun
caITied by the perpetrator who confronted
Espadron (most likely the AK-47) was
clearly not a handgun, as was caITied by the
petitioner.
Mims'
and
Espadron's
undisclosed
statements would not have served to
impeach the trial testimony of LaITY Boatner
or his identification of the petitioner. Mims
confirmed that he did not see the subjects he
described at any time before or during their
entrance into 2230 North Roman, and thus
would not have been able to testify as to
whether their faces were covered when
Boatner first encountered them. He further
. stated that one of the men may not have
been masked at all. Espadron described a
subject that was clearly not the petitioner,
who Boatner testified was the only
perpetrator whose face he observed. Her
statement thus does not undermine his
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identification. Therefore, the petitioner
cannot show that the undisclosed statements
of Dale Mims or Reba Espadron would have
aided him at trial.
B. Evidence of Phillip Young's Improved
Medical Condition

The petitioner claims that prosecutors
withheld material evidence from the
defense-namely Detective Ronquillo'S
supplemental report and "daily" notes
indicating that he interviewed Phillip Young
in Charity Hospital following the shootingthat would have demonstrated the
petitioner's innocence and therefore cast the
State's trial evidence in a different light. He
further notes that- the evidence regarding
Young's improved medical condition and
the statements made by him contradict
Ronquillo's testimony and the prosecution's
statement to the jury that Young was in a
vegetative state and unable to communicate.
These allegations are spurious.
First, the petitioner was well aware of
Young's medical condition throughout the
proceedings. Young was in fact a coperpetrator of the North Roman Street
murders and was charged in the same
indictment as the petitioner. In fact, on
October 19, 1995-barely a month after the
petitioner was arraigned-the court ruled
Young irrestorably incompetent, finding that
he "will never be able to assist his counsel in
trial due to perminent [sic] brain damage."
Second, Ronquillo'S notes regarding
Young's condition do not conflict with his
trial testimony. In fact, in response to. the
prosecutor's very first question on the issue,
Ronquillo confirmed that he had indeed
spoken to Young at Charity Hospital. The
prosecutor even admonished Ronquillo in
his questioning, in light of the hearsay rule,
not to "say what [Young] said if he said

anything to you." This open court colloquy
hardly evidences a prosecutorial conspiracy
to conceal from the jury the fact that Young
could in fact communicate. Moreover,
Ronquillo's testimony that Young could not
speak much and could only use his left hand
. did not conflict with his undisclosed notes;
rather, his notes corroborate that testimony
almost
word-for-word.
Furthermore,
Ronquillo's statement at trial that he
couldn't understand. anything· that Young
was saying did not refer to Young's inabillty
to communicate at all, merely-when
presented in the context of the colloquy as a
whole-to his ability to communicate
verbally, which inability is acknowledged
even by the petitioner. The statement also
reflects
Ronquillo'S
own subjective
impression of Young's communicative
ability and, as such, is not an allegation of
objective fact that could be empirically
contradicted by the undisclosed report.
In any event, even if Young's "statements"
had been disclosed ahd admissible at trial-·
despite their constituting hearsay-they
would not have served to undermine
confidence in the jury's verdict. Detective
Ronquillo testified at the post-conviction
hearing that he disavowed Young's
statements because he was uncertain as to
whether they even had any substance. As
noted above, the jury would have been free
to consider the fact, as prosecutors would no
doubt have emphasized, that Young was a
known associate and co-defendant of the
petitioner, as well as the inherent bias that
accompanied that relationship. This was
corroborated by Ronquillo'S post-conviction
testimony that "the whole nature of
[Young's] behavior and how he answered
questions changed" when he found out
Ronquillo was a homicide detective. Young
could also reasonably fear that the
petitioner-who had just murdered five
people in cold blood-would not hesitate to
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do the same· to him if he "snitched."
Accordingly, Young had every incentive in
the world to deny the petitioner's
involvement in the killings or in his
wounding, even if he could not deny his
own presence on the scene. Therefore, the
petitioner cannot show that there was a
reasonable probability that confidence in the
outcome would have been undermined.
Relatedly, Young had a corresponding
incentive to blame his injuries on one of the
occupants of the house. However, the jury
would also have been free to consider that
the .25 calibre handgun that the petitioner·
ascribes to Robert Simons was found by
police clutched in Young's hand and would
have been reasonable in finding it unlikely
that Young had somehow managed to grab
the gun from Simons after having essentially
been rendered paralyzed and unconscious by
the shot to his head. Even if established,
however, the fact that Simons may have shot
Young would not have served to exonerate
the petitioner. Finally, the statements by
Young that do not exculpate the petitioner"drove in car", "girlfriend's carlO-are of no
real evidentiary value.
Finally, while .the petitioner argues that the
undisclosed evidence, even if not admissible
itself, constitutes Brady material because it
could have led to the discovery of
admissible evidence favorable to the
defense, he fails even to speculate what
additional evidence could have been
discovered to exculpate him based on the
disclosure thereof. Detective Ronquillo was
examjned at length during the postconviction hearing about numerous other
leads and suspects in the North Roman
Street murders and testified that through
investigation he was able to' eliminate
everyone but the petitioner as a confirmed
perpetrator. Confronted with that testimony
at trial, the jury would have been reasonable

in discrediting any "alternative suspect"
theory that the disclosure of Young's
hospital statements may have engendered.
The only evidence of how the defense would
have used Young's statements was offered
by the petitioner's trial counsel, who
testified at the post-conviction hearing that
he would have attempted to locate Young 01',
in the alternative, to introduce Ronquillo's
notes as evidence of police harassment of
Young to make an identification. However,
Young's whereabouts throughout the
proceedings-especially after his remand to
the state forensic facility-were hardly a
secret and counsel could easily have visited
and attempted to interview him with
minimal diligence. Finally, as Young never
identified any of the alleged actual
perpetrators, any evidence as to police
"harassment" to that end would have been
entirely irrelevant.
The petitioner has utterly failed. to
demonstrate the materiality of the
undisclosed notes regarding Phillip Young's
improved medical condition and his
"statements" to Detective Ronquillo.
C. Evidence Regarding Robert Trackling's
Involvement in the Murders
The petitioner alleges that prosecutors
withheld material evidence of Rob eli
Traclding's
confession
to
having
participated in the North Roman Street
murders and his implication of Donielle
Bannister therein. . . . The petitioner cites
[Eric Rogers' post-conviction testimony
regarding Trackling's prison cell confession]
as material evidence that directly exculpates
him from the North Roman Street murders.
The second piece of undisclosed information
involves a June 1, 1995, interview between
Detective Adams and Trackling relating to.
his involvement in the Morrison Road
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murders, during which Trackling identified
the petitioner from a photographic lineup as
"Short Dog" and implicated him in the
Morrison Road murders. The petitioner
notes with suspicion the timing of Adams'
interview with Trackling . . . and the fact
that Trackling was not asked about his role
in the North Roman Street murders, despite
the infOlmation learned from Rogers. He
further points to a notation entry in
Detective Ronquillo's supplemental report
stating that Adams had interviewed
Trackling and that Trackling had denied
being involved in the North Roman Street
murders, which he contrasts with the fact
that Adams did not, as far as is known, ask
Trackling about North Roman Street. The
petitioner surmises that this proves the
existence of an as-of-yet undisclosed
interview, even as the District Attorney's
file contains no such second interview.
Finally, the petitioner directs this Court to a
notation in Ronquillo's supplemental report
referring to his interview with Trackling in
July of 1995, during which Trackling denied
his involvement in the North Roman Street
murders and offered the alibi that he was at
work when the crimes were committed. The
report goes on to note that Ronquillo
checked Trackling's time card and
discovered that he did not clock out of work
until 7:45 pm. The petitioner cites this as
proof of Trackling's possible involvement in
the North Roman Street murders, which did
not occur until 8:30 pm. Police lmowledge
of Trackling' s involvement, according to the
petitioner, was evidenced by his being
placed in photographic lineups shown to
Reba Espadron and Larry Boatner, neither
of whom identified him as a perpetrator.
Upon that, the petitioner argues that police
concealed Trackling's confession to his
prejudice.
The petitioner's unwieldy allegation as to

evidence
of
Trackling's
supposed
involvement in the North Roman Street
murders fails to satisfy his burden under
Brady. As an initial matter, Eric Rogers'
testimony at trial-to the extent it tracked
his police statement and post-conviction
testimony-would have been inadmissible
hearsay through Trackling and Detective
Adams. Moreover, his undisclosed statement
that Trackling admitted to committing the
North Roman Street murders with Donielle
Bannister and Robert Home is contradicted
by his own post-conviction testimony that
Trackling told him he committed the
murders with Bannister and Romalice
McGee. It is also contradicted by the other
undisclosed evidence of which the petitioner
complains-Trackling's own statements to
Adams and Ronquillo denying his
involvement in the North Roman Street
murders. His statement regarding Romalice
McGee's involvement was rebutted by
Detective
Ronquillo's
post-conviction
testimony that Larry Boatner was shown a
. lineup containing McGee's picture and was
unable to identify him as one of the
perpetrators.
Rogers' statement that "Short Dog" was
Robert Home is contradicted by Trackling's
identification of the petitioner as "Short
Dog" as well as by the testimony of the
petitioner's own sister, Trenieze Smith, at
his related trial in the Morrison Road case,
in which she aclmowledged that she thought
her brother went by the niclmame "Short
Dog." At the post-conviction hearing, she
similarly testified that the petitioner was
lmown as "Shorty." FUlihermore, Rogers'
post-conviction testimony that he in fact
never received the sentence reduction that
Adams allegedly offered him in return for
implicating the petitioner contradicts his
unsupported allegation that Adams had
coaxed him to do so,. Finally, under
Louisiana evidence rules, Rogers' testimony
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would have been subj ect to impeachment
through his conviction for second-degree
murder, further damaging his credibility.
Accordingly, Rogers' inconsistent and
. controverted statements . . . would carry
little evidentiary weight and the petitioner
cannot therefore show that the trial jury
would have been. unreasonable in
discrediting his testimony in· light of the
countervailing evidence.
As to Detective Adams' intei'view with
Trackling, the petitioner fails to demonstrate
that its substance is favorable to his defense.
Indeed, disclosure of that statement would
have only provided additional evidence
implicating the petitioner in the North
Roman Street murders by introducing
another photographic identification and
.corroboration that his nickname was "Short
Dog." Coupled with Eric Rogers' statement
that "Short Dog" was involved in the North
Roman Street murders, the effect would be
highly prejudicial at trial. That Trackling
was not· questioned by Detective Adams
about the North Roman Street murders
. during his June 1, 1995, interview means
nothing; as the interview was explicitly
concerned with his role in the Morrison
Road case, it is not surprising that Adams
did not delve into ancillary investigations.
Even if the petitioner's allegation of an
undisclosed second interview between
Adams and Trackling, in which Trackling
denied his involvement in the North Roman
Street murders, were substantiated, that
information would be merely cumulative of
Trackling's interview with DeteCtive
Ronquillo, during which he denied the same.
.The petitioner further fails to show how
Trackling's undisclosed interview with
Detective Ronquillo, in which he denied his
involvement in the North Roman Street
murders, would have exculpated him in the
same crime. The only evidence that the

petitioner .advances in support of his
argument is the fact that Trackling's time
card showed that he was not at work, as he
had told Ronquillo he was, at the time of the
murders. However, Ronquillo testified that
he found Trackling's denial credible because
he had already confessed to being involved
in the Morrison Road murder and Ronquillo
"[didn't] see why he would confess to one
murder and not the other." Moreover, the
effect of disclosing Trackling's possible
involvement to the jury would have been
soundly rebutted by Ronquillo'S testimony
that Larry Boatner was shown photographic
lineups including Trackling's picture and
. was unable to identify him as a perpetrator.
The petitioner acknowledges that much, but
still claims that police concealed the
evidence of his supposed confession.
However, as noted, the only evidence of
Trackling's supposed involvement comes
from the mouth of a convicted murderer
who's credibility is undermined by the very
evidence the petitioner complains was not
disclosed to him. That evidence also reflects
Trackling's implication of the petitioner in
the murders by his nickname. Therefore, the
petitioner's own argument defeats itself.
In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that
the undisclosed evidence was somehow
sufficient to convince the jury of Trackling' s
involvement in the North Roman Street
murders, this would still not constitute
material or even favorable evidence entitling
the petitioner to habeas relief. As is by now
surV1VIng
well
documented,
both
eyewitnesses-Reba Espadron and Larry
Boatner-testified that three to four subjects·
participated in the home invasion and
killings, including the petitioner and likely
Phillip Young. As noted, Shelita Russell
also indicated that more than one subject
entered the house, and Dale Mims likewise
testified that he observed four men flee the
scene after the shootings. Trackling's own
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alleged confession indicates that he
committed the murders with two other
people-Donielle 'Bannister and "Short
Dog," i.e. the petitioner. Thus, the evidence
establishing Trackling's involvement in the
crime would do nothing to negate the
petitioner's own involvement; it would
merely add another name to the indictment.
The petitioner therefore cannot demonstrate
that the jury would have been unreasonable

in finding the evidence of his guilt sufficient
'
'
nonetheless.

***
CONCLUSION
F or the foregoing reasons, the petition for
writ of certiorari should be denied.
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"Brady and the New Orleans DA: Another Look"
SCOTUSblog
June 13,2011
Lyle Denniston

Just weeks after the Supreme Court divided
deeply over the tactics of prosecutors in
New Orleans, the Justices on Monday
decided to take another look, adding a new
case claiming repeated violations of those
prosecutors' duty to share information that
would help defense lawyers.
Public
defender lawyers, in the new case, aimed
strong complaints at the District Attorney's
office in Orleans Parish, contending that it
has "a well-documented history of hiding ..
. from defense counsel" evidence of
potential aid to the defense. That office, they
contended, has not taken seriously prior
orders from the Supreme Court to change its
ways.
It may not be a coincidence. that the new
case, Smith v. Louisiana (docket 10-8145),
has been developing at the Court even as the
Justices were working on the case of
Connick v. Thompson (09-571), the case
decided· on a 5-4 split on March 29,
absolving the New Orleans DA of
complaints for failing to train prosecutors
about their obligations under the Court's
1963 precedent in Brady v. Maryland. In
Brady, the Court decided that it was
unconstitutional for prosecutors to suppress
an accomplice's confession. It established
the basic obligation of prosecutors to share
with defense counsel any "exculpatory"
(that is, favorable) evidence, if that evidence
bore on guilt or innocence.

Brady violations were also directly at issue
in the Connick v. Thompson case. Last year,
as the Court initially pondered that case, it
sought a closer look, asking for the record of
lower court proceedings; Not long after· that

file reached the Court in February of last
year, the Justices granted review, on the sole
question of whether· a "single Brady
violation" would justify a finding that the
DA's office had improperly failed to train its
line prosecutors. Ultimately, the Court said
no, but the dissenting Justices protested that
there was far more than a single violation in
the prosecution of John Thompson.
The Connick case was argued last October,
and intemal discussions began. In
December, the case of Smith v. Louisiana,
involving Juan Smith was filed at the Court.
After the state urged the Court not to hear
that case, the Justices then called for a
response by the· state. That request was
issued in February of this year, while draft
opinions were still circulating in Connick v.
Thompson,' that case was then decided near
the end of March, and nine days later the
Justices sought the lower court record in
Smith-an indication that they were then
examining it as a potential sequel to
Connick. Nothing further was done with the
case until Monday, with the grant.
In a ,lengthy footnote in the petition in the
Smith case, his lawyers ticked off a list of
cases which, they asserted, showed that "the
history of the Orleans Parish District
Attomey's Brady violations began before
and continued after Mr. Smith's tria1." One
of the cases cited in that footnote was the
case of John Thompson. That footnote also
noted that, in the 1995 case of Kyles v.
Whitley, the Supreme Court had overtumed
a conviction "because of the extent of the
Brady violations by the Orleans Parish
District Attorney's Office."
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Smith's petition also noted that, since 1981,
there have been seven cases in which
Louisiana death-row inmates have been
exonerated, and four of the seven had been
prosecuted in Orleans Parish "and all four of
these cases . . . involved serious Brady
violations."

mandates reversal." None of the claimed
violations of prosecutors' legal duties, the
brief in opposition argued, involved
"material" evidence and none of it would
have changed the outcome of the case:
Smith's convictions on multiple murder
charges.

The Thompson and Kyles cases were among
the four. "Rather than heeding this Court's
directive in Kyles, the Orleans Parish DA's
office continued its pattern of deceit by
concealing material, exculpatory evidence
from the defense in the instant case," the
petition added.

Smith's conviction of five murders in New
Orleans in 1995 led to a sentence of life in
prison without a chance for parole. That is
the conviction directly at issue in the new
petition. The results of that trial were used
as a factor in a second trial, for four other
murders in New Orleans, also in 1995, and
Smith was sentenced to death after
conviction in that proceeding. In the earlier
proceeding, the petition argued, prosecutors
repeatedly withheld evidence from the
defense-including a jailhouse confession
by another man.

Urging the COUli to deny review, lawyers
for the DA's office said the complaints of
Juan Smith's lawyers "are unsubstantiated,"
adding that "the mere aggregation· of
individually meritless suggestions cannot
prove ... a cognizable violation" of Brady, or
of two other precedents cited· by Smith's
counsel: Napue v. Illinois in 1959 and Giglio
v. US. in 1972 (two other cases involving
misconduct by prosecutors-withholding
knowledge of false testimony in Napue,
failing to disclose a promise of nonprosecution of a co-conspirator in return for
his trial testimony in Giglio).
Smith's lawyers, the prosecutors contended,
were trying to bolster their case by
proposing "that any conviction out of the
Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office

Smith's petition for review in the Supreme
Court raised two issues: whether the
"cumulative effect" of the alleged violations.
by prosecutors would have changed the
verdict against him, and whether state courts
in Louisiana have violated Smith's due
process rights in rejecting his .prosecutorial
misconduct claims. The case will be heard
and argued in the Court's next Term,
starting Oct. 3.

***
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"u.s. Justices Weigh Another Case Involving Claims
of Prosecutorial Misconduct in New Orleans"
New Orleans Times Picayune

June 16,2011
John Simermn
The U.S. Supreme Court will take a look at
yet another case in which Orleans Parish
prosecutors are accused of withholding key
evidence to win a murder conviction.

prosecutors admittedly hiding blood
evidence favorable to Thompson in an
armed robbery case before his 1984 trial for
the murder of hotel executive Ray Liuzza.

The high court this week agreed to hear the
case of Juan Smith, who was convicted by
District Attorney Harry Connick's office on
five counts of first-degree murder in a 1995
rampage inside a home on North Roman
Street.

The Supreme Court majority found that
Thompson needed to show a pattern of
prosecutors ignoring or thumbing their noses
at Brady requirements, but failed to do so.
The dissent was caustic, with Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg calling the failures by
prosecutors in the Thompson case "neither
isolated nor atypical" of the office at the
time of Thompson's trial.

Evidence from the allegedly tainted trial also
helped prosecutors convict Smith in a
separate trio of murders a month earlier,
including the killing .of former Saints
football player Bennie Thompson's ex-wife
and child. That case landed Smith on death
row.
Gary Clements, director of the Capital PostConviction Project of Louisiana, which will
represent Smith at oral arguments expected
this fall, said the court this session has
accepted only one in 1,100 similar appeals
by indigent criminal defendants.
It's the second recent case the Supreme
Court has taken up in which Orleans Parish
prosecutors were accused of violating a
requirement under Brady v. Maryland to
give the defense ali exculpatory evidence.
In an ideologically divided, 5-4 opinion in
March, the court sided with the city,
rejecting a $14 million judgment for former
death row inmate John Thompson. The issue
in the that case was not whether the DA's
office could be held liable for a few

"Something's going on there," said
Clements of the Supreme Court's renewed
interest with the Smith case. "What makes it
stand out is they are looking at the
allegations that we have made that the
Orleans Parish District Attorney's Office
has once again failed to turn over important
evidence that supports the defendant."
In its appeal, the capital defense group
counts seven death penalty convictions
overturned in Louisiana for Brady violations
since 1981-four of them in Orleans Parish.
Clements said all four took place during the
tenure of Connick, who retired in 2003.
Clements said attorneys for Smith found the
exculpatory evidence in investigative
updates that they received a few years ago.
According to the petition, several witnesses
in the quintuple murder told police the
killers wore masks that made their identities
indiscernible, and one Orleans Parish inmate
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told police another man had confessed he
was at the murder scene and that Smith was
not there.

new claims. We believe we will be able to
effectively defend the conduct of Mr.
Connick's office in due course."

The same year of Smith's arrest, the
Supreme Court scolded Connick's office for
threatening to drag the justice system to "a
gladiatorial level" by suppressing evidence.

Smith was arrested. five months after three
gunmen entered the home on the 2200 block
of North Roman Street, ordered six people
to lie on the floor and shot five dead in the
bloodiest crime in New Orleans that year.

"This is another example of our office being
called on to defend prosecutions that
occurred decades ago," said Christopher
Bowman, an assistant district attorney and
spokesman for DA Leon Cannizzaro.
"However, every court that has reviewed
(Smith's) claims has summarily denied
them. We don't believe .(he) is making any

A month earlier, Bennie Thompson's. 3year-old child, his ex-wife Tangie
Thompson and her boyfriend, Andre White,
were killed in their residence on MOlTison
Road. Smith's appeal on that conviction is
on hold pending resolution of the North
Roman Street case.
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Maples v. Thomas
10-63
Ruling Below: Maples v. Allen, 586 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 1718
(U.S. 2011).

In 1999, Cory Maples was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. Maples appealed
to both the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme Court and both courts
affirmed his conviction. Subsequently, Maples filed for post-conviction relief alleging numerous
instances of ineffective assistance on the part of his trial counsel. The trial court ordered
Maples's petition dismissed and sent notice to Maples's new counsel, two attorneys with the
New York City law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell along with Maples's local counsel in Alabama.
Maples's local counsel took no action. The attorneys from Sullivan & Cromwell had left the firm
by the time the dismissal order was issued. The firm's mail room returned the notice to the
Alabama circuit court clerk unopened. The deadline for appealing the dismissal of the petition
for post-conviction relief passed and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals denied Maples an
out-of-time appeal. Maples then filed a federal habeas petition that was denied in the district
court. The district court held that Maples's ineffective-assistance claims were procedurally
defaulted because he failed to file a timely appeal to the dismissal of his motion for postconviction relief and even if such a default were the result of ineffective assistance, such
ineffectiveness could not establish a cause for default as there is no constitutional right to postconviction counsel. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Question Presented: Whether the Eleventh Circuit properly held that there was no "cause" to
excuse any procedural default where petitioner was blameless forthe default, the state's own
conduct contributed to the default, and petitioner's attorneys of record were no longer
.functioning as his agents at the time of any default.
Cory R. MAPLES, Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
Richard F. ALLEN, Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.

United States Court of Appeals for theEleventh Circuit
October 26, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
PER CURIAM:
Cory Maples appeals from the district
court's· denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2254. The district court granted Maples a

certificate of appealability ("COA") on the
issue of whether Maples's ineffectiveassistance claims are procedurally barred.
This Court expanded the COA to include
Maples's claim that the jury instructions
were constitutionally deficient. After review
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and oral argument, we affirm.

1. BACKGROUND
Maples was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death for killing two
companions, Stacy Alan Terry and Barry
Dewayne Robinson II, after an evening of
drinking, playing pool, and riding around in
Terry's car. When the men arrived at
Maples's house, Maples went inside and got
a .22 caliber rifle. Maples then shot each
man twice in the head in an execution-style
killing. See Maples v. State, 758 So.2d 1,
14-15 (Ala.Crim.App.1999). Maples fled in
Terry's car.
Maples signed a confession, stating that he:
(1) shot both victims around midnight; (2)
had drunk six or seven beers by about 8
p.m., but "didn't feel very drunk"; and (3) .
did not know why he decided to kill the two
men. Faced with this confession, Maples's
trial attorneys argued that Maples was guilty
of murder, but not capital murder. Under
Alabama law, capital murder involves, inter
alia, (1) murder during a robbery, or (2) the
murder of two persons by one act or
pursuant to one scheme or course of
conduct. The trial judge instructed the jury
on capital murder, robbery, and the lesser
included charges of murder (a non-capital
crime) and first-degree theft of property.
Both the capital murder and the lesser
included murder charges required that the
jury find that Maples had the intention to
cause the death of a person. The jury
convicted Maples of capital murder.
On direct appeal, the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals and the Alabama Supreme
Court affirmed Maples's conviction and
death sentence. Ex parte Maples, 758 So.2d
81 (Ala.1999); Maples v. State, 758 So.2d 1
(Ala.Crim.App.1999). On direct appeal,
Maples argued that the jury instructions

violated due process because the trial court
failed to include, sua sponte, an instruction
on the lesser included, non-capital offense of
manslaughter due to voluntary intoxication.
This claim forms part of the basis of the
current' appeal.
Maples subsequently filed a petition for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Alabama
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, claiming,
inter alia, .that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate or present evidence
of: (1) Maples's mental health history; (2)
his intoxication at the time of the crime; and
(3) his alcohol and drug history. Maples's
Rule 32 petition claimed the jury
instructions violated due process by not
including the lesser offense of manslaughter
due to voluntary intoxication. The State of
Alabama moved the state trial court (what
Alabama calls the circuit court) to dismiss
Maples's Rule 32 petition, and that motion
was denied. Seventeen months later, the trial
court issued an order (the "Rule 32 Order")
dismissing Maples's Rule 32 petition. The
trial court dismissed some claims for failure
to state a claim, and found other claims
procedurally batTed because they could have
been raised at trial or on direct appeal but
were not.
The Alabama trial court clerk sent copies of
the Rule 32 Order, filed on May 22, 2003,
to: (1) Maples's two attorneys (Jaasi
Munanka and Clara Ingen-Housz) with the
law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell in New
York, who were attorneys of record and had
performed all of the substantive work on
Maples's Rule 32 case; and (2) Maples's
local counsel (John G. Butler, Jr.) in
Alabama. No one disputes that both Butler
and Sullivan & Cromwell received copies of
the Rule 32 Order dismissing Maples's
petition.
Neither

Maples

nor

any of his three
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attorneys filed a notice of appeal from the
dismissal of Maples's Rule 32 petition
within the 42 days required by Alabama
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1). Butler
took no action whatsoever after receiving
the Rule 32 Order. Sullivan & Cromwell
received the Rule 32 Order but instead of
opening the envelope that contained it, the
firm returned. it to the Alabama circuit court
clerk.
By the time the trial court dismissed
Maples's Rule 32 petition, attorneys
Munanka and Ingen-Housz had left Sullivan
& Cromwell. As Maples's Sullivan &
Cromwell attorney acknowledged at oral
argument, arrangements had been made
within the firm for other attorneys at
Sullivan & Cromwell to· take over
representation of Maples. However, none of
Maples's attorneys filed anything with the
Alabama trial court reflecting this change.
The State's attorney (Jon Hayden) wrote
Maples a letter, dated August 13, 2003,
informing him that although his deadline for
appealing the dismissal of his Rule 32
petition had passed, Maples still had four
weeks to file a federal habeas petition.
Hayden gave Maples the address to file a .
federal habeas petition and informed him
how to seek new counsel if he wished.
Thereafter, Maples's mother contacted
Sullivan & Cromwell. On Maples's behalf,
new attorneys from the Sullivan &
Cromwell firm requested that the Alabama
trial court re-issue its Rule 32 Order so that
he might file a timely appeal. The trial court
refused, stating in an order that it was
"unwilling to enter into subterfuge in order
to gloss over mistakes made by counsel for
[Maples]." Ex parte Maples, 885 So.2d 845,
847 (Ala.Crim.App.2004) (quoting trial
court order).

Maples, through counsel Sullivan &
Cromwell, then petitioned the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of
mandamus directing that he be granted an
out-of-time appeal. That court denied his
petition, finding that the circuit court clerk
had propedy served Maples's attorneys of
record at their listed addresses with the Rule
32 Order and the attorneys had failed to act.
Thus, an out-of-time appeal was not
warranted. The Alabama Supreme Court
also denied Maples's petition for a writ of
mandamus requesting an out-of-time appeal
of the Rule 32 dismissal. The United States
Supreme Court denied Maples's subsequent
celiiorari petition.
In the meantime, Maples, again through
.counsel Sullivan & Cromwell, had filed the
federal habeas petition at issue here alleging,
inter alia, the same ineffective~assistance
claims asserted in his Rule 32 petition and
the same jury-instruction claim asserted in
his direct appeal. The, district court stayed
the § 2254 petition while Maples's state
court petition seeking an out-of-time appeal
of the Rule 32 Order was pending.
After the state appellate courts denied
Maples's requests for an out-of-time appeal
in his Rule 32 case, the district court denied
Maples's § 2254 petition. The district court
concluded that: (1) Maples's ineffectiveassistance
claims
were
procedurally·
defaulted because Maples did not timely file
an appeal of the dismissal of his Rule 32
petition; (2) even if Maples's default were
the result of his three post-conviction
counsel's failing to file a Rule 32 appeal,
such ineffectiveness could not establish
cause for the default because there is no
constitutional right to post-conviction
counsel; and (3) the Alabama appellate
courts' decisions that Maples was not
entitled to a sua sponte jury instruction on
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manslaughter due to voluntary intoxication
was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal
law. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When examining a district court's denial of
a § 2254 petition, we review the district
court's factual findings for clear error arid its
legal determinations de novo." We review
de novo the district court's determination
that a claim has been procedurally defaulted.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), governs
Maples's § 2254 petition and appeal.
AEDPA "greatly circumscribes federal comi
review of state court decisions" and
"establishes a general framework of
substantial deference for reVIewmg every
issue that the state comis have decided."
According to § 2254, as amended by
AEDP A, a federal court shall not grant a
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state
pnsoner
with respect to any claim that was
. adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings
unless
the
adjudication of the claim(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly
as
established
Federal
law,
determined by the Supreme Comi of
the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was
based
on
an
unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State
court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

III. DISCUSSION
A. Procedural Bar

The first issue is whether Maples's
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims
are procedurally barred from federal habeas
review.
Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in
federal comi, a petitioner must exhaust all
state comi remedies that are available for
challenging his state conviction. To exha~st
state remedies, the petitioner must "fairly
pl'esent[ ]" every issue raised in his federal
petition to the state's highest court, either on
direct appeal or on collateral review. Thus,
to properly exhaust a claim, "state prisoners
must give the state courts one full
opportunity to resolve any constitutional
issues by invoking one complete round of
the State.' s established appellate review
;process. "
Maples's ineffective~assistance claims were
first presented to the state trial court in
Maples's Rule 32 petition. It is undisputed
that Maples never appealed that court's
dismissal of his Rule 32 claims. Thus,
Maples did not properly exhaust those
claims in state court. And because any
further attempts by Maples to exhaust those
claims in state court would be futile,
Claims
are
Maples's
unexhausted
procedurally defaulted.
We know that Maples's further attempts at
exhaustion would be futile because the
Alabama courts' already have denied
Maples's requests for an out-of-time Rule 32
appeal. So Maples has procedurally
defaulted his ineffective-assistance claims
for this reason.
Maples urges this Comi to overlook his
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procedural default, claiming the Alabama
courts have not' regularly enforced
Alabama's time limits for appeals, although
they obviously did so in Maples's case. For
a state procedural ruling to preclude federal
habeas review of Maples's ineffectiveassistance claims, the state court's ruling
must rest upon an "independent" and
"adequate" state-law ground.
Here, it is undisputed that (1) the last state
court's judgment was based on a procedural
bar to state review and not the merits of the
claim, and (2) that state law ground was
independent of the federal question. More
specifically, under Alabama law, Maples
had 42 days to file a notice of appeal of the
. Rule 32 Order but did not do so .. And the
Alabama appellate court denied Maples's
request for an out-of-time appeal under state
law and undisputedly did not consider the
merits of his Rule 32 claims. Thus, the only
question in this case is whether Alabama's
procedural bar provides an "adequate" state
ground for denying relief.
"[T]he adequacy of state procedural bars" is
not a matter of state law, but "is itself a
federal question." To constitute an adequate
state ground, the state procedural rule "must
not be applied in an arbitrary or
unprecedented fashion," but must be
"sufficiently firmly established and regularly
followed" to warrant a procedural default. In
determining whether a state procedural rule
is firmly established and regularly followed,
courts consider whether the state has put
litigants on notice of the rule and whether
the state has a legitimate state interest in the
rule's enforcement. Further, while "regularly
followed" means "closely hewn to," it does
not mean complete unanimity or absolute
consistency of state decisions applying the
rule.
Here, the district court properly concluded

that Alabama's 42-day and out-of-time
appeal rules were firmly established and
regularly followed by the Alabama courts
and were not applied in an unprecedented or
arbitrary fashion in Maples's case. Maples
was on notice of the rules and the state has
an undoubted legitimate state interest in its
time deadlines for appeals for finality
purposes. Further, Alabama courts routinely
have enforced the 42-day rule and denied
out-of-time appeals.
Alabama has granted out-of-time appeals in
only three limited circumstances: (1)
prisoners proceeding pro se who were not
served with copies of the relevant orders
within the 42-day period; (2) qirect criminal
appeals where the defendant requested
counsel to appeal but no appeal was filed,
given that a defendant has a constitutional
right to counsel; and (3) the trial court,
acting through its clerk, assumed a duty to
personally serve or notify a. patty who was
represented by counsel in Rule 32
proceedings, but then negligently failed to
do so, resulting in an out-of-time appeal.
None of these three exceptions apply here.
First, Maples never filed any pleadings pro
se or otherwise appeared pro se but had
three counsel who were served with the Rule
32 Order. Second, Maples's case was not a
. direct criminal appeal; but an appeal from a
collateral Rule 32 dismissal, where Maples
has no constitutional right to counsel.
Indeed, Maples does not rely on these two
exceptions.
Rather, Maples relies on the third exception,
arguing primarily that his case is like
Marshall, where the Alabama courts granted
an out-of-time appeal. However, Maples's
case is wholly different from Marshall. The
petitioner Marshall filed a notice of appeal
that was dismissed as untimely. Marshall 1,
884 So.2d at 898. Marshall filed a second
Rule 32 petition seeking an out-of-time
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appeal for his first Rule 32 petition. 9 The
Alabama appellate courts in Marshall
appeared to find that the state circuit court
clerk assumed a duty to serve Marshall
personally in prison, even though he had
counsel at some point, because Marshall had
filed "numerous pro se motions and
pleadings throughout this matter" in the
circuit court and had "request[ed]
information on the status of his first Rule 32
petition." The out-of-time appeal in
Marshall was granted only because the "the
court assumed a duty of notification it did
not otherwise owe the petitioner and then
failed to perform that duty."
The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that
the remedy for breach of the clerk's duty to
. notify was issuance of a writ of mandamus
to the clerk directing reinstatement of
Marshall's untimely appeal to the docket,
and not the grant of Marshall's second Rule
32 petition. The Alabama Supreme Court's
decision that Marshall was entitled to an
out-of-time appeal expressly relied on
Johnson's and Weeks's assumption-of-duty
rule.
In contrast to Marshall, Maples never filed
any pleadings pro se but had three attorneys
to whom the clerk sent notice. Maples relied
exclusively on his counsel and made no
attempt to deal directly with the state trial
court or its clerk, or to keep himself apprised
directly of the developments in his case.
. Maples never requested the clerk to give
him personal notice in addition to his
counsel. There is no basis here upon which
9 In Marshall, the petitioner's counseled Rule 32
petition was denied in June 2000. Marshall's
November 2000 notice of appeal was dismissed as
untimely. Marshall filed a second Rule 32 petition,
claiming he personally never received notice of the
denial of his first Rule 32 petition and was due an
out-of-time appeal because the trial court did not
send him pei'sonally a copy of the denial order in the
first Rule 32 case.

to infer that the trial court clerk was
negligent or that the clerk even knew Maples
wanted to be personally informed of the
court's orders, much less that it assumed a
duty to notify Maples personally in prison.
Indeed, in Maples's case, the Alabama
appellate court itself expressly distinguished
Marshall when it denied Maples's request
for an out-of-time appeal. Maples, 885
So.2d at 848-50. Simply put, Marshall does
not convince us that Alabama appellate
cOUlis ignore the state's procedural rules for
appeals or fail to apply them regularly.
Maples can point to no Alabama case where
an out-of-time appeal has been granted in
circumstances such as his case.
For all of these reasons, we conclude that it
was neither arbitrary nor inconsistent for the
Alabama courts to enforce its 42 day rule for
appeals and deny Maples's request for an
out-of-time appeal, and that Alabama's
appeal rules are adequate, independent state
law procedural rules barring Maples's
ineffective-assistance claims from federal
habeas review.
B. Cause and Prejudice
Procedural Default

to

Excuse

Notwithstanding that a claim has been
procedurally defaulted, a federal cOUli may
still consider the claim' if a state habeas
petitioner can show either (1) cause for and
actual prejudice from the default; or (2) a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. Maples
argues that, even if they are procedurally
defaulted, his ineffective-assistance claims
should be heard by the federal court because
he has demonstrated cause for and prejudice
from the default. Cause is established if
"some objective' factor external to the
defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply
with the State's procedural rule." "Such
external impediments include evidence that
could not reasonably have been discovered
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in time to comply with the rule; interference
by state officials that made compliance
impossible; and ineffective assistance of
counsel at a stage where the petitioner had a
right to counsel."
Here, the factor that resulted in Maples's
default-namely, counsel's failure to file a
timely notice of appeal of the Rule 32
Order-cannot establish cause for his default
because there is no right to post-conviction
counsel.
C. Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement
and Estoppel as to the Procedural Bar

Maples's remaining arguments are based on
a footnote in the State's brief to the Alabama
Supreme Court opposing Maples's request
for an out-of-time appeal of the Rule 32
Order. In the Alabama Supreme Court,
Maples's brief asserted that "Maples may
very well be· executed despite valid postconviction claims merely because he was
denied the opportunity to timely appeal the
dismissal of his Rule 32 Petition." A
footnote in the State's response brief said
that "Maples has filed a petition for [a] writ
of habeas corpus in federal court . . . [and]
may still present his postconviction claims
to that. court.~' Maples argues that this
statement in the State's footnote (1) is a
waiver of the exhaustion requirement or (2)
judicially estops the State· from arguing that
his
ineffective-assistance
claims
are
procedurally barred..

bar unless the State's footnote can be
considered an express waiver.
This Court has found express waivers under
§ 2254(b)(3) only where the State has
provided an explicit statement during federal
habeas proceedings that it is waiving a
petitioner's procedural default.
Here, the State's footnote statement to the
Alabama Supreme Court is not an "express
waiver." Merely observing to a state court
that a: petitioner may present his claims in
· federal habeas proceedings does not imply
that the federal court would reach the merits
of these claims. And observing. that a
petitioner may present his claims in federal
court, without explicitly· stating that the
State was Walvmg the
exhaustion
requirement, cannot satisfy § 2254(b)(3)'s
mandate that the State "expressly waive[ ]
the requirement." Because the State did not
expressly waive the exhaustion requirement
or the procedural bar, it cannot be deemed to
have waived those defenses nor can it be
estopped from asserting them now.
D. Jury-Instruction Claims

***
IV. CONCLUSION
We affirm the distric.t court's denial of
· Maples's § 2254 petition.
AFFIRMED.

Maples's arguments fail. Section 2254(b)(3)
provides that "[a] State shall not be deemed
. to have waived the exhaustion re'quirement
or be estopped from reliance upon the
requirement unless the State, through
counsel, expressly waives the requirement."
Thus, we cannot find either waiver of
exhaustion or estoppel as to the procedural

BARKETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
· I cannot agree that Maples's ineffective
of
counsel
claims
are
assistance
procedurally barred. As such, the claims
should be reviewed on the merits. As the
majority opinion explains in detail, a
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petitioner's habeas claims are procedurally
defaulted-and therefore rendered unavailable
for review by this court-when, inter alia, the
state rule on which the default is based is
"adequate and independent." However,
Alabama's law on out-of-time appeals,
which forms the basis of Maples's claim in
this case, is not "adequate" pursuant to the
Supreme Court's definition of that term.
Maples therefore has not procedurally
defaulted. Accordingly, there is no
procedural bar to the consideration of the
ineffective assistance of counsel claims that
. Maples attempts to bring before this· couti.
The Supreme Court defines an "adequate
and independent" state court decision as one
"[which] rests on a state law ground that is
independent of the federal question and
adequate to support the judgment." To be
considered "adequate" by a federal court,
the state procedural rule must be both
"firmly established and regularly followed."
In other words, the rule must be "clear [and]
closely hewn to" by the state for a federal
. court to find it to be adequate. The
"adequacy" requirement thus means that the
procedural rule "must not be applied in an
arbitrary or unprecedented fashion." If the
rule is not firmly established, or if it is
applied in an arbitrary or unprecedented
fashion, then it is not adequate to preclude
federal review. In this case, the rule used to
procedurally bar review in the state court
was not firmly established or, if interpreted
as firmly established, was applied to Maples
in an unprecedented and arbitrary fashion.
As demonstrated by Marshall v. State, 884
So.2d 898, 899 (Ala.Crim.App.2002),
overruled on other grounds, 884 So.2d 900
(Ala.2003),1 the rule which the majority
1 The Alabama Supreme Court held that Marshall
should have petitioned for a writ of mandamus rather
than seeking relief as he did. This procedural change
did not affect Marshall's underlying claims. In any
event, Alabama subsequently amended its rules of

applies is not firmly established and has
been arbitrarily applied to Maples. As in this
case, the defendant in Marshall did not
receive notice when his first Rule 32 petition
for post-conviction relief was denied. His
time to appeal the denial thus lapsed before
he was even aware an order had been
entered. When Marshall was finally notified,
he filed a second Rule 32 petition which
asked the court to permit him to file his
appeal out of time. The Alabama Couti of
Criminal Appeals granted that petition.
The majority finds that Marshall permits an
out-of-time appeal based on failure to notify
the defendant personally only when the
court has assumed a duty to notify the
defendant personally of an order in his case.
Only then would the cOllli's failure to notify
the defendant violate his rights. Applying
. that rule to the issues in Marshall, this
majority concludes that the Marshall couti
allowed Marshall an out-of-time appeal
because the court had assumed a duty to
notify Marshall of its decision after he wrote
to the clerk of courts· inquiring about the
status of his case. The court then allegedly
violated that duty-thereby permitting an
out-of-time appeal-when its clerk failed to
respond.
That may be the rule that Marshall
suggested; but it is not the rule that Marshall
applied. Like Maples, Marshall did not
begin filing his requests with the clerk until
after the order denying his Rule 32 petition
had been decided. As Marshall himself
explained, he made the requests "because he
had no idea that his first· petition had been
dismissed." Again, like Maples, Marshall
was represented by counsel in his Rule 32
proceeding; neither Maples nor Marshall
civil procedure to peJmit Marshall's method of
challenging the denial of his out-of-time appeal of his
Rule 32 petition. This dissent therefore uses the
procedural terminology interchangeably.
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were proceeding pro se. Counsel for both
Marshall and Maples received a copy of the
order denying the their clients' Rule 32.
petitions, and both sets of counsel failed to
timely act on that order. Despite these·
indistinguishable facts, the Marshall court
granted an out-of-time appeal, and the
Maples court did not. The Marshall opinion
thus provides no clear basis for
distinguishing the facts of Marshall's out-oftime appeal from the facts of Maples's out~
of-time appeal. This inconsistency in the
application of Alabama's law on granting
out-of-time appeals renders the rule an
inadequate ground on which to bar federal.
review of Maples' s claims.

Marshall aside, the interests of justice also
require that Maples be permitted review of
his claims when the alleged default of those
claims occurred through no fault of his own.
Rather, any such default is entirely the fault
of his post-conviction counsel, and this court
is allowing him to be put to death because of
that negligence. "[T]he penalty of death is
different in kind from any other punishment
imposed under our system of criminal
justice." Due to this "unique nature of the
death penalty," the. Eighth Amendment
demands "heightened reliability . . . in the
detelmination whether the death penalty is
appropriate in a particular case." As a result,
the Supreme Court has recognized that "in
capital cases, it is constitutionally required
that the sentencing authority have
information sufficient to enable it to
consider the character and individual
circumstances of a defendant prior to the

imposition of a death sentence." If the facts
alleged by Maples to support his claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel are true,
then the jury in this case was left without
sufficient information of Maples's character
and individual circumstances when it
returned a verdict for the death penalty.
Notwithstanding the supposed procedural
bar in. this case, the imposition of the death
penalty and the heightened reliability that it
requires, necessitate federal review of
Maples's ineffective assistance claims.
Ultimately, "[h]abeas corpus is governed .by
equitable principles." Barring federal review
of claims defaulted under state law serves
'the dual principles of comity and federalism,
Nevertheless, in certain cases, like the
present case, those equitable principles
"must yield to the imperative of correcting a
fundamentally unjust [sentence]." Without
review of Maples's claims, we cannot
ascertain the reliability of Maples's death
sentence.
Maples was entitled to an out-of-time appeal
under Alabama precedent established in
Marshall v. State, 884 So.2d 898, 899
(Ala.Crim.App.2002). Because he was
denied that opportunity, the merits of his
claims must be examined by the district
court to determine whether or not his
sentence is reliable. If AEDP A bars review
in
such
circumstances,
then
its
constitutionality would appear questionable
in this regard.
I respectfully dissent.
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"Supreme Court Says No to Campaign Finance
Review, Yes to Death Row Inmate Appeal"
Washington Post
March 22, 2011
Robert Barnes

***

. tried to intervene, but the court said it was
too late.

The court agreed to hear th~ case of an
Alabama death row inmate whose appeal
has been turned .down by lower comis
because ofa paperwork mix-up.

Maples also found no relief from the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 11 th Circuit in
Atlanta. Gregory G. Garre, who was
solicitor general under President George W.
Bush and is now representing Maples,
brought the issue to the Supreme Comi.

Death row case

Cory R. Maples was convicted in 1997 of
killing two men after a night of heavy
drinking and drug use. He filed appeals
alleging that his inexperienced comiappointed attorneys-who during the trial
. warned the jury that it might appear they
were "stumbling around in the dark"-were
negligent.
At one. point in the years of appeals that
followed, Maples was represented by two
lawyers from a New York firm, Sullivan &
Cromwell. But the two left the firm without
telling Maples or the court. And when the
court sent notice of an unfavorable ruling,
someone in the law firm's mailroom
stamped the letters "Return to sender."
The letters went back to the county clerk,
who did nothing with them. It was only after
the 42-day deadline for appeal had passed
that Maples received notice. The law firm

The case, he wrote, "raises the shocking
prospect that a man may be executed
without any federal court review of serious
constitutional claims due to a series of
events for which all agree he was blameless
and notwithstanding the state's own failings
in the purported default."
Garre noted in his petition that in 2006, the
court held in Jones v. Flowers that, when the
loss of a home was at stake, state officials
had to take action when an important notice
was returned unopened.
"It follows that the state may not 'shrug [its]
shoulders ... and say 'I tried' when a man's
life is at stake," Garre wrote.

The case is Maples v. Thomas and will be
argued in the court term that begins in
October.
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"Sullivan & Cromwell's Life-or-Death Mistake?"
Above the Law .
November 2, 2009
Kashmir Hill

.More than a decade ago, Cory Maples of
Alabama murdered two people. After an
evening of heavy drinking, playing pool, and
riding around in a friend's car, Maples killed
two friends, shooting them execution-style.
. According to cOUli documents, he signed a
confession, "stating that he: (1) shot both
victims around midnight; (2) had drunk six
or seven beers by about 8 p.m., but 'didn't
feel very drunk'; and (3) did not lmow why
he decided to kill the two men. Faced with
this confession, Maples's trial attorneys
argued that Maples was guilty of murder,
but not capital murder."
A jury found Maples guilty and sentenced
him to death.
Maples appealed his capital murder
conviction with the help of attorneys at
Sullivan & Cromwell:
Maples subsequently filed a petition for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Alabama
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, claiming,
inter alia, that trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to investigate or present evidence
of: (1) Maples's mental health history; (2)
his intoxication at the time of the crime; and
(3) his alcohol and drug history.
The trial court dismissed Maples' Rule 32
petition, and sent notice of the decision to
the attorneys at Sullivan & Cromwell and to
local Alabama counsel. There was a 42-day
period for filing a notice of appeal, but all
the lawyers involved dropped the ball on the
case, PepsiCo-style.

So what's the explanation· for S&C's
missing the deadline for filing an appeal?
From our tipster:
Basically, Sullivan & Cromwell
forgot to file a notice of appeal for a
death row inmate, causing him to
procedurally
default
all
his
ineffective-assistance claims. Oops!
Here's the explanation, from the Eleventh
Circuit:
The Alabama trial court clerk sent
copies of the Rule 32 Order, filed on
May 22, 2003, to: (1) Maples's two
attorneys (Jaasi Munanka and Clara
Ingen-Housz) with the law firm of
Sullivan & Cromwell in New York,
who were attorneys of record and
had performed all of the substantive
work on Maples's Rule 32 case; and
(2) Maples's local counsel (John G.
Butler, Jr.) in Alabama. No one
disputes that both Butler and
Sullivan & Cromwell received
copies of the Rule 32 Order
dismissing Maples's petition.
Neither Maples nor any of his three
attorneys filed a notice of appeal
from the dismissal of Maples's Rule
32 petition within the 42 days
required by Alabama· Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1). Butler
took no action whatsoever after
receiving the Rule 32 Order. Sullivan
& Cromwell received the Rule 32
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Order but instead of opemng the
envelope that contained it, the firm
returned it to the Alabama circuit
court clerk.

New Sullivan & Cromwell attorneys helped
Maples file his federal habeas petition, but
that petition was denied:
The district court concluded that:

Apparently attorneys Munanka and IngenHousz had left Sullivan & Cromwell.
Although anangements had been made for
new attorneys to take over the pro bono
matter, they had not filed notice of the
change of counsel with the Alabama trial
court.
The state's attorney wrote Maples a letter
letting him know he had missed the deadline
to appeal the Petition's dismissal, but that he
could still file a federal habeas petition.
Thereafter, Maples's mother contacted
Sullivan & Cromwell. On Maples's behalf,
new attorneys from the Sullivan &
Cromwell firm requested that the Alabama
trial court re-issue its Rule 32 Order so that
he might file a timely appeal. The trial court
refused, stating in an order that it was
"unwilling to enter into subterfuge in order
to gloss over mistakes made by counsel for
[Maples]. "

(1) Maples's ineffective-assistance claims
were procedurally defaulted because Maples
did not timely file an appeal of the dismissal
of his Rule 32 petition; (2) even if Maples's
default were the result of his three postconviction counsel's failing to file a Rule 32.
appeal, such ineffectiveness could not
establish cause for the default because there
is no constitutional right to post-conviction
counsel; and (3) the Alabama appellate
courts' decisions that Maples was not
entitled to a sua sponte jury instruction on
manslaughter due to voluntary intoxication
was not contrary to, or an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal
law.

The decision was affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit in a per curiam opinion. Cory
Maples remains on death row.

179

"Alabama Plans Death Penalty Despite
Paperwork Mix-Up"
The Guardian

January 8, 2010
Ed Pilkington
A death row prisoner in Alabama has had a
final plea against execution turned down by
the federal appeals court on the grounds that
his lawyers failed to meet a 42-day deadline
to file legal paperwork.

. After Maples was sent to death row in 2000
he took on another team of lawyers for postconviction appeals. They found that his
original lawyer had made basic and serious
mistakes.

Cory Maples, 35, may go to his death as a
result of a procedural mistake by his lawyers
of which he had no knowledge or he had no
control.

He had failed to present the jury with
evidence that Maples had been drunk, or that
he had a history of mental illness, suicide
attempts and drug addiction, to such an
extent that he was mentally incapable of
carrying out a premeditated murder and was
thus unfit to face the death penalty.

The case has highlighted inconsistencies in
the application of the death penalty across
America: critics say the system is so skewed
that issues of justice and fairness are
frequently lost ina myopic focus on
bureaucratic rule-keeping.
"We have created an incredibly complex
procedural maze, with the result that we are
risking executing people who should not
have been given a death sentence in the first
place," said Bryan Stevenson, director of the
Alabama-based Equal Justice Initiative, EJI.
The case of Maples began on 7 July 1995
when two friends, Stacy Terry and BatTY
Robinson, went round to his house. Later, as
the men were leaving in their car, Maples
.shot them both twice in the head with his
father's gun. He confessed to the murders,
telling police he had drunk about eight pints
of beer.
At his trial, Maples was found guilty by 10
votes to two and the jury recommended
death. Just one fewer vote against him
would have spared him under Alabama law.

His new lawyers, at a large international
firm called Sullivan & Cromwell, went
before the Alabama courts to argue that
Maples's trial lawyer had mishandled his
defence, but in 2003 a judge rejected the
petition. They then had 42 days to file a
further appeal.
.
Paperwork was mailed from Alabama to
their New York offices, addressed to two
lawyers who had left the company. The
letter was returned unopened to the Alabama
comis and the deadline missed.
.
Sullivan & Cromwell said it could not
comment as the case, which it continues to
work on, is still active. After.prolonged legal
wrangling, the federa1 appeals court has
ruled that because the· deadline was missed,
Maples has lost the right to a final appeal
against being put to death. "Any and all fault
here lies with Maples for not filing a timely
notice of appeal," the ruling says.
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One judge, Rosemary Barkett, dissented
from the ruling, saying "the interests of
justice require that Maples be permitted
review of his claims. This court is allowing
him to be put to death because of the
negligence" of his lawyers.
Death row campaigners say the Maples case
highlights the brutal, legalistic approach to
execution adopted in Alabama and a handful
of other states. Alabama has 200 death row
prisoners, and holds the record in the
country for the number of people sentenced
to death each year in recent times.
Yet it is the only state in America that has
no public defender programme, which
means that people charged with offences
that could lead to the death penalty have no
right to choqse a lawyer for themselves.
Instead, they are handed a lawyer by
Alabama state, some of whom, according to

EJI, have fallen asleep or been drunk during
trials.
At the time Maples went on trial there was a
limit on out-of-court preparation costs for
the state-appointed lawyer, who was given
just $1,000 (£625) to prepare for the case.
"When you pay someone this kind of money
you have every reason to think the lawyer is
not going to do effective work," Stevenson
said.
The result, he added, was that the burden of
responsibility was placed on death row
prisoners themselves-many of whom are
poorly educated or mentally ill-to
negotiate the legal maze.
"The crazy situation is that we execute
someone according to whether documents
were filed on a Thursday or Friday, or if the
Ts were cross and the Is dotted," he said.
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"Pro Bono and Big Law Firms (or Who Exactly Was
CoryMaples's Lawyer?)"
Balkinization
March 23,2011
Jason Mazzone

The Supreme Court has granted review in
Maples v. Allen, a habeas case. Cory Maples
was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death in Alabama. The conviction and
sentence were affirmed on appeal. Maples
thereafter filed a state petition for postconviction relief arguing that his trial lawyer
was constitutionally defective. The state
court hearing that petition denied it. Maples
did not file a timely notice of appeal from
that denial and only found out about the
decision after the time to appeal had passed.
According to the record in the case, the
court clerk had mailed of a copy of the order
denying the petition to Maples's attorneys at
the law firm where, according to the docket
. information, they were employed. Those
lawyers, however, had since left the firm
(without updating their contact information
with· the court) and so the mail room
receiving the court's mailing sent it back to
the court. The court clerk made no
additional effort to locate Maples's
attorneys. The clock ticked. Maples's time
to appeal ran out. After Maples eventually
became aware of the denial of his original
petition, he unsuccessfully petitioned the
state appellate court to allow an untimely
appeal. He thereafter filed a federal habeas
. petition, asserting his ineffective assistance
of trial counsel claim. The federal district
court denied the habeas petition on the
ground that the claim was procedurally
defaulted and there was no good cause that
would excuse the default. The 11th Circuit
affirmed the district court.
The case has attracted significant attention
because the lawyers representing Maples in

the post-conviction proceeding, Clara IngenHousz and Jaasi Munanka, were from the
New York office of Sullivan & Cromwell
(S&C); it was the S&C mail room that
returned the trial court's oi'der to the court
after Ingen-Housz and Munanka had left
S&C. Numerous commentators have asked
how it is that S&C dropped the ball, with the
result that Maples· now faces execution
. without any federal review of his ineffect.ive
assistance of counsel claim.
I see some different issues.
First things first: the case isn't important for
the legal questions it raises and it isn't going
to generat~ any new law. Maples is
represented at the Supreme Court by former
Solicitor General Gregory Gane. Maples
asks the Supreme Court for a ruling that the
state timing rule is not consistently applied
and therefore is not adequate to procedurally
bar his habeafi petition. In light of. the
Comt's recent decision in Beard v.' Kindler,
it is very unlikely that the Court will grant
Maples reliefon that basis. Instead, I predict
a "sympathy" per curiam, in which the Court
will squeezes Maples's plight into Holland
v. Florida. and hold that equitable tolling is
appropriate in his case. Maples will end up
with federal review of his ineffective
assistance of counsel claim (which, like
most such claims, will likely fail on the
merits).
The more interesting aspect of the case is
what it tells us about pro bono work at big
law firms.
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Although Ingen-Housz and Munanka were
attorneys at S&C at the time they took on
Maples's case, Maples was apparently not
represented by S&C itself. Among the
materials in the record (petition for cert., p.
257a) is an affidavit from an S&C patineI',
Marc De Leeuw, who explains:
Lawyers at S&C handle pro bono
cases on an individual basis.
Accordingly, the lawyers who first
appeared in this case, and all lawyers
who have participated thereafter,
have done so on an individual basis,
and have attempted not to use the
firm name on cOlTespondence or
cOUli papers.

solid. As is true of most pro bono work in
big firms, it is very likely that Ingen-Housz
and Munanka worked on Maples's case in
the office and not at home. They likely used
firm resources (the Westlaw account,
secretarial support and so on). And they
were likely able to count the hours they
worked on the case towards whatever hourly
expectations the film has of its attorneys.
Moreover, S&C (like other big firms)
celiainly gives a public impression that the
firm itself is handling the pro bono cases.
S&C's website says, for example:

In the state cOUli filings, therefore, Maples's
attorneys of record were Ingen-Housz . and
Munanka (not Ingen-Housz and Munanka of
S&C).

S&C consistently ranks among the
leaders of large firms in participation
in pro bono and other public service
activities .... We are proud of our
tradition of public service and of the
quality and quantity of S&C's
diverse pro bono practice.

It isn't hard to think of reasons a big law
firm would, as a legal matter, have pro bono
clients represented by individual attorneys
rather than the firm at large. Individual
representation limits the firm's exposure to
liability; the firm need not hold onto the case
if (as here) the lawyers leave the firm; the
firm need not commit its vast resources to
the case; and if the case comes out badly the
firm can deny responsibility. Indeed, if
Ingen-Housz and Munaka were Maples's
attorneys in an individual capacity, it
becomes hard to fault the S&C mailroom or
S&C itself. After all, nobody at S&C would
have a responsibility (or perhaps even
authority) to open and hand over to another
attorney within the firm a court document
sent to an individual attorney in care of S&C
,concerning a client S&C never represented.

Our lawyers . . . represent pro bono
clients around the country in various
habeas corpus matters, in postconviction death row proceedings
and in federal narcotics prosecutions.
Sullivan & Cromwell's public
service activities are coordinated by
Marcia Levy, Special Counsel for
Pro Bono Initiatives, along with the
Firm's five-patineI' Public Service
Committee. S&C recently created
the position of Special Counsel for
Pro Bono Initiatives to enhance the
Film's deep commitment to pro bono
work and broaden the opportunities
and types cif pro bono m!ltters
. available. In addition, the Firm has
designated a day-to-day coordinator
of pro bono activities.

In practice, however, the wall between
individual attorneys and the firm where they
are ordinarily employed is obviously far less

out
The
coordinators . seek
challenging and rewarding public
service opportunities. The Firm
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creates munerous opportunities for
all lawyers, summer associates and
legal assistants to participate III
public service activities.
Public service matters .are generally
undertaken in one of two ways: as a
result of a referral from a community
organization or at the initiative of the
Firni or individual lawyers. .S&C
encourages lawyers to learn about
and sign up for pro bono matters
Pro
Bono
Net
through
(www.probono.net). In whichever'
way a matter is initiated, a proposed
new matter goes through the Firm's
standard new matter opening
procedures.
These
procedures
include conflict clearance as well as
approval by the Managing Partners
Committee.
All of this suggests to me that pro bono
clients are S&C clients.
More significantly, Maples might well have
believed-and might still believe-he was
represented by S&C. His petition for
celiiorari indicates that after Maples learned
of the missed deadline, his mother called
S&C, which arranged for new lawyers from
the firm to take over the case. The Eleventh
Circuit's opinion refers repeatedly to S&C
as representing Maples. And the Wall Street
Journal says that S&C hired Gregory Garre
to handle the case at the Supreme Court.
This case raises in my mind three basic
questions about big law representation of

pro bono clients. One is whether the clients
know they are represented only by
individual attorneys (and therefore cannot
count on the firm as a whole for resources
and support). A second question is whether
big firms should receive the public credit
they do for pro bono work conducted by
attorneys acting in an individual capacity.
The third question might be the most
important. If lawyers at big firms are
handling pro bono case in an individual (and
not firm) capacity, we might well ask about
the quality of lawyering the pro bono clients,
especially in death penalty cases, are given.
Clara Ingen-Housz and Jaasi Munanka
began representing Cory Maples in
September 2000. Ingen-Housz was trained
as a lawyer in France and she received an
L.LM from Harvard in 1999. Munanka
graduated from the University of Michigan
Law School, also in 1999. Neither of the two
did a clerkship before starting at S&C. In
other words, Maples's life was in the hands
of two lawyers, one educated in France, both
just entering their second year as S&C
associates in New York City. And those two
sophomore lawyers were responsible for
navigating the complexities of Alabama law
and the minefieid of federal law governing
habeas review of state court judgments.
There is no question that a firm like S&C
can handle the complexities and risks of
death penalty litigation. But leaving the task
to two beginners, if that's what big firms are
doing, is surely a bigger sin than any a mail
room employee niight commit.
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Howes v. Fields
10-680
Ruling Below: Fields v. Howes, 617 F.3d 813 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted 131 S. Ct. 1047
(U.S. 2011).

In 2001, Petitioner Randall Fields was serving a 45-day sentence for disorderly conduct in the
Lenawee county j ail when he was taken out of his cell and questioned for several hours about his
relationship with a minor. FIelds was informed he was free to leave at any time during this
session but was not otherwise read his Miranda rights. Statements made by Fields during this
session were used at a subsequent trial, over objection by defense counsel, where Fields was
convicted of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct. The Michigan Court of Appeals
affirmed Fields' conviction, holding that Fields was unquestionably in custody but because he
had been informed he was free to leave and never asked to do so, Miranda wamings were not
required. The Michigan Supreme Court denied Fields permission to appeal that decision and
Fields then filed for habeas relief in federal coUti. The district court conditionally granted Fields'
habeas petition holding the state court umeasonably applied Mathias v. United States resulting in
non-harmless error.
.
Question Presented: Whether this Court's clearly established precedent under 28 U.S.C. § 2254
holds that a prisoner is always "in custody" for purposes of Miranda any time that prisoner is
isolated from the general prison population and questioned about conduct occurring outside the
prison regardless of the surrounding circumstances.
Randall Lee FIELDS, Petitioner-Appellee,
v.
Carol HOWES, Respondent-Appellant.

United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Decided and Field: August 20,2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
DAN AARON POLSTER, District Judge.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Appellant appeals the district court's
conditional grant of the petition of writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The district court found that the Michigan
Court of Appeals umeasonably applied
established federal law in determining that a
confession made by Appellee was properly
admitted into evidence. For the following
reasons, we affirm.

Appellee Randall Lee Fields was
incarcerated at· the Lenawee County
Sheriffs Department for disorderly conduct
on December 23, 2001, when a corrections
officer escorted him from his cell to a locked
conference room in the main area of the
sheriff s department. Fields was not advised
of where he was being taken or for what
purpose. He was wearing an orange
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jumpsuit, but was
otherwise chained.

not handcuffed or

In the conference room, Fields was
questioned by Deputy David Batterson and
Deputy Dale Sharp about his relationship
with Travis Bice, whom Fields had met
when Bice was a minor. The questioning
commenced between 7:00 p.m. and 9:00
p.m. and lasted for approximately seven
hours. Fields was not read his Miranda
rights but was told that if he did not want to
cooperate he was free to leave the
conference room at any time. Leaving the
locked conference room would have taken
nearly twenty minutes, as a corrections
officer would have had to have been
summoned to return Fields to his cell.
Fields did not ask for an attorney or to go
back to his cell. However, he told the
officers more than once that he did riot want
to· speak with them anymore. At one point in
the interview, Fields became angry and
started yelling. Deputy. Batterson testified
that he told Fields he was not going to
tolerate being talked to like that and that
Fields Was welcome to return to his cell.
Additionally, Deputy Sharp testified that
Deputy Batterson told Fields that if he
continued to yell the interview would be
terminated. Fields testified that he was told
to "sit my fucking ass down" and that "if I
didn't want to cooperate, I could leave."
During the interview, Deputy Batterson told
Fields that there had been allegations of a
sexual nature involving Bice. Fields initially
did not acknowledge any sexual relationship
with Bice, but he eventually admitted to
masturbating Bice and engaging in oral sex
with him on at least two occasions. Prior to
trial in the Lenawee County Circuit Court,
the trial judge denied Fields' motion to
suppress these statements. At trial, over the
renewed objection of defense counsel,

Deputy Batterson testified to Fields'
jailhouse admissions. Fields was ultimately
convicted of two counts· of third-degree
.criminal sexual conduct and was sentenced
on December 5, 2002, to a prison term often
to fifteen years.
Fields filed an appeal of right in the
Michigan Court of Appeals on three
grounds. The ground relevant to the instant
appeal asserted that "[t]he trial court
violated Mr. Fields' due process rights by
admitting his alleged custodial statement
where Mr. Fields was in custody in the
county jail and the Lenawee County sheriff
interrogated him for as much as 7 hours
without providing Miranda warnings." The
Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
cOUli, holding that because Fields "was
unquestionably in custody, but on a matter
unrelated to the interrogation" and "was told
that he was free to leave the conference
room and return to his cell ... [but] never
asked to leave . . . Miranda warnings were
not required . . ." People v. Fields, No.
246041,2004 WL 979732, at *2 (Mich.App.
May 6, 2004). The Michigan Supreme Court
denied Fields leave to appeal the Michigan
Court of Appeals' decision. People v.
Fields, 471 Mich. 933, 689 N.W.2d 233
(Mich.2004) (table).
Fields then filed a pro se petition, pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, for a writ of habeas
corpus on the same grounds as his direct
appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals.
The district court conditionally granted
Fields's habeas petition, holding that the
state court unreasonably applied Mathis v.
United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503,20
L.Ed.2d 381 (1968) and that the state court's
error was not harmless. Appellant Carol
Howes,
Warden
of the
Lakeland
Correctional
Facility
in
Coldwater,
Michigan, has appealed the district court's
decision.
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court's grant of a writ of habeas
corpus is reviewed de novo. Findings of fact
are reviewed for clear error unless· the
district court's decision is based on the
transcripts from the petitioner's state court
trial, in which case the findings of fact are
reviewed de novo. Questions of law and
mixed questions of law and fact are also
reviewed de novo.

III. ANALYSIS
Appellant argues that the district court
misinterpreted and erroneously applied 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) by determining that the
state court adjudication was objectively
unreasonable.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), which is part of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), provides that:
(d) An application for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment
of a State court shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings
unless
the
adjudication of the claim(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly
established
Federal
law,
as
determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
The district court made no findings of fact
because the parties agreed there were no
factual disputes. Thus, we are left to
examine, de novo, whether the Michigan
Court of Appeals' decision was contrary to,

or an unreasonable application of, clearly
established federal law.
A state court decision is contrary to clearly
established Jederallaw as determined by the
Supreme Court if: (1) the state court arrives
at a conclusion opposite to that r~ached by
the Supreme Court on a question of law; or
(2) the state court confronts a set of facts
that are materially indistinguishable from a
Supreme Court decision and nevertheless
arrives at a result different from Supreme
Court precedent. A state court unreasonably
applies clearly established federal law if the
state court identifies the correct goveming
legal rule from the Supreme Court's cases
but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the .
state prisoner's case. A state court's
application of federal law must be
"objectively unreasonable" to be an
unreasonable application of federal law
under § 2254(d)(1). Critically, "an
unreasonable application of federal law is
different from an incorrect application of
federal law." Nevertheless, if the Supreme
Court has not "broken sufficient legal
ground to establish [a] . . . constitutional
principle, the lower federal courts cannot
themselves establish such a principle with
clarity sufficiept to satisfy the AEDP A bar"
under either the contrary to or unreasonable
application standard.
The Fifth Amendment provides that no
person ". . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against
himself. . . ." In Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 444-45,86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966), the Supreme Court held that this
privilege against self-incrimination applies
to a criminal suspect subjected to custodial
interrogation. Specifically, statements taken
during a custodial interrogation cannot be
admitted to establish the guilt of the accused
unless the accused was provided a full and
effective waming of his rights at the· outset
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of the interrogation process and knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived his
rights.
Custodial
interrogation
is
"questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way."

Miranda only applies if the suspect was (1)
interrogated while
(2)
in custody.
Interrogation under Miranda is "express
questioning or its functional equivalent" that
law enforcement officers "should know [is]
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response." Appellant does not dispute that .
the two law enforcement officials' seven
hour questioning of Fields constituted an
interrogation. Therefore, we must only
determine whether Fields was in custody for
purposes of Miranda.
"Miranda warnings are required only where
there has been such a restriction on a
person's freedom as to render him 'in
custody. ,,, "Although the circumstances of
each case must certainly influence a
determination of whether a suspect is in
custody for purposes of receiving of
Miranda protection, the ultimate inquiry is
simply whether there is a 'formal arrest or
restraint on freedom of movement' of the
degree associated with a formal arrest."
In Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 88
S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381 (1968), the
Supreme Court held that "nothing in the
Miranda opinion ... calls for a cUliailment of
the warnings to be given persons under
interrogation by officers based on the reason
why the person is in custody." While the
petitioner in Mathis was serving time in a
state prison for an unrelated conviction, an
IRS agent questioned him about tax refunds
he had claimed on his individual income tax
returns. The agent did not read the petitioner
his Miranda' rights prior to obtaining
documents and oral statements subsequently

used to convict the petitioner of two counts
of knowingly filing a false claim. At trial,
the district court denied the petitioner's
attempts to suppress the evidence elicited by
the revenue agent. On appeal, the circuit
court affirmed the district court.
The Supreme COUli reversed the lower
courts, finding that the petitioner was
entitled to receive a Miranda warning prior
to questioning by the govemment agent.
Specifically, the Supreme Court rejected the
respondent's contentions that Miranda did
not apply because: (1) the questions asked
were part of a routine civil, rather than
criminal, tax investigation; and (2) the
petitioner was in jail for a separate offense
than that for which he was being questioned.
The respondent's first contention was
rejected because, as occurred with the
defendant in Mathis, civil tax investigations
frequently lead to criminal prosecutions. In
rejecting the second distinction, the Supreme
Court found that requiring Miranda
warnings only where questioning occurs in
connection with the case for which a suspect
is being held in custody "goes against the
whole purpose of the Miranda decision
which was designed to' give meaningful
protection to Fifth Amendment rights."
The central holding. of Mathis is that a
.Miranda warning is required whenever an
incarcerated individual is isolated from the
general prison population and interrogated,
i.e. questioned in a manner likely to lead to
self-incrimination, about conduct occurring
outside of the prison. In the instant case, the
district cOUli determined that the Michigan
Court of Appeals unreasonably applied
Mathis by concluding that the investigators
need not have provided Miranda warnings
to Fields because the interrogation was
unrelated to the crime for which he was
being held in custody. Though we agree
with the district cOUli's decision, we believe
that the Michigan Court of Appeals'
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· decision was contrary to, as opposed to an
unreasonable application of, Mathis. In its·
opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals
explicitly stated that Fields "was
unquestionably in custody, but on a matter
unrelated to the interrogation," yet still
concluded that Miranda warnings were not
required. People v. Fields, No. 246041,
2004 WL 979732 at *2 (Mich.App. May 6,
2004) (emphasis added). The Michigan
Court of Appeals did not cite Mathis nor any
case relying upon Mathis in its decision.
However, the material facts in this case are
indistinguishable from Mathis. In both
cases, the imprisoned suspect was
interrogated about a matter unrelated to his
offense of incarceration. Yet, while the
Supreme Court in Mathis held that the
suspect was entitled to a Miranda warning
prior to interrogation, the Michigan Court of
Appeals ruled that a Miranda warning was
not required. The Michigan Court of
Appeals therefore arrived at a conclusion
contrary to clearly established federal law.
Appellant contends that federal law does not
necessarily require Miranda warnings any
time an incarcerated individual is questioned
about a subject unrelated to the offense of
incarceration. As there was no Sixth Circuit
decision on point at the time of briefing,
Appellant cites numerous cases from other
Circuits to support its position.
However, these
cases are readily
distinguishable from Mathis and do not
provide persuasive authority to this case,
which may explain why none of them were
cited by the Michigan Court of Appeals.
Four
cases
involved
on-the-scene
questioning by prison officers concerning an
offense committed .in the jail itself. See
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602
("General on-the-scene questioning as to
facts surrounding a crime or other general
questioning of citizens in the fact-finding
process is not affected by our holding").

Five cases involved voluntary confessions
made by individuals who were not
interrogated in isolation.
Because Fields was removed from the
general prison population for interrogation
about an offense unrelated to the one for
which he was incarcerated, Mathis is the
applicable law. None of the cited appellate
cases, all of which Were decided subsequent
to Mathis, erode its essential holding:
Miranda warnings must be administered
when law enforcement officers remove an
inmate from the general prison population
and interrogate him regarding criminal
conduct that took place outside the j ail or
prison.
The Michigan Court of Appeals correctly
determined that Fields was "unquestionably"
in custody and was subject to interrogation.
Fields was taken from his prison cell to a
conference room without explanation. The
conference room was locked. Though told
that he could leave at any time, exiting the
conference room was a lengthy process that
required a corrections officer to be
summoned. Thus, Fields faced the type of
"restraint on freedom of movement"
necessary to be deemed in custody.
Furthermore, Fields was .questioned for
approximately seven hours. The subject of
the questioning was his sexual relationship
with a minor, which was not related to his
offense of incarceration. This was assuredly
an interrogation as it was express
questioning that was reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response.
Despite properly determining that Defendant
was in custody and subject to interrogation,
the Michigan Court of Appeals erroneously
concluded that "there must be some nexus .
between [the elements of custody and
interrogation]· in order for Miranda to
apply." Fields, 2004 WL 979732, at *2. The
Michigan Court of Appeals relied upon
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People v. Honeyman, 215 Mich.App. 687,
546 N.W.2d 719, 723 (1996), which created
the "nexus" test without citation to federal
authority. Fields, 2004 WL 979732, at *2 n.
3. However,· Miranda and its progeny only
require a finding of custodial interrogation;
there is no nexus requirement. Thus, the
MiChigan Court of Appeals erred first by
searching for a nexus between custody and
interrogation and then by finding that,
because Defendant was in custody "on a
matter unrelated to the interrogation,"
Defendant wasn't "in custody for the
purpose of determining whether Miranda
wamings were required." Fields, 2004 WL
979732, at *2.

. Any doubt that Fields was in Miranda
custody is erased by both this Court's recent
decision in Simpson v. Jackson, 615 F.3d
421, No. 08-3224, 2010 WL 2771861 (6th
Cir. July 13,2010), and the Supreme Court's
U.S. opinion in Maryland v. Shatzer, - , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175 L.Ed.2d 1045
. (2010). As an initial matter, it should be
noted that although Simpson was argued
after our case and both opinions were
written concurrently, the Simpson decision
was issued prior to this opinion. We are
therefore bound. by its ruling. Because
Simpson only briefly discussed the Miranda
custodial interrogation issue, we are
including a detailed explanation of our
ruling.
In Simpson, the incarcerated appellant, op
separate occasions, made incriminating
statements to police officers questioning him
about a crime unrelated .to his offense of
incarceration. The appellant was not read his
Miranda rights on either occasion. The
statements were then used as evidence to
support criminal charges against the
appellant. The appellant moved to suppress
these statements at trial, but the state trial
judge denied the motion and admitted his
statements. The appellant was subsequently

convicted. On direct appeal, the Court of
Appeals of Ohio upheld the appellant's'
conviction. The appellant then petitioned for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2254, which was dismissed by the
district court. The appellant appealed the
dismissal to our court. The panel reversed
the district court's dismissal and granted the
appellant's petition, holding that the state
court's decision was contrary to factually
indistinguishable Supreme Court precedent.
Specifically, the panel found "no relevant
factual distinction between Mathis and the
circumstances
of
[the
appellant's
statements]. "
In both our case and Simpson, "as in Mathis,
state agents unaffiliated with the prison
isolated an inmate and questioned him about
an unrelated incident without first giving
Miranda wamings." Moreover, the state
court judges in both cases, without even
citing Mathis, ruled that statements obtained
from such questioning was admissible. And
in both cases, the failure to heed Mathis and
forego the issuance of Miranda wamings
was "improper" and "any resulting
statements [should have been] suppressed"
by the trial court.
In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Supreme Court
found an incarcerated prisoner subjected to
questioning on an unrelated crime to be in
custody for Miranda purposes. The Shatzer
defendant, who was serving a sentence for
an unrelated child-sexual-abuse offense, was
questioned at the correctional institution by
a detective on August 7, 2003, regarding
allegations he had sexually abused his son.
Before any questions were asked, the
defendant was read his Miranda rights.
Mistaking the detective for an attomey, the
defendant waived his rights. However, once
the detective explained he' was there to
question the defendant about the allegations
that he abused his son, the defendant
declined to speak to the detective without an
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attomey present and was released back into
prison
population.
the
general .
Approximately two-and-a-half years later,
on March 2, 2006, a new detective visited
the defendant, who had been transferred to a
different facility, to question him about the
same allegations of abusing his son. The
defendant was read his Miranda rights, and
a written waiver of these rights was
obtained. The defendant was questioned for
approximately thirty minutes in a
maintenance closet. He never requested an
attomey be present or referred to his prior
refusal to answer questions.
Five days later, the detective retumed to the
correctional facility with another detective
to administer a polygraph examination to the
defendant. The defendant was read his
Miranda rights, and a written waiver was
again obtained. When the detectives began
questioning the defendant, he became upset
and incriminated himself by saying "1 didn't
force him." He then requested an attomey,
ending the interrogation.
At trial, the defendant moved to suppress the
incriminating statements made in 2006
based on his invocation of his Miranda
rights in 2003. The trial court denied his
motion to suppress, reasoning that there was
a break in custody between 2003 and 2006,
and therefore, the 2006 waiver of his
Miranda rights superseded the defendant's
request for an attomey in 2003. The
, defendant was subsequently found guilty of
sexual child abuse of his son. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland reversed and
remanded, and the Supreme Court of the
United States granted a writ of certiorari.
Holding that a break in custody of more than
two weeks terminates' an invocation of
Miranda protections, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals of Maryland and remanded the
matter. The Court's opinion discussed

whether incarceration necessarily constitutes
custody, which it had "never decided ... and
[had] indeed explicitly declined to address ..
" Concluding that "all' forms of
incarceration" satisfy the restraint on
freedom of movement analysis of custody,
the Court nevertheless held that "lawful
imprisonment imposed upon conviction of a
crime does not create the coercive pressures
identified in Miranda "and. therefore
Miranda rights are not triggered simply
because an individual is incarcerated. That
is, Miranda custody requires both a restraint
on movement, which is always satisfied by
incarceration, and coercive pressure.
Critically for the pending appeal, the Court
noted that" [n] 0 one questions that Shatzer
was in custody for Miranda purposes during
the interviews with Detective Blankenship
in 2003 and Detective Hoover in 2006." A
prisoner is in custody when he is removed
from his "normal life" by being taken from
his. cell to an isolated area, such as a closet
or conference room, for the purpose of
interrogation. Once the prisoner is then
released back into the general prison
population, away from his interrogators, he
is no longer in custody.
Thus, faced with a factual scenario of an
inmate being removed from his cell and
being interrogated about an unrelated crime,
the Supreme Court expressed no doubt that a
Miranda waming was required. The
question facing the Court was whether the
inmate's 2003 invocation of his Miranda
rights precluded law enforcement from
soliciting a Miranda waming in 2006 and
interrogating the inmate again. The Supreme
Court's unambiguous conclusion that the
. Shatzer defendant was in Miranda custody
on both occasions serves to bolster our
detennination regarding Fields.
Moreover, in finding that the defendant in
Shatzer was in custody, the Supreme Court
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did not address the physical circumstances
of the intenogation, such as whether the
intenogation room was· windowless,
whether the defendant was handcuffed,
whether the defendant was told he could
stop the intenogation or the length of the
intenogation. The Court's approach,
combined with the holding in Simpson,
. provides us the necessary guidance to
formalize a bright line test for determining
whether Miranda rights are triggered for an
incarcerated individual. A Miranda warning
must be given when an inmate is isolated
from the general prison population and
intenogated about conduct OCCUlTing outside
of the prison.
The critical issue in this inquiry becomes
whether the prisoner is isolated from the
general prison population for questioning.
"Miranda ... was designed to guard against
. . . the 'danger of coercion [that] results
from the interaction of custody and official
intenogation. '" While locking doors or
handcuffing the inmate enhances the
potential for coercion, isolation is perhaps
the most coercive. aspect of custodial
intenogation. Assuming the inmate is indeed
undergoing intenogation, being placed in a
room, apart from others within the prison
populatiort, sequesters the. prisoner with his
accusers in the type of scenario for which
Miranda seeks to provide protection.
Moreover, "[w]hen a prisoner is removed
from the general prison population and taken
to a separate location for questioning, the
duration of that separation is assuredly
dependent upon his intenogators." The
sense of control exercised by intenogators
over the prisoner in determining the length
of the prisoner's removal from his normal
life further reinforces the element of
coercion.· A prisoner may feel he has no
choice but to cooperate and provide the
exact answers his intenogators seek to elicit,
regardless of the potential for incrimination.
We believe a reasonable person in an

inmate's position would VIew such
intenogation conducted in isolation as
coercive, thus necessitating a Miranda
warning.
This bright line approach will obviate factspecific inquiries by lower courts into the
of
prison
precise
circumstances
intenogations conducted in isolation, away
from the general prison population.
FUlihermore, law-enforcement officials will
. have clearer guidance for when they must
administer Miranda warnings prior to a
prison intenogation.
The Michigan COUli of Appeals' conclusion
that, although Fields was in custody,
intenogation without a Miranda warning
was permissible because the questioning
concerned an unrelated matter contradicts
clearly established federal law as determined
by the Supreme Court in Mathis. In order for
habeas relief to be warranted, however, we
must also determine if the admission of
Fields' involuntary confession was harmless
enol'. An eITor that "'had substantial and
injurious effect or illfluence in determining
the jury's verdict,'" is not harmless. Even if
there is only "grave doubt about whether a
trial enor of federal law has substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining
the jury's verdict, that enor is not harmless."
Moreover, "the risk that the confession is
unreliable, coupled with the profound
impact that the confession has upon the jury,
requires a reviewing court to exercise
extreme caution before determining that the
admission of the confession at trial was
harmless."
There is no question that the failure to
suppress Fields' confession was not
harmless enor. In fact, Appellant has not
even challenged this portion of the district
court's ruling. Fields was convicted of two
counts of third~degree criminal sexual
conduct. As noted by the district court, the
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critical evidence against Fields was his
confession and the victim's testimony. The
victim, however, recanted his testimony on
several occasions, including telling two law
enforcement officers and at least three other
individuals' that the sexual conduct with
Petitioner never occurred. Accordingly,
Fields' confession must have heavily
influenced the jury's decision. The district
court therefore correctly concluded that the
trial court's errol' was,not harmless and that,
consequently, habeas relief was merited
because the Michigan Court of Appeals'
decision contradicted ,federal law as
established by the Supreme Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed supra, the district
court's conditional grant of the petition of
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 is hereby AFFIRMED.
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge, concurring.
I agree that the outcome of this case is
controlled by this court's prior decision in
Simpson v. Jackson, No. 08-3224, 615 F.3d
421, 2010 WL 2771861 (6th Cir. July 13,
2010). However, I write separately because I
disagree with both Simpson's and the
majority's interpretation of two Supreme
Court cases: Mathis v. United States, 391
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1503, 20 L.Ed.2d 381
(1968) and Maryland v, Shatzer, U.S. - , 130 S.Ct. 1213, 175L.Ed.2d 1045
(2010). In particular, in contrast to the
majority and Simpson, I do not believe that
Mathis obviates the need for the contextspecific custody analysis clearly established
by Miranda and its progeny. Moreover, I do
not agree with the majority that Mathis
established a bright line test to the effect
that, "[a] Miranda warning must be given
when an inmate is isolated from the general
prison population and interrogated about

conduct occurring outside of the prison."
Instead, applying the context-specific
Miranda custody analysis under the
deferential review mandated by AEDP A, I
believe that the propel' course of action in
this case would be to reverse the district
court and uphold the state court's
. determination.
I read Mathis as standing for a narrower
proposition than does the majority. The
Court in Mathis addressed the government's
argument that it should: "narrow the scope
of the Miranda holding by making it
applicable only to questioning one who is
'in custody' in connection with the very case
under investigation." The Court found that
there was "nothing in the Miranda opinion
which call[ed] for a curtailment of the
warnings to' be given persons under
interrogation by officers based on the reason
why the person is in custody." Therefore,
Mathis holds that Miranda applies to a
person interrogated while in prison on
charges unrelated to the investigation for
which he is interrogated, but it does not
establish that such a person is automatically
in custody 01' entitled to Miranda warnings
anytime he is intenogated away from the
general prison population. Instead, this
determination depends on the contextspecific analysis of whether the inmate' is
deemed to be "in custody"; i.e., whether he
was subject to the sort of isolation and
coercive influence that trigger the need for
Miranda warnings. Therefore, I would not
read the "essential holding" of Mathis to be
warnings
must
be
that "Miranda
administered when law enforcement officers
remove an inmate from the general prison
population and interrogate him regarding
criminal conduct that took place outside the
jail 01' prison."
Furthermore, I also do not read Shatzer as
bro'adly as does the majority here.
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Admittedly, Shatzer does state that: "[n]o
one questions that Shatzer was in custody
for Miranda purposes during the interviews
with Detective Blankenship in 2003 and
Detective Hoover in 2006." However, the
fact that no one questioned whether Shatzer
was in custody, does not mean (or clearly
establish) that anytime an inmate is removed
from the general prison population and
interrogated he is "in custody" for Miranda
purposes. Instead, it only means that the
parties, unlike the government in this case,
did not make an issue of the "in custody"
requirement in relation to those specific
interrogations.
Consequently, instead of adopting a bright
line rule governing the interrogation of those
already in prison and mandating that we find
that Fields was in custody, I believe that the
normal, context-specific analysis articulated
in Miranda and its progeny applies here and
that this analysis should determine whether
Fields was in custody for Miranda purposes.
In speaking of "custody," the language of
the Miranda opinion indicates that "when an
individual is taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom by the authorities in
any significant way and is subjected to.
questioning, the privilege against selfincrimination is jeopardized." However, as
the Court's cases "make clear . . . the
freedom-of-movement test identifies only a
necessary and not a sufficient condition for
Miranda custody" and "Miranda is to be
enforced 'only in those types of situations in
which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. '" The Court noted
in Berkemer that:
The purposes of the safeguards
prescribed by Miranda are to ensure
that the police do not coerce or trick
captive suspects into confessing, to
relieve the inherently compelling
pressures generated by the custodial

setting itself, which .work to
undermine the individual's will to
resist, and as much as possible to
free. courts from the task of
scrutinizing individual cases to try to
determine, after the fact, whether
particular
confessions
were
voluntary.
fd. at 433, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (internal citations

and quotations omitted).
Indeed, under the Miranda custody test:
"[t]wo discrete inquiries are essential to the
determination: first, what were the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation;
and second, given those circumstances,
would a reasonable person have felt he or
she was not at liberty to terminate the
interrogation and leave." Consequently, the
Miranda custody analysis in this case is
shaped by the circumstances surrounding
Fields' interrogation, including the fact that
Fields was already incarcerated on separate
charges and, therefore, that he lived in
prison.
Turning to the particulars of this case, the
Michigan Court of Appeals was the last state
court to issue a reasoned oplmon.
considering this issue. That court noted that
the fact that "a defendant is in prison for an
unrelated offense when being questioned
does not, without more, mean that he was in
custody for the purpose of determining
whether Miranda warnings were required."
People v. Fields, 2004 WL 979732, *2
(Mich.Ct.App. May 6, 2004) (citation
omitted). The court also noted that:
[D]efendant was unquestionably in
custody, but on a matter umelated to
the
interrogation:
Although
defendant was not read his Miranda
rights, he was told that he was free to
leave the conference room and return
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to his cell. Defendant never asked to
leave. Because Miranda wamings
were not required, the trial court did
not en in denying defendant's
motion to suppress his statement.

court's application of federal law to the facts
of the case must be "objectively
unreasonable." The Supreme Court has
stressed that "the most important point is
that an unreasonable application of federal
law is different from an inconect application
of federal law."

Obviously or "unquestionably," Fields was
in custody in the sense that he was
incarcerated on a matter unrelated to the
intenogation. However, this does not mean
that he was "in custody" for purposes of the
Miranda and, indeed, the Michigan COUli of
Appeals went on to describe the ·fact that
Fields would have felt free to telminate the
interview and leave, which is critical to the
Miranda
custody
determination.
In
particular, even though Fields was
intenogated hi a separate conference room,
he was told that he was free to leave the
conference room and retum to his cell;
consequently, the Michigan COUli of
Appeals concluded that Fields was not
subject to the sort of coercion necessary to
trigger Miranda warnings because he was
not in custody for purposes of Miranda.

As discussed above, the Michigan Court of
Appeals' decision has not been shown to be
contrary to' clearly established Supreme
Court precedent. That court did not apply a
rule that contradicts the governing law set
forth by the Supreme Court in its cases;
instead, it applied the conect, contextspecific Miranda custody test. Nor did the
Michigan Court of Appeals arrive at a result
different from Supreme Court precedent on
a set of facts that are materially
indistinguishable from a Supreme Court
decision. Furthermore, while a close call, I
cannot say that the Michigan Court of
Appeals' decision applying the contextspecific Miranda custody analysis is
objectively unreasonable. The Michigan
Court of Appeals provided the specific
sunounding
the
factual
context
investigation:

Id.

We view this determination under AEDP A
which, to grant relief, requires that we find
the state court's decision to be "contrary to, .
or involve[ ] an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law" as
established "by the Supreme Court." 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state-coUli decision
is "contrary to" clearly established federal
law if: (1) the state court applies a rule that
contradicts the governing law set forth by
the Supreme Court in its cases, or (2) the
state court confronts a set of facts that are
materially indistinguishable from. those
presented in a Supreme COUli decision and
neveliheless anives at a result different from
Supreme Court precedent. In order to
constitute an "unreasonable application" of
clearly established federal law, a state

At trial, Deputy Batterson testified
that he removed defendant from his
cell, where he was jailed on domestic
assault, and led him to a conference
room. He told defendant that he
wanted to speak with him in regard
to the victim whom defendant
indicated he knew; The interview
began around 7:00 or 9:00 p.m. and
ended around midnight. Defendant
was not read his Miranda rights, but
Deputy Batterson told him he was
free to leave the conference room
and return to his j ail cell.
Fields, 2004 WL 979732 at * 1.
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As noted above, the Michigan Court of
Appeals found the fact that Fields was told
that he was free to leave to be critical.
It is true that Fields had to leave his cell, and
was escorted through a separate door into a
conference room in a separate building, and
that he was questioned at length. However,
Fields was a prisoner. So, the fact that he
had to be escorted to the conference room,
and could leave and return to his cell at any
time, but only with an escort, were normal,
routine features of his life as an inmate.
While he did have to pass through the Jdoor, and the conference room was in a
separate part of the building, the state cOUli
rightly noted that· the fact that Fields was
told he could leave at any time is of critical
significance. This, along with the fact that
Fields was already accustomed to
incarceration and
its
accompanying
restraints, demonstrate that there were
objective
circumstances
creating an

interrogation environment in which a
reasonable person, already imprisoned on
separate charges, "would have felt free to
terminate the interview and leave."
In short, while the maj ority' s bright line rule
frees the courts from the task of scrutinizing
individual cases to try to determine whether
the suspect already incarcerated on separate
charges was in custody for Miranda
. purposes, I do not believe that it is
appropriate for this court to fashion such a
rule under the constraints imposed by the
AEDP A. Instead, we should apply the
context-specific analysis atiiculated in
Miranda and its progeny to determine
whether Fields was "in custody." Under
these circumstances, because "fair-minded
jurists could disagree over whether [Fields]
was in custody," the state court's decision
that Fields was not in custody was not
objectively unreasonable. However, Slllce
we are bound by Simpson, I concur.
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"Scope of Miranda in Jail"
SCOTUSblog
January 24,2011
Lyle Denniston

The Supreme Court a'greed on Monday to
clarify when prison or jail' officials must
give an inmate warnings about his rights
under Miranda v. Arizona, when they take
the prisoner out of a cell for questioning
about another crime. The issue arises in a
Michigan child sex abuse case, Howes v.
Fields (10-680). The Court's ruling on the
case-expected in its next Term-will
clarify the scope of the Court's ruling in
1968 in Mathis v. Us. That was one of two
cases granted review before the Justices
began a four-week recess.

* * *,
The new Miranda case the Court put on its
decision docket grows out of an
investigation by sheriff's deputies in
Lenawee County, Mich., into a possible
sexual abuse of a minor. Randall Fields was
in the county jail serving a 45-day sentence
for disorderly conduct. He was taken out of
his cell, and questioned for perhaps seven
hours in a conference room. During the
questioning, he was told he could leave, but

state courts concluded that he was "in
custody" during that intelTogation.
However, state courts ruled that, because
Fields was questioned about a potential
crime other than the one for which he was in
j ail, and thus there was no connection
between the two, the deputies were not
required .to give him Miranda warnings.
That ruling was overturned when Fields took
the case on to federal court. The Sixth
Circuit, Court interpreted the 1968 Mathis
decision to mean that "a Miranda warning is
required
whenever
an
incarcerated
individual is isolated from the general prison
population and intelTogated, i.e., questioned
in a manner likely to lead to selfincrimination, about conduct occurring
outside of the prison."
State officials urged the Supreme Court to
rule that such a "bright-line rule" goes
beyond what the Court had previously
required.

***
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"Guam Joins Miranda Suit in High Court"
Pacific Daily News
June 9, 2011
Steve Limtiaco

Guam Attorney General Leonardo Rapadas
and attorneys general from three dozen
states filed a "friend of the court" brief with
the U.S. Supreme Court, challenging a
recent federal court decision that limits the
ability of law enforcement to question
prisoners.
At issue before the high court is how to
apply Miranda-informing someone of their
right to remain silent and their right to legal
counsel-when they are already locked up.
The Sixth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals in
August 2010 ruled that inmates who are
pulled aside for questioning while locked up
need to be read their Miranda rights.
But the attorneys general in their May 31
brief argue it is only necessary to read
inmates their Miranda rights if they are
exposed to restraints or "coercive pressures"
other than those typical of being in prison.
Several other federal courts have adopted
that position, they noted.
The case is based on statements made by
Randall Fields, who was arrested and locked

up for disorderly conduct at the Lenawee
County, Michigan, Sheriff s Department in
December 2001. Deputies moved Fields to a
locked conference room at the sheriff s
department and questioned him. His
statements to deputies were used against him
in court, and he was convicted of two counts
of criminal sexual conduct.
He appealed to the federal district court,
which ruled that Fields' confession was
improperly admitted into evidence. Carol
Howes, warden of the Lakeland Correctional
Facility, appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which
agreed with the lower court.
According to the U.S. Supreme Comi brief
filed by Rapadas and others, the states
oppose any expansion of the Miranda
doctrine, especially in prison, because it
gives prisoners greater rights than other
citizens.
"Periodic removal from the. general
population is a fact of life for most inmates
and, therefore, does not itself generate the
same type of coercive pressures at issue in
Miranda," they stated.
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Messerschmidt v. Millender
10-704
Ruling Below: Millender v. County of Los Angeles, 564 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 2009), rehearing en
banc 620 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted Messerschmidt v. Millender 10-704, 2011 WL
2518829 (U.S. June 27,2011).

Detective Curt Messerschmidt applied for a wanant to search the premises of Augusta Millender
and seize property in connection with an assault with a deadly weapon. Millender was the foster
mother of suspect Jeny Ray Bowen. Bowen's girlfriend at the time, Shelly Kelly alleged that
Bowen fired multiple shots at her vehicle from "a black sawed off shotgun with a pistol grip." .
Kelly provided Messerschmidt with a photograph of Bowen with this weapon. Messerschmidt
drafted a warrant application that sought to seize all firearms, firearm parts, ammunition, or
firearm-related paperwork at the residence and any articles of evidence that tended to show
Bowen's affiliation with a street gang.
The warrant was approved investigators conducted an early mOlning search of the residence,
failing to find Bowen or the "black sawed off shotgun with pistol grip." The officers did however
find and confiscate Millender's personal shotgun and ammunition.
The Millenders filed suit, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations. The district
court concluded the warrant was facially valid but unconstitutionally overbroad as to the search
for firearms, firearm-related materials, and gang-related materials. The district court rejected the
officers' claims of qualified immunity which was the subject of the Ninth Circuit appeal. The
Ninth Circuit held the warrant was not supported by probable cause and the officers were not
entitled to qualified immunity.
Questions Presented: (1) Whether police officers are entitled to qualified immunity when they
obtained a facially valid wan-ant to search for firearms, firearm-related materials,and gang..;
related items in the residence of a gang member and felon who had threatened to kill his
girlfriend and fired a sawed-off shotgun at her. (2) Whether United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984), and Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), should be reconsidered or clarified.
Augusta MILLENDER; Brenda Millender; and William Johnson, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; Robert J. Lawrence (292848); Curt Messerschmidt
(283271), Defendants-Appellants,
and
Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department; Leroy D. Baca; Scott Walker (188188); Rick
Rector (280600); Donald Nichiporuk (213625); Richard Schlegel (280735), e/s/a M.
Schlegel; Brice Stella (402018), e/s/a D. Stella; Jack Demello (223333), e/s/a J. Dernell;
David O'Sullivan (293952); Jack Ritenour (164927); and Ian Stade (279464), Defendants.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed August 24,2010
199

[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
IKUTA, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiffs Augusta Millender, Brenda
Millender,
and
William
Johnson
(collectively, "the Millenders") filed this suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the County
of Los Angeles, the Los Angeles County
Sheriffs Department, and several individual
members of the Sheriff s Department,
alleging violations of their civil rights. Their
complaint arose from a search pursuant to a
warrant obtained by Detective Curt
Messerschmidt of the Los Angeles County
Sheriff s Department and executed under the
supervision of Sergeant Robert Lawrence.
Messerschmidt and Lawrence (collectively,
"the deputies") appeal from the district
court's determination that they were not
entitled to qualified immunity with respect
to" the alleged overbreadth of the search
warrant. Because the challenged sections of
the warrant were "so lacking in indicia of
probable cause as to render official belief in
its existence unreasonable," Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S.Ct. 1092,
89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), we affirm.
I

On November 4, 2003, Messerschmidt
applied for an arrest warrant for Jerry Ray
Bowen at 2234 E. 120th St., Los Angeles,
and for a warrant to" search that address and
seize specified property in connection with
"a spousal assault and an assault with a
deadly weapon." Messerschmidt prepared an
affidavit, entitled "Statement of Probable
Cause." The affidavit contained the
following facts:

According to Kelly, as soon as the officers
[assigned to protect her as she moved out of
a residence shared with Bowen] left, Bowen

appeared and screamed, "I told you to never
call the cops on me bitch!" Bowen
physically assaulted Kelly and [Kelly
eventually escaped]. Bowen followed
seconds later, now holding "a black sawed
off shotgun with a pistol grip." Standing in
front of Kelly's car, "Bowen pointed the
shotgun at Kelly and shouted, "If you try to "
leave, I'll kill you bitch." Kelly was able to
escape by" leaning over in her seat and
flooring the gas. Bowen jumped out of the"
way and fired one shot at her, blowing out
the front left tire qf Kelly's car. Chasing the
car on foot, Bowen fired four more times in
Kelly's direction, missing her each time.
. . . Kelly reported the shooting, described
Bowen's firearm as a "black sawed off
shotgun with pistol grip," and gave the
officers four photos of Bowen to aid their
investigation.

a

Based on this information, Messerschmidt
put a photo of Bowen into a "six pack" lineup. When Messerschmidt showed the photo
line-up to Kelly, she immediately identified
Bowen
and
circled
his
picture.
Messerschmidt's affidavit states that "[t]he
person [Kelly] identified IS Jerry Ray Bowen
. . . , a known Mona Park Crip gang
member." Kelly told Messerschmidt that
Bowen's current address was 2234 E. 120th
St., Los Angeles.

***
Messerschmidt's" affidavit also requested
night service of the search warrant, giving
two reasons. First, "the investigation has
shown that the primary suspect in this case
has gang ties to the Mona Park Crip gang
based on information provided by the victim
and the cal-gang data base." Second,
Messerschmidt believed that' "the nature of
the crime (Assault with a deadly weapon)
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goes to show that night service would
provide an added element of safety to the
community" as well as· to those personnel
serving the warrant. The affidavit concluded
by stating that Messerschmidt "believes that
the items sought will be in the possession of
Jerry Ray Bowen and the recovery of the
weapon could be invaluable m the
successful prosecution of the suspect
involved in this case, and the curtailment of·
further crimes being committed."
In addition to preparing the affidavit,
Messerschmidt completed a "Search
Warrant and Affidavit" form to authorize the
search of the residence identified in
"Attachment 1" and the seizure of property
identified in "Attachment 2." Attachment 1
identifies the "location to be searched" as
2234 E. 120th St. in Los Angeles.
. Attachment 2 sets out two categories of
items to search and· seize. The first
paragraph lists:
All handguns, rifles, or shotguns of
any caliber, or any firearms capable
of firing ammunition, or firearms or
devices modified or designed to
allow it to fire ammunition~ All
caliber
of
ammunition,
miscellaneous gun parts, gun
cleaning kits, holsters which could
hold or have held any caliber
handgun being sought. Any receipts
or paperwork, showing the purchase,
ownership, or possession of the
handguns being sought. Any firearm
for which there is no proof of
ownership. Any firearm capable of
firing or chambered to fire any
caliber ammunition.
.
The second paragraph lists:
Articles of evidence showing street
gang membership or affiliation with

any Street Gang to include but not
limited to any reference to "Mona
Park Crips", including writings or
graffiti depicting gang membership,
activity or identity. Articles of
personal
property tending to
establish the identity of person [sic]
in control of the premise or premises.
Any photographs or photograph
albums depicting persons, vehicles,
weapons or locations, which may
appear relevant to gang membership,
or which may depict the item being
sought and or believed to be
evidence in the case being
investigated on this warrant, or
which may depict evidence of
criminal activity. Additionally to
include any gang indiCia that would
. establish the persons being sought in
this
warrant,
affiliation
or
membership with the "Mona Park
Crips" street gang.

***
Messerschmidt was aware of other relevant
facts not included in the affidavit. First,
Kelly explained to Messerschmidt that the
address she gave him, 2234 E. 120th St.,
was the home of Bowen's foster mother,
Augusta Millender. Second, Messerschmidt
knew that Bowen had a previous criminal
record and was on summary probation for
spousal battery and driving without a
license. Bowen also had several previous
felony convictions and misdemeanor arrests,
and was a "third strike candidate" under
California law.· Third, in addition to
identifying the gun Bowen used as a black
sawed-off shotgun with a pistol grip, Kelly
gave Messerschmidt a picture. of Bowen
posing with the gun. FOUlih, there was no
evidence that Bowen's assault on Kelly was
in any way gang-related. In subsequent
testimony, Messerschmidt answered "No" to
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the question, "So you didn't have any reason
to believe that the assault on Kelly was any
sort of a gang crime, did you?"
Before Messerschmidt submitted the
warrants and affidavit to the magistrate, they
were reviewed by his supervisors in the
Sheriff s station, Sergeant Lawrence and
Lieutenant Ornales. In addition, Deputy
District Attorney Janet Wilson signed the
search warrant, indicating that she had
reviewed it for probable cause and approved
it. Messerschllidt presented the Search
Warrant and ·Affidavit and the Probable
Cause An'est Warrant, along with their
attachments (including the affidavit), to a
magistrate. The magistrate approved both
warrants and authorized night service.
At 5:00 a.m. on the morning of November 6,
2003, the Sheriffs Department's SWAT
team served the search and arrest warrants at
the 120th St. address. The SWAT team
forced open the front security door, broke a
front window, and proceeded to enter,
search, and clear the house. The ten
occupants of the house, including the
Millenders, were ordered to exit, which they
did. Once the SWAT team had secured the
residence, investigators searched the area.
While Messerschmidt and Lawrence did not
participate in the search, they were both
present. The investigators conducting the
search failed to find Bowen or a black
sawed-off shotgun with a pistol grip.
However, they did find and take Augusta
Millender's personal shotgun (a black 12gauge "Mossberg" with a wooden stock), a
box of .45 caliber "American Eagle"
ammunition, and a letter from Social
Services addressed to Bowen. Some two
weeks later, Messerschmidt, without SWAT
assistance, arrested Bowen in the middle of
the day· after discovering Bowen hiding
under a bed in a motel room.

The Millenders filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 against the County of Los Angeles, the
Los Angeles County' Sheriff s Department,
Sheriff Leroy Baca, and 27 Los Angeles
County deputies, including Messerschmidt
and Lawrence. As relevant here, the
Millenders alleged violations of their FOUlih
and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The
parties filed cross motions for summary
adjudication on the validity of the arrest and
search warrants. The district court concluded
that the arrest warrant was facially valid, and
granted the defendants' motion for summary
adjudication on this issue. The Millenders
have not appealed this ruling.
The district cOUli also held that the warrant's
authorization to search for and seize all
firearms, firearm-related materials, and
gang-related items was unconstitutionally
overbroad, but that its authorization to
search for evidence tending to establish
control of the premises was constitutional.
Accordingly, the court granted the
Millenders'
motion
for
summary'
adjudication as to firear~- and gang-related
evidence, but granted the defendants'
motion as to identification evidence. The
district court then rejected the deputies'
claim of qualified immunity on the ground
that the deputies' actions were not
objectively reasonable.
Messerschmidt and Lawrence timely
appealed the district court's determination
that they were not entitled to qualified
immunity.
II

[Jurisdiction and Standard of Review]
III

"The

doctrine of qualified

immunity
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protects government officials from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known." A
police officer is not entitled to qualified
immunity if: (1) the facts show that the
officer's conduct violated a plaintiff's
constitutional
rights; and (2) those rights .
.
were clearly established at the time of the
alleged violation. Although we have
. discretion to address these prongs in any
order, we begin in this case by considering
whether the deputies' conduct violated the
Millenders' constitutional rights.
A

The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects,
against
umeasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported
by Oath 01' affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.

u.s. Const. amend. IV.
***
We read the Fourth Amendment as requiring
"specificity," which has two aspects,
"particularity and breadth." "Particularity is
the requirement that the warrant must clearly
state what is sought. Breadth deals with the
requirement that the scope of the warrant be
limited by the probable cause on which the
warrant is based." In determining whether a

warrant's description is sufficiently specific
to meet these Fourth Amendment
requirements, we consider the following
questions:
(1) whether probable cause exists to
seize all items of a particular type
described in the warrant; (2) whether
the warrant sets out objective
standards by which executing
officers can differentiate. items
subject to seizure from those which
are not; and (3) whether the
government was able to describe the
items more particularly in light of the
information available to it at the time
the warrant was issued.
Spilotro, 800 F.2d at 963 (citations omitted).

The first consideration encapsulates the
overarching Fourth Amendment principle
that police must have probable cause to
search for and seize "all the items of a
particular type described in the warrant."
The second and third factors are relevant to
determining whether the warrant satisfies
this general rule.
When considering challenges to warrants
under this framework, we must be mindful
that a "magistrate's determination of
probable cause should be paid great
deference by reviewing courts." The
Supreme Court has directed us to take a
practical approach in determining whether
there is sufficient probable cause, and to
avoid "interpreting affidavits in a
hypertechnical, rather than a common-sense,
manner." "Deference to the magistrate,
however, is not boundless." We are not to
"defer to a warrant based on an affidavit that
does not provide the magistrate with a
substantial basis for determining the
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existence of probable cause."
B

We begin by analyzing whether the
warrant's authorization to search for
firearms and firearm-related materials
satisfies
the
three-factor
specificity
framework. We first consider whether the
deputies had probable cause to search for
and seize "all the items of a particular type
described in the warrant." "The premise here
is that any intrusion in the way of search or
seizure is an evil, so that no intrusion at all
is justified without a careful prior
detelmination of necessity." For example,
probable cause to search for documents
peliaining to "certain aspects of [an]
operation" cannot justify the seizure of all
documents in an office.
As noted above, the warrant in this case
authorizes a search for essentially any
device that could fire ammunition, any
ammunition, and any firearm-related
materials. There is no dispute that the
deputies had probable cause to search for
and seize the "black sawed off shotgun with
a pistol grip" used in the crime. But the
. affidavit does not set forth any evidence
indicating that Bowen owned or used other
firearms, that such firearms were contraband
or evidence ofa crime, or that such firearms
were likely to be present at the Millenders'
residence. Nothing in the warrant or the
affidavit provides any basis for concluding
there was probable cause to search for or
seize the generic class of firearms and
firearm-related materials listed in the search
warrant. As such, we . conclude that
"probable cause did not exist to seize all
items of those particular types."

***

More specific standards may be contained in
an affidavit, rather than the warrant itself,
only if: "(1) the warrant expressly
incorporate [s] the affidavit by reference and
(2) the affidavit either is attached physically
to the warrant or at least accompanies the
warrant while agents execute the search." ...
In this case, the deputies argue that the
affidayit narrowed the scope of the search
warrant by including specific information
about the crime at issue, the weapon used,
and Bowen's gang membership, and that
this information cured any constitutional
deficiency. The affidavit does satisfy the
first prong of the Kow test: the distri~t court
found
that the
warrant
expressly
incorporated the affidavit by reference. But
there is no evidence in the record, nor do the
deputies argue, that the affidavit was
physically attached to the warrant or
accompanied the warrant on the search..
Therefore, we cannot consider its. effect.
Even if we could consider the affidavit, it
still would· not cure the warrant's
deficiencies .... As in Kow, where we held
that an incorporated affidavit did not cure a
facially invalid warrant, "there is absolutely
no evidence in this case that the officers who
executed the warrant, although instructed to
read the affidavit, actually relied on the
information in the affidavit to limit the
warrant's overbreadth." Accordingly, we
cannot uphold the warrant based on
objective standards in the affidavit.
Finally, as suggested by the framework's
third consideration, warrants may sometimes
authorize a search for classes of generic
items if the government was not "able to
describe the items more particularly in light
of the information available to it at the time
the warrant was issued." ... But where the
police do have information more specifically
describing the evidence or contraband, a
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warrant authorizing search and seizure of a
broader class of items may be invalid....
In this case, the deputies had a precise
description of the firearm used by Bowen in
connection with his assault. Kelly,
[described the gun and provided a picture of
it]. Because the govemment knew '''exactly
what it needed and wanted, ", this third
consideration also cuts against the validity
of the warrant.
The deputies argue that the broad scope of
the walTant was. necessary in light of the
specific circumstances of the crime. They
note that a sawed-off shotgun can be broken
down into separate pieces for easier
concealment and that the deputies had
probable cause to believe that a search for
the disassembled parts of the sawed-off
shotgun would be necessary. But this
reasoning does not preclude a more precise
description of the items subject to seizure.
Under the specific circumstances of the
crime, the deputies' probable cause extended
only to firearm components that could be
part of a disassembled sawed-off shotgun
with a pistol grip; there was no probable
cause to search for disassembled pieces of
all firearms described in the warrant.
The deputies also argue that it was necessary
to draft the firearm description broadly
because Kelly could have been mistaken in
her description of the gun. This argument
has little force in this situation, because
Kelly provided the officers with a picture of
the weapon. The warrant did not omit details
that Kelly might have mistaken or that might
not have been accurately reflected in the
photo, such as the color or specific make of
the weapon. Rather, Messerschmidt failed to
include any limitation that would have
helped focus the walTant on the specific type
of gun legitimately subject to the search.
Thus, the deputies' argument, if availing,

would impermissibly allow police to
"enlarge a specific authorization, furnished
by a walTant . . . into the equivalent of a
general warrant to rummage and seize. at
will."
In short, the deputies had probable cause to
search for a single, identified weapon,
whether assembled or disassembled. They
had no probable cause to search for the
broad class of firearms and firearm-related
materials described in the walTant. Although
we have upheld walTants describing broad
classes of items in certain cases,. the
rationales adopted in those cases are
inapplicable here given the information the
deputies possessed.
The deputies raise several additional
arguments to justify the breadth of the
warrant. These arguments, however, are
unrelated to the constitutional requirement
that a search warrant not issue except upon
probable cause for every item described in
the warrant.
First, the deputies argue that it was
reasonable for the warrant to authorize a
broad search for firearms and firearmrelated materials because Bowen is a violent
and dangerous person. . . . The dissent
makes similar arguments, see Dissent at
12742-44, n.1 & n.6, and also contends that
probable cause existed because firearms are
inherently dangerous, Dissent at 12743-44. 4
There is no doubt that deputies have a valid
. interest in protecting themselves and the
public from potentially· violent and
dangerous suspeCts. Indeed, the Supreme
Court has recognized that courts must give
"some latitude" to "officers in the dangerous
and difficult process of making arrests and
executing search warrants," In this vein, the
We refer to Judge Callahan's dissent as "the
dissent" or "Dissent." We refer to Judge Silverman's
dissent by name.

4
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Court's "search incident to arrest" doctrine
allows a police officer to take into account
the inherent hazards raised by an arrestee's
potential access to firearms. But there is no
"dangerousness" exception to the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement,
regardless of whether a search involves
violent suspects or deadly weapons. A
police officer's valid safety concerns do not
create a "fair probability" that a broad class
of weapons may be found in a suspect's
residence or that such items are contraband
or evidence of a crime. The deputies cite no
case, and we have found none, holding that a
warrant's overbreadth could be cured simply
because of potential danger to police officers
at .some point in the future. Indeed, such a
rule would permit officers to transform
every warrant into a "general, exploratory
]"
allowing
"indiscriminate
search[
rummaging through a person's belongings."
Nor is there a per se rule that police have
probable cause to search the residences of
ex-felons for firearms and firearm-related
items.
Here the record is devoid of evidence that
Bowen possessed guns other than the sawedoff shotgun identified by Kelly or that the
broad range of firearms covered by the
warrant would be present in the Millenders'
residence. Therefore, regardless of Bowen's
history or the inherent dangerousness of
firearms, the police lacked probable cause to
apply for a search warrant for a broad range
of firearms.
In any event, because Messerschmidt did not
inform the magistrate of Bowen's prior
felonies, his criminal history is not relevant
to our analysis here. It is well established
that, in reviewing a search warrant, we are
"limited
to
the
information
and
circumstances contained within the four
comers of the underlying affidavit."
Probable cause is a determination made by

the issuing magistrate based on the facts
presented to him, not a determination made
by an officer based on information known
only to himself. Therefore, the dissent errs
in suggesting that Messerschmidt's personal
knowledge that Bowen· was a felon is
sufficient to create probable cause. Dissent
at 1036 & n.1.
Second, the deputies argue they were
justified in seeking all firearms and firearmrelated materials because such materials
could aid in the prosecution of Bowen.
Again, this argument is unrelated to. the
constitutional requirement that there be
probable cause for each item described in
the warrant. Although the deputies likely
had probable cause to search for a limited
range of firearm-related material that would
have provided circumstantial evidence of
ownership of the sawed-off shotgun at issue,
such as receipts or compatible ammunition,
the warrant extended beyond such evidence
to "[a]ny firearm capable of firing or
chambered to fire any caliber ammunition."
Put simply, the Fourth Amendment does not
authorize the issuance of warrants to
conduct fishing expeditions to find evidence
that could assist officers in prosecuting
suspects.
The deputies further argue that any caliber
of shotgun or receipts would show the
possession and purchase of guns. But we fail
to see how this gives the deputies probable
cause, because the possession and purchase
of guns by itself does not constitute
contraband or evidence of a crime. As
discussed above, the warrant did not include
the information about Bowen's criminal
record that could make his possession and
purchase of guns a criminal offense, and
thus such information cannot be considered
in our analysis. Moreover, while the district
court· concluded that the deputies had
probable cause to search for "[a]rticles of
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personal property tending to establish the
identity of the person or persons in control
. of the premise or premises," a ruling the
Millenders do not challenge on appeal, the
deputies do not argue that such probable
cause justified their search for the broad
range of firearms listed in the warrant. Nor
. could they. While we have upheld warrants
authorizing searches for "[i]ndicia tending to
establish the identity of persons in control of
the premises," the probable cause to search
for such "indicia of control" usually refers to
such items as "utility company receipts, rent
receipts, cancelled mail envelopes, and
keys," not to the full range of firearm and
firearm-related materials sought here.
Although we are deferential to a
magistrate's determination of probable cause
and consider the language of a warrant and
affidavit in a common sense and practical
manner, here we are unable to identify any
basis, let alone a "substantial basis," for
probable cause to search and seize the broad
category of firearm and firearm-related
materials set forth in the warrant.
Accordingly, we find ourselves in that rare
situation where we must conclude that the
magistrate lacked a substantial basis for
issuing the warrant for this broad range of
items.

"'for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in
association with' a group that meets the
specific statutory conditions· of a 'criminal
street gang, ", and when the act is done with
the "'specific intent to promote, further, or
assist in any criminal conduct by gang
members. ", Here, Messerschmidt himself
stated he had no reason to believe that
Bowen's assault on Kelly was related to
gangs, and there is no evidence in the
affidavit (or the record) to suggest
otherwise. Because the deputies failed to
establish any link between gang-related
materials and a crime, the warrant
authorizing the search and seizure of all
gang-related evidence is likewise invalid.
IV

Our conclusion that there was no probable
cause for the broad categories of firearmand gang-related items listed in the search
warrant, and that the search warrant violated
the Millenders' constitutional rights, is only
the first step in our analysis of whether the
deputies are entitled to qualified immunity.
We must next consider whether the
Millenders' constitutional rights were
"clearly established" at the time of the
deputies' alleged misconduct.
A

C
We next consider the search warrant's
authorization to search for all gang-related
items. . . . Neither of [the] assertions
[provided in the affidavit] provides probable
cause for a magistrate to conclude that
"contraband or evidence of a crime," would
be found at Mrs. Millender's residence.
Merely being a gang member or having
gang ties is not a crime in California. The
relevant California law "imposes increased
criminal penalties" for gang membership
only when the underlying criminal act is

The Supreme Court has refined the
application of the qualified immunity test in
the FOUlth Amendment context. See Malley,
475 U.S. at 344-46, 106 S.Ct. 1092; Groh,
540 U.S. at 563-65, 124 S.Ct. 1284. In
private actions against officers who have
executed
constitutionally
inadequate
warrants, the Supreme Court has held that an
officer loses qualified immunity only when
"a reasonably well-trained officer in [the
defendant officer's] position would have
known that his affidavit failed to establish
probable cause and that he should not have
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applied for the warrant." This standard
"provides ample protection to all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly
violate the law."
Despite this protection, the Supreme Court
has preserved the right of individuals to seek
relief in certain narrowly defined
circumstances. Malley and Groh, the two
leading Supreme Court cases in this context,
deal with facts and arguments similar to the
case before us. In Malley, plaintiffs sued a
state trooper under § 1983 for applying for
an arrest warrant that failed to establish
probable cause. Rather than granting the
officer absolute immunity, Malley held that
officers should receive only qualified
immunity because "it would be incongruous
to test police behavior by the 'objective
reasonableness' standard in a suppression
hearing, while exempting police conduct in
applying for an arrest or search warrant from
any scrutiny whatsoever in a § 1983
damages action." Accordingly, Malley held
that officers would be entitled to qualified
immunity in § 1983 actions only under the
same facts that would allow the government
to claim a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule in a suppression hearing.
Said otherwise, officers lose immunity only
"where the warrant application is so lacking
in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence unreasonable."
Malley rejected the argument that the
. trooper was "shielded from damages
liability because the act of applying for a
warrant is per se objectively reasonable" and
that he was "entitled to rely on the judgment
. of a judicial officer in finding that probable
cause exists and hence issuing the warrant."
According to Malley, that view of objective
reasonableness was "at odds" with cases
such as Leon and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396
(1982). Rather, the pertinent question must

be "whether a reasonably well-trained
officer in [the defendant. officer's] position
would have known that his affidavit failed to
establish probable cause and that he should
not have applied for the warrant." If a
reasonable officer would have known that
the affidavit was fatally deficient, then the
defendant's "application for a warrant was
not objectively reasonable, because it
created the unnecessary danger of an
unlawful arrest [or search]." Malley declined
to hold that an officer could rely on the
determination of the magistrate, stating that
"it is possible that a magistrate, working
under docket pressures, will fail to perform
as a magistrate should" and, accordingly, it
was "reasonable to require the officer
applying for the warrant to minimize this
danger by exercising reasonable professional
judgment."
Groh offers an example of one of the rare
cases described in Malley when a warrant is
"so lacking in indicia of probable causeas to
render official belief in its existence
unreasonable," 475 U.S. at 345, 106 S.Ct.
1092, notwithstanding the approval of a
magistrate. In Groh, the plaintiff claimed his
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated
because the warrant authorizing the search
and seizure of his property was invalid. 540
U.S. at 554-55, 124' S.Ct. 1284. Although
the defendant officer had prepared a detailed
application for the warrant, the warrant itself
included only a description of the plaintiff s
residence, and it did not incorporate the
application by reference. Groh held that the
warrant "was plainly invalid" because it
totally failed to describe the things to be
seized, let alone with particularity.
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the
search conducted pursuant to the warrant
was unconstitutional. Rejecting the officer's
assertion of qualified immunity, Groh
reasoned that "just a simple glance [ ]would
have revealed a glaring deficiency that any
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reasonable police officer would have known
was. constitutionally fatal." Further, the
Court held that the officer "may not argue
that he reasonably relied on the Magistrate's
assurance that the warrant contained an
adequate description of the things to be
. seized and was therefore valid" because the
officer himself prepared the invalid warrant.
Accordingly, as Malley and Groh make
clear, a plaintiff can proceed with a § 1983
action stemming from· an officer's
application for an invalid warrant in those
limited situations when "a reasonably welltrained officer" in the defendant's situation
would have known that the warrant did not
establish probable cause. When the warrant
is so lacking in indicia of probable cause,
officers cannot claim that they acted
reasonably by seeking a warrant merely
because a neutral magistrate approved the
application; rather, officers must exercise
"reasonable
professional
their
own
judgment."
In interpreting these precedents, we have
emphasized the "distinction between
warrants with disputable probable cause and
warrants so lacking in probable cause that
no reasonable officer would view them as
valid.~' Where the "lack of probable cause
was so obvious that any reasonable officer
reading the warrant would conclude that the
warrant was facially invalid," we have held
. that "[a]pproval by an attorney and a
magistrate did not· justify reasonable
reliance."
B
While the deputies claim that "a reasonably
well-trained officer" in their position would
no.t have known that the search warrant
failed to establish probable cause, they add
little to their prior arguments. The deputies
argue that they could have reasonably but

mistakenly concluded that they had probable
cause to seize the weapon found at the
Millender residence because "they would
not know if the suspect would be coming
back and the officers would not want the
suspect to gain access to more weapons and
hurt other people, including the victim in
this case." To the extent this argument
differs
from
their
"dangerousness"
argument, see supra at pp. 12729-30, it also
fails. Although officers may make a
warrantless entry into a residence under
certain exigent circumstances, such as when
"they have an objectively reasonable basis
for believing that an occupant is seriously
injured or imminently threatened with such
injury," the exigent circumstances doctrine
is an exception to the warrant requirement,
not an authorization for the deputies to apply
for a warrant that is not supported· by
probable cause. The deputies also assert they
could have been reasonably mistaken as to
whether the underlying crime was gangrelated. This argument borders on· the
frivolous, given Messerschmidt's statement
that he had no reason to hold such a belief,
and the absence of any evidence that the
crime at issue was gang-related.
The deputies' arguments cannot change the
reality that the warrant in this case suffered a
"glaring deficiency." Neither it nor the
affidavit established probable cause that the
broad categories of firearms, firearm-related
material,
and
gan·g-related
material
described in the warrant were contraband or
evidence of a crime. Moreover, a reasonable
officer in the deputies' position would have
been well aware of this deficiency. The
affidavit indicated exactly· what item was
evidence of a crime . . . and reasonable
officers would know they could not
undertake a general, exploratory search for
unrelated items unless they had additional
probable cause for those items. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say that an officer
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could reasonably but mistakenly believe that
the search warrant established "a colorable
argument for probable cause." Rather, the
warrant here was "plainly invalid."

guideline," Dissent at 1041, does not excuse
the police officers from compliance with the
existing rules mandated by the Supreme
Court.

Citing the dissenting opinions in Malley and
Groh, see Dissent at 1039 n.8, 1038-40 &
n.l0, 1045-46, the dissent would hold that
the officers acted in an objectively
reasonable manner as a matter of law
because they "reasonably relied" on the
review and approval of "their superiors, the
district attorney, and the magistrate to
correct the alleged over breadth in the search
warrant," Dissent at 1044. Judge Silverman
likewise suggests that the deputies are
entitled to qualified immunity because they
obtained a warrant, consulted with their
superiors, and acted in good faith. Silverman
Dissent at 1049-50. We cannot accept these
propositions, however, because they conflict
with the majority opinions in Malley and
Groh, which imposed on police officers the
independent responsibility to ensure there is
at least a colorable argument for probable
cause, and rejected the factors suggested by
the dissenting justices for giving police
officers even further protection from
liability. Nor can we agree that the officers
were objectively reasonable in obtaining a
search warrant for a broad range of firearms
and gang indicia because the suspect was an
ex-felon, the firearms were inherently
dangerous, and the firearms were
specifically described. Dissent at 12759-60.
As explained above, under basic Fourth
. Amendment principles, a search warrant is
not supported by probable cause unless the
affidavit establishes that the items in the
search warrant are contraband or evidence of
a crime; neither information known only to
the officer, the criminal status of the suspect,
nor the dangerousness of the items listed in
the warrant establishes probable cause. The
dissent's desire to transform these longstanding rules into a more "workable

The deputies here had a responsibility to
exercise their reasonable professional
judgment. As Malley recognized, "ours is
not an ideal system," and as such in
circumstances such as these a neutral
magistrate's approval (and, a fortiori, a nonneutral prosecutor's, cannot absolve an
officer of liability. Accordingly, the deputies
are not entitled to qualified immunity with
respect to the Millenders' claim that their
role in obtaining and executing the warrants
violated their constitutional rights.

v

***
AFFIRMED.
CALLAHAN, Circuit Judge, with whom
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge joins, dissenting:
Although the majority's opinion nicely lays
out the law applicable to a determination of
qualified immunity, my review of the law
and the facts in this case :require that I
dissent. I address four matters. First, I take
issue with the majority's determination that
the warrant constitutionally could not
provide for the search and seizure of
firearms other than the sawed-off shotgun.
Second, in reviewing the applicable case
law, the maj ority fails to appreciate the
factors courts have used to transform an
abstract standard-·did the officer reasonably
rely on review by counsel and a
magistrate-into a workable guide for a line
officer. Third, I would find thatthe totality
of the circumstances in this case compels a
finding that the line officer reasonably relied
on his supervisors, the district attorney, and
the
magistrate
to
determine
the
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constitutional limits of the search warrant.
Finally, I am concerned that the majority's
parsing of the search warrant is likely to
encourage uncertainty
and needless
litigation. I would grant the officer qualified
immunity.
I

Our differing views on the warrant's
provision for the search and seizure of
firearms are revealed by our respective
applications of UnitedStates v. Spitotro, 800
F.2d 959 (9th Cir.1986), which sets fOlih the
framework for determining a warrant's
sufficiency. There we held that "[i]n
determining whether a description is
sufficiently precise," we should concentrate
on one or more of the following:
(1) whether probable cause exists to
seize all items of a particular type
described in the warrant; (2) whether
the warrant sets out objective
standards by which executing
officers can differentiate items
subject to seizure from those which
are not; and (3) whether the
government was able to describe the
items more particularly in light of the
information available to it at the time
the warrant was issued.
Id. at 963 (citations omitted).

The majority admits that there was probable
cause to search for and seize the. "black
sawed-off shotgun with a pistol grip," but
objects that "the affidavit does not set forth
any evidence indicating that Bowen owned
or used any other firearms, that such
firearms were contraband or evidence of a
crime, or that such firearms were likely to be
present at the Millenders' residence." Op. at
1025. This approach overlooks the fact that
the search warrant was accompanied by an

arrest warrant for Bowen, the real object of
the search, who the officer believed resided
at the residence. Bowen was reasonably
considered to be dangerous'....
Given this context, the officers had probable
cause to search for and seize any firearms in
the home in which Bowen, a gang member
and felon, was thought to reside. In Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317,
76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme COUli
held that probable cause exists when "there
is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence Of a crime will be found m a
particular place." Firearms by their very
nature are dangerous and numerous laws
render their possession by convicted felons
criminal. Thus, in light of the facts known to
the officer, i.e., that Bowen had recently
fired a shotgun at his girl friend, was a gang
member, was a felon, and presumably was
armed, there was at least a "fair probability"
not only that there might be firearms in the
house in which Bowen was believed to be
residing, but that such firearms would be
"contraband or evidence of a crime."
Moreover, the safety of all involved, both
the officers and the inhabitants of the horne,
requires that officers seeking the nighttime
arrest of a dangerous felon be allowed to
seize any firearm that they come across in
their search for that individual or for
evidence that is otherwise properly covered
by the search warrant. Indeed, securing any
weapons found during the search is justified
to protect the officers executing the warrant
from harm while doing so.
Once it is understood that there was a fair
probability that any firearms found in the
house in which Bowen was thought to reside
would be contraband or evidence of a crime,
the warrant meets the second and third
provisions of the Spilotro· framework. The
warrant sets· out firearn1s and firearmsrelated items in objective language that
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allowed the officers to differentiate what
items they might seize. Furthermore, as any
firearm was likely to be contraband or
evidence of a crime, a more particular
description was neither required nor
desirable. Accordingly, I dissent from the
majority's determination that the wanant's
provision for the search and seizure of
firearms was unconstitutional.

B. Ninth Circuit Authority
A review of our own precedent reveals and
reinforces the factors that should be
considered in determining whether an
officer who sought a wanant reasonably
relied on review by counsel and a
magistrate.
[Summary of Ninth Circuit precedent.]

II

C. Analysis
A. Supreme Court Authority

The majority and I agree that the standard
for determining qualified immunity has been
set forth by the Supreme Court in "Malley v.
Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46, 106 S.Ct.
1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) and Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 124 S.Ct. 1284, 157
L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004). Moreover, there is
little difference in our reading of these
opinions in the abstract. Rather, we differ on
the application of the qualified immunity
test to a front line police officer's request for
an atTest wanant and accompanying search
wanant. The majority's position is difficult
to reconcile with the Fourth Amendment's
preference for searches authorized by
neutral and detached magistrates.

Our review of Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit cases addressing reasonable reliance
reveals certain considerations that transform
what might otherwise be an abstract
question into a working guide for police
officers. Among these considerations are:
(1) whether it was reasonable for the officer
to apply for the wanant; (2) whether there
was sufficient probable Calise to issue a
wanant; (3) whether the wanant was
facially invalid; (4) whether the warrant
properly identified the limited matters to be
searched; (5) whether the officer fairly
sought review by his or her superiors,
counsel and a magistrate; and (6) whether
the
officer's· misunderstanding
was
reasonable even where there was no
probable cause.

[Summary of Malley, Grah, and Leon.]
In sum, I agree with the majority that
pursuant to Malley and Groh, the question is
whether a reasonably well-trained officer in
the defendant's situation would have known
that the wanant did not establish probable
cause. Op. at 12734-35. But an appreciation
of the specific language in the Supreme
. Court's opinions should lead us to focus on
those factors that transform an abstract
standard into a workable guideline for a line.
officer.

All of these factors should be applied in a
manner consistent with the Supreme Court's
perspective that qualified immunity should
"amply" protect "all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate
the law."
III

The application of these factors to the
present case compels a determination that
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the officers reasonably relied on their
superiors, the district attorney, and the
magistrate to correct the alleged over
breadth in the search warrant.
First, as this case comes to us, we accept
that it was reasonable for the officers to
apply for the warrant and that there was
sufficient probable cause for the warrant to
issue. In the district court, plaintiffs
challenged whether the affidavit established
probable cause to believe that Bowen could
be found at the residence, but the district
court denied that claim. On this
interlocutory appeal from the district comi's
denial of qualified immunity, we accept the
district comi's determination that there was
sufficient probable cause to allow the officer
to apply for the nighttime search warrant
and for the magistrate to issue the warrant.
Second, the warrants were facially valid.
They adequately identified the location to be
searched, the person to be arrested, and the
items to be seized. Regardless of whether
there was probable cause to search for
firearms and indicia of gang membership,
thttse limited items were properly identified
on the face of the warrant.
Third, Officer Messerschmidt scrupulously
followed the proper procedUl'esin seeking
the arrest and search warrants. The warrant
affidavit was reviewed by his sergeant and
Messerschmidt consulted a lieutenant.
Moreover, the warrants were reviewed by a
deputy district attorney before they were
presented to, reviewed by, and signed by a
magistrate. Messerschmidt followed the
Supreme Comi directions in Leon to seek
the "detached scrutiny of a neutral
magistrate. "
Despite accepting that there were reasonable
grounds for seeking the warrants, that there
was sufficient probable cause to issue the

search warrant, that the warrant was facially
valid, and that the proper procedUl'es were
followed to have the warrants reviewed and
approved by a neutral magistrate, the
majority nonetheless concludes that the
absence of probable cause for two sections
of the warrant was so obvious that the
officer is not entitled to qualified· immunity.
Despite our observation, and the Supreme·
Court's observation, that "reasonable minds
frequently may differ on the question
whether a particular affidavit establishes
probable cause," the majority, in essence,
considers the officer to have been
incompetent or dishonest. Initially, it should
be noted that the majority does not suggest
that the officer was dishonest. Although the
plaintiffs in the district court argued that the
officer had failed to present the magistrate
with all the relevant facts, the district court
rejected those contentions, and there is
nothing in the majority's opinion that
resurrects that contention. Rather, the
majority's opinion basically holds. that the
lack of relationship between the charged
crime by Bowen and certain items described
in the search warrant was so obvious that the
officer may be held personally liable for
having entertained a contrary thought. Of
COUl'se, in light of my perspective on
whether the search might include firearms
other than the sawed-off shotgun, I think
that the officer's inclusion of other firearms
in the warrant, if not proper, was certainly
objectively reasonable.
How could the officer have thought that he
could search for indicia of gang
membership? We must ask this question
based on what the officer knew when he
prepared his affidavit. Here, we agree that
the officer knew that Bowen had fired a
sawed-off shotgun at a person in public, that
he was a felon, and that he had ties with a
street gang. We also accept that the officer
reasonably believed that Bowen was "hiding
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out" at the house on 120th Street. Why are
these "facts" not sufficient to allow the
officer initially to include a search for
indicia of gang membership in his warrant
application? Indeed, the affidavit in support
of the warrant offered precisely this line of
reasoning.
It appears that ultimately there was no
evidence of a link between Bowen's assault
on Kelly with a deadly weapon and his
membership in a street gang, but the officer
did not know this when he applied ,for the
warrant. Given that Bowen was a felon, a
gang member, and had used a sawed-off
shotgun, the possession of which might well
be illegal, the officer may reasonably have
conceived of possible ties between the
crime, the weapon and the gang. I do not
disagree with the district court's and the
majority's determination that nevertheless
there was insufficient probable cause to
support a warrant for indicia of gang
membership. Rather, my point is ,only that it
was reasonable for the officer to think that
there might be sufficient probable cause, at
least to include the request in the initial
application that would then be reviewed by
his superiors, a deputy district attomey and a
magistrate.

The officer. may well have made factual and
legal mistakes. He may have thought that the
facts that Bowen was a felon, a gang
member, and had committed an assault with
a deadly weapon created probable cause tb
search for indicia for gang membership. He
was wrong, but objectively viewed, his
mistake was not objectively umeasonable.
One way of ascertaining whether a mistaken
belief was reasonable is to compare it to
other cases where we have found that an
officer was not entitled to qualified
immunity. I can find no clear precedent that
supports the majority's conclusion. In Kow,

58 FJd 423, "the lack of probable cause was
so obvious that any reasonable officer would
conclude that the warrant was facially
invalid." Similarly, the warrant in Stubbs,
873 F.2d 210, was facially invalid. Perhaps
the most analogous case is KRL II There,
we denied qualified immunity to Officer
Hall because we found that "no reasonable
officer could conclude that the discovery of
a 1990 ledger and several checks showed
that KRL had been primarily engaged in
fraudulent activity since 1990." However,
our denial of qualified immunity was based
on: (1) Hall's "leadership role in the overall
investigation;" (2) our factual determination
that "the discovery of a ledger and several
checks predating the allegedly fraudulent
activity by five years did not provide
sufficient probable cause to search for
documents dating back to 1990;" and (3) our
conclusion that the warrant was obviously
facially
invalid.
Although
Officer
Messerschmidt may have been in charge of
the investigation of Bowen, he did not have
a leadership position similar to that held by
Hall in KRL II Furthermore, his incorrect
factual conclusion was not as far-fetched as
that in issue in KRL II, and the warrant was
not obviously facially invalid.
It might also be noted that in 2003, when
Messerschmidt sought the warrant, neither
of our opinions in KRL had issued.
However, we had decided Ortiz, 887 F.2d
1366. In that case, the officer sought 'a
warrant to search a home for weapons and
explosives based on only four telephone
calls by the same anonymous person.
Nonetheless, whiIe finding that there was no
probable cause to support the warrant, we
granted the police officer qualified
immunity, commenting that an "error of
constitutional dimensions may have been
committed with respect to the issuance of ,
the warrant, but it was the judge, not police
officers who made the ,critical mistake." I
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would hold that here, as in Ortiz, the
officer's "conduct was 'sufficient to
establish objectively reasonable behavior. '"

basis on which the officer mistakenly
thought he could seek a walTant to search for
indicia of gang membership.

Moreover, the majority's opinion appears to
extend unnecessarily the guiding Supreme
Court opinions. In Malley, the Court stated
that the question was "whether a reasonably
well-trained officer in petitioner's position
would have lmown that his affidavit failed to
establish probable cause and that he should
not have applied for the walTant." In Groh,
the Court denied qualified immunity
because the walTant "did not describe the
items to be seized at all "and "was so
obviously deficient that we must regard the
. search as 'walTantless' within the meaning
of our case law." Here, there IS really no
question that there was probable cause to
issue the wanant and that it was not facially
invalid.

Moreover, the two provisions of the walTant
at . issue-those authorizing searches for
firearms and . for indicia of gang
membership-do not appear to have been
very important either when the walTant was
initially sought or later. First, as noted, the
primary purpose of the search was to alTest
Bowen. Second, because the district court
upheld the wanant's provision allowing the
search for, and seizure of, indicia of home
ownership, and because the majority
concedes that the officers were entitled to
search for disassembled parts of the sawedoff shotgun, the questioned provisions did
not expand the actual scope of the search.
Third, as the search only resulted in the
seizure of Mrs. Millender's shotgun and a
box of ammunition (and no indicia of gang
membership), it does not appear that
plaintiffs were really harmed by the search
authorized by the questioned provisions of
the warrant (as contrasted to the entry into
the home and the general search). As Justice
Kennedy noted in his dissent in Groh,· the
Supreme Court has stressed that "'the
purpose of encouraging recourse to the
walTant procedure' can be served best by
rejecting overly technical standards when
cOUlis review warrants." Here, even
accepting that there was no probable cause
to support the questioned provisions of the
walTant, because this defect did not expand
the scope of the search nor cause any real
harm to the plaintiffs, it should not defeat an
otherwise appropriate grant of qualified
immunity.

I recognize that each provision of a search
wanant should be supported by probable
cause. Nonetheless, we have held in appeals
from suppression orders that evidence from
valid portions of a walT ant may be severed
from invalid portions. Similarly, we should
recognize that the lack of probable cause for
one clause in an otherwise valid wan'ant
does not mean that the officer's decision to
seek the wanant, or even to include that
clause in the walTant, was necessarily
unreasonable. Instead, at least where the
walTant is supported by probable cause and
is facially valid, but there is some question
asto the sufficiency of evidence to support a
section of the walTant, then absent some
showing of bad faith on the part of the
officer or of a failure to present .all the
relevant known facts to the magistrate, the
officer should be allowed to rely on his
superiors, the district attomey and the
magistrate to COlTect any over-breadth.
Certainly, that should be the case here, as
the officer's affidavit clearly sets forth the

This conclusion is reinforced by the purpose
of qualified immunity: to "amply" protect
officers other than "the plainly incompetent
or those who knowingly violate the law."
Hete, as noted, there is no suggestion that
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the officer "knowingly violated the law."
While the majority concludes that the officer
should have known that the search warrant
was too broad, the length it has to go to
make that point suggests that an officer's
failure to so reason cannot be considered
plain incompetence. Indeed, the very fact
that judges on this en banc panel disagree on
this point, in itself, weighs in favor of
granting qualified immunity.
IV

Last, but not least, I am concerned that the
maj ority' sparsing of the search warrant will
lead to uncertainty and needless litigation.
Denying qualified immunity where, as here,
the defect in the warrant (a lack of probable
cause for two sections of a warrant) did not
expand the scope beyond what was
constitutional and did not caUse any real
harm, creates considerable incentive to
challenge all but the narrowest of warrants.
Even if the overbreadth of a warrant does
not produce any evidence and does not
result in any real harm, a disgruntled person
can overcome a claim of qualified immunity
.by showing that the officer did not have
probable cause to support some part of the
warrant. This seems contrary to the purpose
of qualified immunity.
Moreover, the approach may well interfere
with a police officer's ability to properly
protect the public and investigate crimes.
Instead of investigating . a possible
relationship between an assault with a
deadly weapon by a convicted gang member
and the felon's street gang, the majority
would hold the officer personally liable for
not grasping that these facts did not support
the issuance of a warrant for anything other
than the felon and the particular weapon.
This appears to be the type of "hIgh level of
generality" that Justice Thomas warned
against in his dissent in Groh, 540 U.S. at

578, 124 S.Ct. 1284. Furthennore, this
approach may well discourage officers from
following up on leads that they would
otherwise bring to the attention of their
superiors for fear of personal liability if they
unwittingly err in their judgment.
To recap, although· I think that the officer
could reasonably have sought to search for
firearms other than the shotgun, I agree with
the majority that there was not a sufficient
showing of a relationship between the
assault and gang membership to provide
probable cause for the inclusion of indicia of
gang membership in the search warrant. But,
applying the factors stressed by the Supreme
Court and our court, I cannot conclude that
the officer's inclusion of the provision in the
.warrant was so objectively unreasonable as
to preclude reliance on the approval of his
supervisors, the district attorney and the
magistrate. It was reasonable for the officer
to apply for the warrant, there was probable
cause to issue the walTant, the warrant was
not facially invalid, the warrant properly
identified the limited matters to be seized,
and the officer followed the proper
procedures for seeking review by his
superiors, a district attorney and a
magistrate. Moreover, at least as to the
questioned provisions, it does not appear
that the officer hid any relevant information
from his superiors or the magistrate and his
affidavit plainly presented the grounds on
which he sought indicia of gang
membership. Furthermore, I have found no
precedent that suggests that an officer may
not rely on his superiors and the magistrate
when he makes an honest mistake in
thinking that there is probable cause to
support a provision in an otherwise valid
warrant. The majority's contrary conclusion
is of little real benefit to the plaintiffs, and
unfairly punishes a line officer for what, at
most, was a failure· on the part of his
sup enol'S, the deputy district attomey and
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the magistrate, to properly limit the warrant.
Here, as in Ortiz, an "error of constitutional
dimensions may have been committed with
respect to the issuance of the warrant, but it
was the judge, not the police officers who
made the critical mistake." I would hold that
the officer's application for a search warrant
which included searching for other firearms
and indicia of gang membership was not
objectively unreasonable and that the officer
is entitled to qualified immunity.
SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge, with whom
TALLMAN,
Circuit
Judge,
joins,
dissenting:
I join Parts II through IV of Judge
Callahan's dissent, but write separately to
emphasize several points.
The doctrine of qualified immunity "protects .
goveniment officials from liability for good
faith misjudgments and mistakes," and that
is precisely the situation here. The judge
issued a defective warrant and the deputies
mistakenly relied on it, but their mistake was
. entii'ely in good faith. The deputies did not
act until they obtained the warrant and they
did only what the warrant authorized them
to do. They did not engage in any form of
misconduct. They did not rough-up the
residents. They did not put false information
in the affidavit, conceal exculpatory
information, or seize property not mentioned
in the four-comers of the warrant. This is
not a case where police officers sought to
evade the warrant requirement; to the
contrary, they sought to comply with it. The
record is totally devoid of any evidence that
the deputies acted other than in good faith.
Qualified immunity protects from liability
. "all but the plainly incompetent and those
who knowingly violate the law." Does the
deputies' mistake rise to the level of plain
incompetence or intentional violation of the

law? I cannot imagine a clearer case of
reasonable error .than this one. In
determining whether the deputies reasonably
relied on the warrant, "all of the
circumstances . . . may be considered." It is
undisputed that the deputies knew Bowen to
be a convicted felon with a very violent
history, including convictions for assault
with a deadly weapon and being a felon in
possession of a firearm. They also knew that
he repOliedly had just shot at the victim
several times with a short-barrel Shotgun. As
a convicted felon, Bowen was prohibited
. from possessing firearms. Under· such
circumstances, how can it be "entirely
unreasonable"-not just a mistake but
entirely unreasonable-for the deputies to
have relied on a jUdge-signed warrant
authorizing the seizure of all of Bowen's
guns?
I also do not see how the deputies can be
deemed to be plainly incompetent, or to
have knowingly violated the law, for relying
on the warrant's authorization to seize Mona
Park Crip gang paraphemalia. The deputies
had probable cause to believe both that
Bowen was tied to the Mona Park Crip gang
and that he was residing at the Millender
residence.
Had
Mona
Park
Crip
paraphemalia been found in close proximity
to guns during the search of the Millender
house-say, a gun concealed in Mona Park
Crip clothing-such a discovery would have
tended to prove that the guns were Bowen's
and not the Millenders'. It is commonplace
for search warrants to authorize the seizure
of items that can help identify persons in
control of the premises or contraband. The
deputies' belief iri the validity of this portion
of the warrant was entirely reasonable.
Qualified immunity insulates police officers
from the threat of personal liability so that
they can "execute [their] office with the
decisiveness and the judgment required by
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the public good." The tradeoff for this
perceived societal benefit is that some
wrongs will go uncompensated. That is the

nature of immunity, and it is a tradeoff
adopted by the Supreme Court itself.
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"Cert. Grant in Millender v. LA: Qualified Immunity
for an Unconstitutional General
Warrant to Seize Firearms?"
The Volokh Conspiracy
July 10, 2011
David Kopel

The Supreme Court recently granted
celiiorari in Millender v. Los Angeles. Here
are the background facts: Bowen sh60ts at
his ex-girlfriend with a sawed-off shotgun.
The police obtain a search warrant for the
home of Bowen's 73-year-old former foster
mother. The warrant application does not
disclose that Bowen last lived with his foster
mother 15 years ago. (The girlfriend
suggested to the police that Bowen might be
hiding there.) The warrant authorizes the
seizure of all firearms on the premises, not
merely the particular gun which had been
used in the crime against the girlfriend.
The police executed a 5 a.m. dynamic entry,
and in the course of their search, seize a
firearm which is lawfully owned by the 73year-old woman, Augusta Millender. She
sues, and the 9th Circuit en banc rules that
the warrant was objectively unconstitutional.
The officer who procured the warrant (and
Los Angeles, by respondeat superior) are not
entitled to qualified immunity, because the
warrant to seize all firearms was so clearly
unconstitutional, based on settled law.
In the certiorari grant, the Questions
Presented are:
This COUli has held that police officers who
procure and execute warrants later
dete1mined invalid are entitled to qualified
immunity, and evidence obtained should not
. be suppressed, so long as the warrant is not
"so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render official belief in its existence entirely
umeasonable." United States v. Leon, 468

U.S. 897, 920, 923 (1984); Malley v. Briggs,
475 U.S. 335,341,344-45 (1986). The
Questions Presented are: 1. Under these
standards, are officers entitled to qualified
immunity· where they obtained a facially
valid warrant to search for firearms, firearmrelated materials, and gang-related items iri
the residence of a gang member and felon
. who had threatened to kill his girlfriend and .
fired a sawed-off shotgun at her, and a
district attomey approved the application, no
factually on point case law prohibited the
search, and the alleged overbreadth in the
warrant did not expand the scope of the
search? 2. Should the Malley/Leon standards
be reconsidered or clarified in light of lower
courts' inability to apply them in accordance
with their pUlpose of deterring police
misconduct, resulting in imposition of
liability ort officers for good faith conduct
and improper exclusion of evidence in
criminal cases?
The phrasing of the Questions Presented
further
suggest that
attomeys
for
Respondents have an uphill battle. The
Supreme Court docket page is here; the full
history of the case in the district court and
the Ninth Circuit, with full text of many of
the relevant documents, is available at the
website of Califomia attomey Chuck
Michel. Michel is, in my opinion, one of the
top two firearms law lawyers in Califomia,
the other being Don Kilmer.
In conjunction with Stephen Halbrook,
Michel filed an amicus brief in Millender,
on behalf of the National Rifle Association
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and the California Rifle and Pistol
Association Foundation. The brief explains
how the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on
general warrants is closely entwined with
the right to arms; for example, the 1662 gun
ban of the wicked Stuart king Charles II was
enforced by general warrants.
The Questions Presented seem to presume
the u;nconstitutionality of the general
warrant, with the only issue before the Court
The
being
qualified
immunity.
Halbrook/Michel argument on qualified
immunity points out that
Detective Messerschmidt knew that the only
firearm involved in- the crime was a black,
pistol-gripped, short barreled shotgun. He
nonetheless drafted a general warrant
authorizing search and seizure of all
firearms and firearm parts from the home of
an elderly woman, her daughter, and her
grandson, knowing that the suspect (Bowen)
did not even live III that home.
Messerschmidt cannot now rely on the
defense that he persuaded others up the
chain to approve his general warrant.

It bears repeating that the affidavit failed to

disclose that the residence was that of an
elderly lady and her relatives, not that of the
suspect.
Although Los -Angeles argues that the
unconstitutionality of the warrant was not
clearly established at the time the warrant
was executed, Halbrook and Michel point
to:

Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298
-F.3d 1022 (9th Cir.. 2002), involved a
general warrant obtained to search for
unregistered firearms, but the warrant
contained no list of firearms to seize. Id. at
554. A list of firearms was included in the
affidavit, but not attached to the warrant. Id.
Only lawful firearms were found. Id. at 555.
The homeowners later filed a civil rights
action for damages. Id. The Supreme Court
upheld the Ninth Circuit's conclusion in
Oroh that the search was unlawful and that
the agent who secured the warrant and led
the search could not rely on the defense of
qualified inmlUnity. Id. at 563-566 ..

Moreover,
In Groh, the law was clearly established in
the very text of the Fourth Amendment.
Case law condemning general warrants in
England dates back to at least 1765 in
Entick, and in the United States, to 1886 in
Boyd. The general warrant here-to search
for all firearms and related items, when only
a black, pistol-gripped; short-barreled
shotgun was at 'issue, and it had little or no
connection to the house to be searchedclearly violated the Fourth Amendment,
would be known to do so by any -competent
officer, and was not sanctified by being
rubber stamped by higher ups.
Michel has announced that NRA and
CRPAFwill file an amicus brief in the
Supreme Court, in part to explain to the
Court the problem of law enforcement
officers seizing large numbers of lawfully- .
possessed firearms in order to boost gun
seizure statistics.

Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004), afj'g
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."Searches for Guns at the Home of a
Suspect's Family Member"
The Volokh Conspiracy
October 2,2009
Eugene Volokh

The Ninth Circuit has just agreed to rehear
Millender v. County of Los Angeles en bane;
here's what I blogged about the case when
the panel opinion came out in May:
Bowen was a felon and likely a gang
member who had apparently committed a
serious gun crime (shooting at the car of his
girlfriend, who was leaving him, with a
sawed-off shotgun). The police heard that
Bowen "might be staying at his foster
mother's home." They therefore got a
warrant to search the foster mother's
(Augusta Millender'S) home for, among·
other things, "all firearms and firemmrelated items."
When they searched the house, they didn't
find Bowen or the gun with which he had
committed the crime, but they did find and
seize "Mrs. Millender's personal shotgun ..
. and a box of 45-caliber ammunition." Mrs.
Millender and the family members with
whom she was living (her daughter and her
grandson) sued, claiming the search violated
the Fourth Amendment. The case eventually
ended up before the Ninth Circuit,. as
Millender v. County of Los Angeles, decided
last Wednesday.
Judge Callahan, writing for herself and for
Judge Fernandez, held that the defendant
police officers were shielded by qualified
immunity because the search was authorized

by the warrant, and that this would be so
even if the warrant was unconstitutionally
overbroad. Judge Callahan did not express a
view on whether the warrant was indeed
overbroad.
Judge Fernandez concurred in the majority
opinion, agreeing that the officers were
shielded by qualified immunity because of
the warrant, but concluded that the sear<;h
was indeed unconstitutional. In this case, he
concluded, there was "extremely little
support for the search of a third person's
home for all firemms and ammunition"
(even though the officers thought Bowen
was staying at the house, and therefore it
was "Bowen's home also").
Judge Ikuta dissented, concluding that "ilo
officer of reasonable competence could have
thought [the] affidavit established probable
cause to search for the items listed in the
warrant," and that therefore the officers
couldn't claim qualified immunity. Judge
Ikuta also briefly cited D. C. v. Heller,
though only in passing, and following a
clause that said, "Mere possession of
firearms is not, generally speaking, a crime."
A very interesting case, and much worth
. reading if you're interested in searches and
seizures as they affect innocent third parties,
if you're interested in gun rights, or if you're
interested in both.
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Williams v. Illinois
10-8505
Ruling Below: People v. Williams, 238 Ill. 2d 125, 939 N.E. 2d 268 (2010) cert. granted, 108505,2011 WL 2535081 (U.S. June 28, 2011).

Defendant Sandy Williams allegedly sexually assaulted, kidnapped, and robbed L.J. on February
10,2000. A vaginal examination ofLJ. was conducted after the incident and swabs were sent to
the Illinois State Police Crime Lab (rSP) for analysis which confirmed the .presence of semen.
The samples were then sent to Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory where a DNA profile was
generated. Six months later, Williams was arrested for an unrelated offense and a blood sample
was drawn pursuant to court order. rsp generated a DNA profile of the defendant's blood
sample.
At trial, rsp forensic biologist Sandra Lambatos testified the two DNA profiles were a match.
The Cellmark lab report was not admitted into evidence and defense counsel objected, claiming a
violation of the Confrontation Clause. The trial court disagreed and Williams was convicted. On
appeal, the Supreme COUli of Illinois affirmed in pmi, holding that Lambatos appealed to the
Cellmark report for the purpose of explaining the basis of her opinion rather than as proof the
truth of her assertions and thus the prohibitions against hearsay evidence were inapposite.
Questions Presented: Whether a state rule of evidence allowing an expert witness to testify
about the results of DNA testing performed by non-testifying analysts violates the Confrontation
Clause, when the defendant has no opportunity to confront.tlw actual analysts.
The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee and Cross-Appellant,

v.
Sandy WILLIAMS, Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

Supreme Court of Illinois
July 15, 2010
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
Chief Justice FITZGERALD delivered the
judgment of the court, with opinion.
After a bench trial in the circuit cOUli of
Cook County, the defendant, Sandy
Williams, was convicted of two counts of
aggravated criminal sexual assault and one
count each of aggravated kidnapping and
aggravated robbery of LJ. The appellate
court affirmed the defendant's conviction,
but reversed the trial court's imposition of a

consecutive sentence. On appeal to this
cOUli, the defendant argues that the
testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic
analyst, who relied upon a DNA report
prepared by a nontestifying third-party
analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary
foundation. Alternatively, the defendant
argues that this testimony concerning the
report was hearsay presented for the truth of
the matter asserted and violated the
defendant's sixth amendment confrontation
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clause right. The State cross-appeals,
maintaining the appellate court improperly
reversed the trial court's imposition of a
consecutive sentence. For the following
reasons, we affirm in part and reverse in
part.
BACKGROUND
The State charged the defendant in a 17count indictment with aggravated criminal
sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and
aggravated robbery. The cause proceeded to
a bench trial. The counts that the State
ultimately submitted to the judge were
counts IV and VI (aggravated criminal
sexual assault under nOJLCS 5/12-14(a)(3)
(West 2000)), count XV (aggravated
kidnapping under no ILCS 5/10-2(a)(3)
(West 2000)) and count XVII (aggravated
robbery under no ILCS5/18-5 (West
2000)). The State entered· a nolle prosequi
. on the remaining counts. The following facts
were adduced at trial.
On February 10, 2000, 22-year-old LJ.
worked until 8 p.m. as a cashier at a clothing
store in Chicago. On her way home to the
south side of the city, she purchased items at
the store for her mother and went toward her
home. As she passed an alley, the defendant
came up behind her and forced her to sit in
the backseat of a beige station wagon, where
he told her to take her clothes off. The
defendant then vaginally penetrated LJ. The
defendant also contacted LJ.'s anus with his
penis, but did not penetrate. He then pushed
LJ. out of the car while keepingLJ.'s coat,
money, and other items. After LJ. ran home,
her mother opened the door and saw her in
tears, partially clothed with only one pant
leg on. After L.J. went into the bathroom,
her mother called the police.
Shortly after 9 p.m., Chicago police officers
arrived at the home and found L.J. in the

bathtub. She had not yet washed her vaginal
area. After L.J. told the officers what had
transpired, the officers issued a "flash"
message for a black male, 5 foot, 8 inches
tall, wearing a black skull cap, a black jacket
and driving a beige station wagon. An
ambulance transported L.J. and her mother
to the emergency room. Dr. Nancy Schubert
conducted a vaginal exam of L.J. and took
vaginal swabs, which were then sealed and
placed into a criminal sexual assault
evidence collection kit along with LJ.'s
blood sample. The kit was sent to the Illinois
State Police (ISP) Crime Lab for testing and
analysis.
On February 15, 2000, forensic biologist
Brian Hapack with the ISP Crime Lab
received LJ.'s sexual assault evidence
collection kit and performed tests that
confirmed the presence of semen. Hapack
placed the swabs in a coin envelope, sealed
the envelope, and placed the evidence in a
secure freezer. Hapack guaranteed the
accuracy of his results by working in a clean
environment free from contamination and by
ensuring that the tests functioned properly.
On August 3, 2000, police arrested the
defendant for an unrelated offense and,
pursuant to a court order, drew a blood
sample from the defendant. On August 24,
2000, forensic scientist Karen Kooi
performed an analysis on the sample that
consisted of four quarter-sized bloodstains
on a filter card. Kooi extracted a
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profile ancl
entered it into the database at the ISP Crime
Lab. Meanwhile, the samples from L.J.'s
sexual assault kit were sent to Cellmark
Diagnostic Laboratory in Germantown,
Maryland, for DNA analysis on November
29, 2000. Cellmark returned LJ.'s vaginal
swabs and blood standard to the ISP Crime
Lab on April 3, 2001. Cellmark derived a
DNA profile for the person whose semen
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was recovered from 1.J. According to ISP
forensic biologist Sandra Lambatos, whose
testimony will be set forth more fully below,
the DNA profile received from Cellmark
matched the defendant's DNA profile from
the blood sample in the ISP database. LJ.
identified the defendant in a line up on April
17, 2001. The defendant was then arrested
for the instant offenses.
At the bench trial, Lambatos was accepted
as an expert in forensic biology and forensic
DNA analysis by the trial cOUli. Lambatos
began her testimony with a brief explanation
of polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing.
PCR testing, according to Lambatos, is one
of the most modern types of DNA analysis
available and is generally accepted in the
scientific community. Lambatos explained
how PCR analysis can be used to identify a
male profile from a semen sample. First, an
analyst conducts a procedure that isolates
and extracts DNA from a sample that may
include a mixture from a particular
defendant and the victim. The DNA is not
large enough to test at. this point, and
requires amplification to form a more
workable sample. After amplification, an
analyst can measure the length of an
individual specific strand through a process
called electrophoresis. A computer translates
this measurement onto a graph called an
electropherogram. The electropherogram is
a representation of the individual's specified
DNA data into a line with peaks
representing the lengths of the DNA strands
of the 13 STR regions. Reports generally
also provide a "table of alleles" showing the
DNA profile of each sample. She also stated
that the statistical probability of a match can
also be determined by entering the alleles
into a frequency database to learn how
common they are in the general population.
Lambatos further testified that it is a
commonly accepted practice in the scientific

community for one DNA expert to rely on
the records of another DNA analyst· to
complete her work. As mentioned, she used
the DNA profile from Cellmark to match the
DNA profile from the defendant's blood
sample, which was contained in the ISP
database. She stated that, because Cellmark
was an accredited laboratory, it was required
to meet "certain guidelines to perform DNA
analysis for the Illinois State Police and so
all those
calibrations· and internal
proficiencies and controls [of the equipment
used] would have had to have been in place
for· them to perform the DNA analysis."
Cellmark's testing and analysis methods
were generally accepted in the scientific
community· according
to
Lambatos.
Lambatos, however, admitted that Cellmark .
had different procedures and standards for
results than the ISP Crime Lab.
Nevertheless, Lambatos testified that she
personally developed proficiency tests for
Cellmark technicians to perform. She further
testified that she routinely relied on results
from Cellmark and she did not observe any
chain of custody or contamination problems.
The prosecutor then asked her expert
opinion regarding the DNA match. Defense
counsel objected and asserted that Lambatos
could not rely upon the testing performed by
another lab. The trial court replied, "We will
see. If she says that she didn't do her own
testing and she relied on a test of another lab
and she's testifying to that. We'll see what
she's going to say."
Lambatos then testified that a match was
generated of the male DNA profile found in
the semen from LJ.'s vaginal swabs to the
defendant's male DNA profile from the
defendant's blood standard. In response to
defense questioning, Lambatos restated her
interpretation of the alleles at each of the 13
locations. She testified about. several
locations where she visually filtered out
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spurious alleles and "background noise" and
distinguished the defendant's profile.
Lambatos concluded that in her expert
opinion, the semen from LJ.'s vaginal swab
was a match to the defendant. Lambatos
testified that the probability of this profile
occurring in the general population was one
in 8.7 quadrillion black, one in 390
quadrillion white, and one in 109 quadrillion
Hispanic unrelated individuals .. She did not
observe any degradation or irregularities in
the sample from L.J.'s vaginal swab.
She stated that, in general, if "there was a
question of a match, then we would
investigate that further by looking at the
electropherograms from all the cases
involved and do some more comparisons on
that." She explained that in looking at
Cellmark's report, she interpreted it and "I
did review their data, and I did make my
own interpretations so I looked at what * * *
they sent to me and did make. my own
determination, my own opinion." While
Lamb ato s testified to her conclusion
informed by Cellmark's report, Cellmark's
report itself was not introduced into
evidence. Also, while Lambatos referenced
documents she reviewed in forming her own
opinion, she did not read the contents of the
Cellmark report into evidence.
At the conclusion of Lambatos' testimony,
the defendant moved to strike the evidence
of testing completed by Cellmark based
upon a violation of his sixth amendment
right to confront witnesses against him. The
defendant also objected on the grounds of
foundation, citing People v. Raney, 324
Ill.App.3d 703, 258 Ill.Dec. 356, 756 N.E.2d
338 (2001), and argued insufficient evidence
was presented regarding the calibration of
the Cellmark equipment. The trial court
denied the defendant's motion to strike. The
trial court stated, "I don't think this is a
Crawford scenario, and I agree with the

State that the evidence is-the issue is, you
know, what weight do you give the test, not
do you exclude it and accordingly your
motion to exclude or strike the testimony of
the last· witness or opinions based on her
own independent testing of the data received
from Cellmark will be denied."
Following this and other testimony
concerning the incident, the State rested.
The trial court denied the defendant's
motion for a directed finding. The defendant
did not present any evidence in his defense.
Thereafter, the trial court found. the
defendant guilty of two counts of aggravated
criminal sexual assault, and one count each
of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated
robQery. The court denied the defendant's
motion for a new trial.
[The Court discussed sentencing.]
On appeal, the appellate court rejected the
defendant's contentions that the State failed
to establish a sufficient foundation for
Lambatos' opinion; that the State failed to
establish that Cel1mark's equipment was
adequately
calibrated
and
properly
functioning; and that the State failed to
establish a sufficient chain of custody based
upon Cellmark's handling of the evidence.
The appellate court next rejected. the
defendant's argument that the results of
Cel1mark's testing and analysis were
testimonial in nature and therefore
Lambatos' expert testimony thereto violated
the defendant's constitutional right to
confrontation. 385 Ill.App.3d at 370, 324
Ill.Dec. 246, 895 N.E.2d 961. The court
noted that the confrontation clause does not
bar the use of testimonial statements for
purposes other than establishing the truth of
the matter asserted. The appellate coUrt
found that "Cellmark'sreport was not
offered for the truth of the matter asserted;
rathel', it was offered to provide a basis for
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Lambatos~

opinion." 385 Ill.App.3d at 369~
324 Ill.Dec. 246~ 895 N.E.2d 961. The court
stated~
"Overall~
defendant essentially
requests that we require each and every
individual involved in the. testing and
analysis of DNA to testify at trial. For
obvious reasons in the abstract and for those
provided in the case at bar~ we decline to
issue such a ruling." 385 Ill.App.3d at 370~
324 Ill.Dec. 246~ 895 N.E.2d 961. ...
This court granted the defendant~s petition
for leave to appeal. 210 Ill.2d R. 315; The
State has requested cross-relief concerning
the appellate court~s modification of the
sentence.
ANALYSIS
Foundational Challenge
The defendant argues generally' before this
cOUli that the. trial court committed
reversible error when it permitted Lambatos
to testify that the defendant~s DNA profile
matched the male DNA profile of the semen
in L.J.~s vaginal swabs. The defendant
specifically argues that the trial court erred
in admitting Lambatos ~ testimony regarding
the match because a sufficient foundation
was not established. The defendant
Lambatos~
additionally
argues
that
testimony violated his sixth amendment
confrontation right under Crawford v.
Washington,. 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354,
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). We begin with the
foundational arguinent. We apply the abuse
of discretion standard to the defendant's
foundational challenge to the trial court's
admission of Lambatos' expert testimony.

defendant, when expert testimony relies
upon data obtained from electronic or
mechanical equipment, the proponent· of the
testimony must offer foundational proof that
the equipment was calibrated and
functioning properly at the time the data was
presented in order to establish that the
expert~ s testimony is reliable. The State
responds that Lambatos' testimony that
Cellmark's testing was done according to
valid scientific theory and reliable
methodology provided a sound basis upon
which Lambatos could formulate her
opinion. Therefore, the State asserts that it
was not obliged to present additional
testimony regarding the calibration and
functioning of Cellmark's equipment to
admit Lambatos' expert opinion pursuant to
Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill.2d 186, 49 Ill.Dec.
308, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981). We agree
with the State.
. In Wilson v. Clark, this court adopted Rules
703 and 705 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence concerning an expert's testimony
at trial. FOlmer Rule 703 states in part:
"The facts or data in the particular
case upon which an expert bases an
opinion or inference may be those
perceived by or made known to the
expert at or before the hearing. If of
a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not
be admissible in evidence in order
for the opinion or inference' to be
admitted."
Fed.R.Evid. 703 (amended 2000).

The defendant contends that the trial court
should not have permitted the State's
forensic analyst to testify because of a lack
of sufficient testimony that the Cellmark
repOli was reliable. According to the

The court in Wilson noted that, in a trial
context, "[b]oth Federal and State courts
have interpreted Federal Rule 703 to allow
opinions based on facts not in evidence."
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Wilson, 84 Il1.2d at 193,49 Il1.Dec. 308,417
N.E.2d 1322. Rule 705 states:

"The expert may testify in terms of
opinion or inference and give
reasons therefor without first
testifying to the underlying facts or
data,' unless the court requires
otherwise. The expert may in any
event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on crossexamination. "
Fed.R.Evid.705.
Following Rule 705, we held in Wilson that,
at trial, "an expert may give an opinion
without disclosing the facts underlying that'
opinion." "Under Rule 705 the burden is
placed upon the adverse party during crossexamination to elicit the facts underlying the
expert opinion." Thus, an expert testifying at
trial may offer an opinion based on facts not
in evidence, and the expert is not required
on direct examination to disclose the facts
underlying the expert's opinion.
This court applied Wilson v. Clark to DNA
evidence in People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill.2d
187, 307 Il1.Dec. 524, 860 N.E.2d 178
(2006). There, the defendant filed a motion
during trial to bar testimony from Terry
Melton, the president of Mitotyping
Technologies,
concerning
human
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA). Melton did
not complete the actual laboratory "bench
work" on, the evidence. The defendant
argued that, without the lab technician's
testimony, Melton's testimony regarding the
mtDNA results was improper. We rejected
that argument, holding that it was enough
that Melton relied upon data reasonably
relied upon by other experts in her field.
Here, the trial court correctly denied defense
counsel's objection to the foundation for

Lambatos' expert opinion. It is undisputed
that Lambatos was qualified as an expert in
forensic biology and DNA analysis;
Lambatos testified that it is the commonly
accepted practice in the scientific
community for a forensic DNA analyst to
rely on the work of other analysts to
complete her own work; and Lambatos
based her opinion on information reasonably
relied upon by experts in her field.
As in Sutherland, Lambatos testified that
Cellmark's work on the vaginal swabs in .
this case and the results of the PCR analysis
conducted by Kooi are the types of data
reasonably relied upon by expelis in her
field. Lambatos testified that, because
Cellmark was an accredited laboratory,
calibrations, internal proficiencies, and
controls had to be in place for the DNA
analysis to be completed in this case. These
internal controls were, according to
Lambatos' testimony, ones. that she'
personally developed. Lambatos herself
reviewed Cellmark's data, including the
electropherogram, and did not have any
question about the match. Rather, she used
her own expertise to compare the two
profiles before her. She also did not observe
any problems in the chain of custody or any
signs of contamination or degradation of the
evidence. Lambatos ultimately agreed with
Cellmark's results regarding the male DNA
profile, and then made her own visual and
interpretive comparisons of the peaks on the
electropherogram and the table of alleles to
conclude there was a match to the
defendant's genetic profile.
We also reject the defendant's specific
complaint that there was no testimony that
the instruments used by Cellmark were'
calibrated and functioning properly. The
defendant principally relies on People v.
Raney, 324 Il1.App.3d 703, 258 Ill.Dec. 356,
756 N.E.2d 338 (2001). Raney held that
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where the expert testimony is based upon an
electronic or mechanical device, the expert
must provide some foundational proof that
the device was functioning properly at the
time it was used. The defendant there argued
that the State failed to establish a proper
foundation for the admission of scientific
results from the gas chromotography mass
spectrometer (GCMS) machine. The court
. agreed, finding that the record contained no
evidence regarding whether the GCMS
machine was functioning properly at the
time it was used to analyze the substance.
FUliher, the Raney court stated an expeti
should be able to explain how the GCMS
machine was calibrated or why she knew the
results were accurate. Finding a lack of such
an explanation, the court concluded that the
State failed to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a· reasonable doubt because of the
lack of foundation. The Raney court
acknowledge<i, however, that "[i]t may not
be feasible for each expert to personally test
the instrument relied upon for purposes of
determining what is a suspected controlled
substance."
We find that the testing of narcotics using a
GCMS machine is not comparable to the
scientific process at issue in this case. At the
defendant's bench trial, Lambatos did not
merely regurgitate results generated by a
machine, as the witness in Raney did.
Lambatos conducted an independent
evaluation of data related to samples of
genetic material, including items processed
at both Cellmatk and the ISP Crime Lab.
Lamb ato s used her expertise and
professional judgment to compare the DNA
profiles. Her examination of the different
alleles from the blood sample and from the
semen sample indicated a match with the
defendant. She also determined the
statistical probability of the match by
examining the alleles and entering them into
a .frequency database to determine how

common they are in the general population.
Further, this case is distinguishable from
Raney because Lambatos maintained that
Cellmark necessarily met the threshold of
proper DNA analysis because Cellmark was
an . accredited laboratory and followed
guidelines that she had personally
developed. We therefore do not accept the
. defendant's invitation to broadly interpret
Raney to find an insufficient foundation
where an analyst merely relies upon data
obtained from electronic or mechanical
equipment.
Finally, under Wilson, the burden is placed
upon the adverse party during crossexamination to elicit facts underlying the
expert OpllllOn. The record reveals
substantial cross-examination of Lambatos'
comparison of the DNA profile from the
database to the DNA profile from the sexual
assault kit.. The record also reveals that the
trial court, sitting as a fact finder,
appropriately weighed the testimony. It
stated:
"The DNA expert that testified, the
last witness, was in my view the best
DNA witness I have ever heard.
Under detail [sic ], lengthy complex
cross-examination by the defense on
every single part of her report she
explains, she told what was the basis
of her opinion, she was an
outstanding witness in every respect.
There is the issue of she didn't do the
actual test. The testing is farmed out
to other labs. Some did the testing,
some are an accredited lab. That was
part of the playback you might say of
the Illinois state police forensic
division at that time, and I agree with
the State that there is no
misidentification here. This is a
match, thisis 1 in 8.7 quadrillion, 50
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times the population for the last 2000
years. It's an absolute match."
Accordingly, the issue of Lambatos' reliance
on Cellmark's report went to the weight of
her opinion and not its admissibility. The
trial court assessed the weight of Lambatos'
testimony and found it convincing.
We therefore find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in finding a sufficient
foundation for Lambatos' testimony and
therefore turn to the defendant's Crav.10rd
argument.
Sixth Amendment .
. The trial court rejected the defense objection
that his sixth amendment right was violated
by Lambatos' testimony concerning
Cellmark's report. The appellate court
affirmed this decision; finding that the
complained-of
statements
regarding
Cellmark's report by Lambatos were not
used for the truth of the matter asserted and
therefore the sixth amendment was not
implicated. The defendant's claim that his
sixth amendment confrontation right was
violated involves a question of law, which.
we review de novo.
The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." This part of the
sixth amendment is called the confrontation
clause and applies to the states through the
fourteenth amendment. In Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354,
158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States
Supreme Court held that the sixth
amendment's "primary object"· is with
"testimonial
hearsay."
Accordingly,
"[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent
from trial have been admitted only where

the declarant is unavailable, and only where
the defendant has had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine." The Supreme C()urt added
an explicit logical corollary to this statement
by pointing out; in a footnote, that the
confrontation clause does not bar the
admission of testimonial statements that are
admitted for purposes other than proving the
truth of the matter asserted. Stated another
way, we need only consider whether a
statement was testimonial if the statements
at issue were, in: fact, hearsay statements
offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
The hearsay rule generally prohibits the
introduction of an out-of-court statement
offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted therein. Underlying facts· and data,
however, may be disclosed by an expert, not
for the truth of the matter asserted, but for
the purpose of explaining the basis for his
opinion. Moreover, it is well established that
an expert may testify about the findings and
conclusions of a nontestifying expert that he
used in forming his opinions.
The defendant argues that the State
introduced the Cellmark report to establish
the truth of the matter asserted and it is
therefore hearsay. Without Cellmark's
report, according to the defendant, Lambatos
could not have given her testimony that the
defendant's DNA matched the profile
deduced by Cellmark The State counters
that Lambatos testified about the Cellmark
tests only to explain how she formed her
own opinion. Therefore, the on:1y statement
that the prosecution offered for the truth of
the matter asserted was Lambatos' own
opinion. According to the State, presentation
of the person who prepared the DNA profile.
at Cellmark was not necessary for
confrontation purposes. We agree with the
State.
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This court has long held that prohibitions
against the admission of hearsay do· not
apply when an expert testifies to underlying
facts and data, not admitted into evidence,
for the purpose of explaining the basis of his
opinion. In Lovejoy, a medical examiner
testified that another toxicologist detected
six different types of drugs in the victim's
body after conducting blood tests, indicating
that poisoning caused the victim's death.
Lovejoy, 235 I1l.2d at 141, 335 I1l.Dec. 818,
919 N.E.2d 843. The medical examiner
testified that he was trained in toxicology
interpretation and that the toxicology report
showed lethal amounts of several
medications in the victim's blood. He
explained how the toxicology report added
to his own physical observations during the
autopsy and that it aided him in determining
the cause of death. Following Wilson v.
Clark and its progeny, we noted that experts
may not only consider the reports commonly
relied upon by experts in their particular
field, but also to testify to the contents of the
underlying records. Quoting People v.
Pasch, we explained:
"'While the contents of reports relied
upon by experts would clearly be
inadmissible as hearsay if offered for
the truth of the matter asserted, an
expert may disclose the underlying
facts and conclusions for the limited
purpose of explaining the basis for
his opinion. [Citation.] By allowing
an expert to reveal the information
for this purpose alone, it will
undoubtedly aid the jury in assessing
the value of his opinion.'"
Lovejoy, 235 I1l.2d at 143,335 I1l.Dec. 818,
919 N.E.2d 843, quoting Pasch, 152 I1l.2d at
176, 178 I1l.Dec. 38,604 N.E.2d 294.

Accordingly, we held that the medical
examiner's
testimony
repeating
the

nontestifying analyst's conclusions was not
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted,
but rather was introduced "to show the jury
the steps [the examiner] took prior to
rendering an expert opinion in this case."
Consequently, there was no confrontation
clause violation.
Our appellate court addressed a similar
fact.ual situation in People v. Johnson, 394
Ill.App.3d 1027, 333 I1l.Dec. 774, 915
N.E.2d 845 (2009). In Johnson, the
defendant challenged an expert's testimony
regarding DNA test results, arguing that he
had no opportunity to cross-examine the
analysts who conducted the testing. The
court observed that experts are permitted to
disclose underlying facts and data to the jury
in order to explain the· basis for their
opinions. It concluded that the State offered
the DNA report at issue as part of the basis
for the expert opinion and no confrontation
violation occurred.
Like Lovejoy and Johnson, Lambatos'
testimony about Cellmark's report was not
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted.
The State introduced this testimony, rather,
to show the underlying facts and data
Lambatos used before rendering an expert
opinion in this case. The evidence against
the defendant was Lambatos' opinion, not
Cellmark's report, and the testimony was
introduced live on the witness stand. Indeed,
the report was not admitted into evidence at
all. Rather, Lambatos testified to her
conclusion based upon her own subjective
judgment about the comparison of the
Cellmark report" with the existing ISP
profile.
For instance, at trial, the defense attorney
questioned her if she confused the
defendant's DNA with L.J.'s DNA. He
asked Lambatos if the alleles were not more
consistent with the victim than the defendant
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at several loci. When asked about a specific
locus called "T-POX," Lambatos responded:
"In my opinion with this profile, it is
a mixture so when we have a mixture
you are looking at the profile asa
whole * * * and it's important to
note that the alleles at each locus on
a DNA molecule that we look at are
very common. It is not uncommon
for you and I to have the same alleles
at a locus or you and 1 to have the
same alleles. The power of this DNA
comes with looking at all 13 areas of
the DNA because it's that
uniqueness looking at all 13 that's
going to give us numbers. And here
like a T-POX and in the other two
that you mentioned, there are only
two alleles and like I say in my
opinion there are only two people in
this profile and it just may so happen
that they share an 8 or that they share
an 11 or it may so happen that she is
an 8 and 11 and he is just an 11, 11,
or he is an 8, 11 and she is an 8, 8.
There's only certain possibilities that
can be attributed at each locus."
After defense counsel stated that Lambatos'
interpretation could have erred because of a
degraded sample, she stated:
"Yes, it's possible to have a
degraded sample but if the sample
was degraded, that would be known
by our earlier examination of the
evidence [by Hapack]. We determine
the quantity and the DNA that we
have and the quality of the DNA and
also after we look at the
electropherograms, you can see the
degradation, their specific patterns,
and the data looks a certain way
when it is degraded. The peaks aren't
as defined. They slope off missing

here and there. Different things
happen with degradation, and .I
didn't see any evidence of
degradation in this particular
fraction. "
The defendant's suggestion that Lambatos
was merely a "conduit" for Cellmark's
report and that the report was entirely
dispositive of Lambatos' opinion, and thus
hearsay, is not compelling. Her testimony
consisted of her expert comparison of the
DNA profile in the ISP database with the
DNA profile from the kit prepared. by
Cellmark. She used her own expeliise to
compare the two profiles before· her: the
blood sample prepared by Kooi and the
Semen sample prepared by Cellmark. She
also did not observe· any problems in the
chain of custody or any signs of
contamination or degradation of the
evidence. Lambatos .ultimately agreed with
Cellmark's results regarding the male DNA
profile. But Lambatos additionally made her
own visual and interpretive comparisons of
the peaks on the electropherogram and the
table of alleles to make a conclusion on the
critical issue: that there was a match to the
defendant's genetic profile. Accordingly,
Cellmark's report was· not used for the truth
of the matter asserted and was not hearsay.
The defendant further asserts that the instant
matter is "directly analogous" to the United
States Supreme COUli's recent. holding of
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. - , 129 S.Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314
(2009). In Melendez-Diaz, the Court
considered whether a celiification by a
forensic lab analyst as to the nature and
weight . of a controlled substance was a
testimonial statement, and thus its admission
in lieu of live testimony by the analyst
violated the sixth amendment right to
confrontation. The defendant in that case,
Luis Melendez-Diaz, was charged with
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cocaine trafficking in an amount between 14
and 28 grams. At trial, the prosecution
placed into evidence white plastic bags
containing a substance that resembled
cocaine. It also submitted three "certificates
of analysis" showing the results of forensic
analysis performed on the seized substances.
The certificates reported the weight of the
substances and stated that the bags '" [have]
been examined with the following results:
The substance was found to contain:
Cocaine. '" The celiificates were sworn to
before a notary public by analysts at the
State
Laboratory
Institute
of the
Massachusetts Department of Public Health
as required by Massachusetts law.
Massachusetts law permitted the use of such
affidavits to provide prima facie evidence of
the analyzed substance's composition,
quality and net weight.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that,
Crawford,
the
analyst's
following
certificates "were testimonial statements and
the analysts were 'witnesses' for purposes of
the Sixth Amendment. Absent a showing
that the analysts were unavailable to testify
at trial and that petitioner had a prior
opportunity to . cross-examine them,
petitioner was entitled to "be confronted
with" the analysts at trial. "The Court found
the "case involves little more than the
application of our holding in Crawford. "
The Court based its holding on ~wo
rationales derived from Crawford. First, the
forensic analyst's certificates were within
the "core class of testimonial statements" in
Cravvford. Because the critical issue was
whether the substance was cocaine, the
"[t]he
Supreme
Court found that
'certificates' are functionally identical· to
live, in-court testimony, doing 'precisely
what a witness does on direct examination. '"
Second, the Court stated, "not only were the
affidavits 'made under circumstances which

would lead an objective witness reasonably
to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial,' [citation]
but under Massachusetts law the. $ole
purpose of the affidavits was to provide
'prima facie evidence of the composition,
quality, and the net weight' of the analyzed
substance. "
The maj ority. explicitly rej ected the
suggestion that the prosecutors were
required to call each person involved in the
chain of custody to the witness stand.
Responding to the dissent in a footnote, the
majority stated:
"[We] do not hold, and it is not the
case, that anyone whose testimony
may be relevant in establishing the
chain of custody, authenticity of the
sample, or accuracy of the testing
device, must appear in person as pati
of the prosecution's case. * * *
'[G]aps in the chain [of custody]
normally go to the weight of the
evidence
rather
than
its
admissibility.' It is up to the
prosecution to decide what steps in
the chain of custody are so crucial as
to require evidence; but what
testimony is introduced must (if the
defendant objects) be introduced
live.
Additionally,
documents
prepared in the regular course of
equipment maintenance may well
qualify as nontestimonial records."
(Emphasis omitted.)
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at - - n. 1, 129

S.Ct. at 2532 n. 1, 174 L.Ed.2d at 322 n. 1.
Accordingly, the Court in Melendez-Diaz
held that the defendant's confrontation
clause right had been violated.
We find that Melendez-Diaz does not change
our determination. In Melendez-Diaz, the
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disputed evidence was .a "bare-bones
statement" thai the substance was cocaine,
and the defendant "did not know what tests
the analysts performed, whether those tests
were routine, and whether interpreting their
results required the exercise of judgment or
the use of skills that the analysts may not
have possessed." Here, Lambatos testified
about her own expertise, judgment, and sldll
at interpretation of the specific alleles at the
13 loci, and confirmed her general
knowledge of the protocols and procedures
of Cellmark. Lambatos also conducted her
own statistical analysis of the DNA match.
She did not simply read to the judge, sitting
as a fact finder, from Cellmark's report. This
is in contrast to Cellmark's report, which did
not include any comparative analysis of the
electropherograms or DNA profiles and was
not introduced into evidence. Cellmark's
electropherogram, rather, was part of the
process used by Lambatos in rendering her
opinion concluding that the profiles
matched. Thus, Lambatos' opmlOn is
categorically different from the certificate in
Melendez-Diaz.
In sum, the State did not offer Lambatos'
testimony regarding the Cellmark report for
the truth of the matter asserted and this
testimony did not constitqte "hearsay."
Thus, the trial court and appellate court
properly
concluded
that
Cral1jord·
considerations did not apply here. Lambatos
disclosed the underlying facts from
Cellmark's repmi for the limited purpose of
explaining the basis for her opinion on the
critical issue concerning whether there was a
DNA match between the defendant's blood
sample and the semen sample recovered
from L.J. By allowing the expert to reveal
the information for this purpose alone, it
undoubtedly aided the judge, sitting as the
factfinder, . in assessing the value of
Lambatos' opinion. Finally, the record
demonstrates that the gaps in the chain of

custody went to the '''weight of the evidence
rather than its admissibility'" and our review
of the record shows that Lambatos'
conclusion was tested "in the crucible of
cross-examination. "
Sentencing

* **
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of
the appellate cOUli is affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
Appellate court judgment affirmed in part
and reversed in part.

Justices THOMAS, KILBRIDE, GARMAN,
and KARMEIER concurred in the judgment
and opinion.
Justice FREEMAN specially concurred,
with opinion.
Justice BURKE concurred in part and
dissented in part, with opinion.
Justice FREEMAN, specially concUlTing:
I agree that defendant's convictions and
sentences must be affirmed. With respect to
defendant's appeal in which he raises
several evidentiary challenges, I concur in
the cOUli's judgment for reasons other than
those expressed in its opinion. With respect
to the State's cross- appeal, I join in that
portion of the· opinion reversing the
appellate court's modification of defendant's
sentence.
My concerns in this case are based on the
lack of foundation for Sandra Lambatos'
testimony....
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The court dismisses defendant's contentions
based on Lambatos' testimony that "because
Cellmark was an accredited laboratory,
calibrations, internal proficiencies, and
controls had to be in place for the DNA
analysis to be completed in this case." The
court concludes that because witnesses like
Lambatos are permitted in Illinois to give an
opinion without disclosing the facts or data
upon which the expert bases her opinion,
such testimony is sufficient. In other words,
Lambatos' foundational testimony was
based upon data reasonably relied upon by
other experts in her field, and defendant's
appellate concerns relate to the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility.
An expert may certainly base. her opinion on
information reasonably relied upon by other
experts in the field. But that was not what
occurred here. Strikingly absent from
Lambatos' testimony is any information
about
Cellmark's
extraction
and
amplification processes in generating the
profile that was used to produce the data
upon which she relied in her making
comparisons. Lambatos' "testing" in this
case consisted of her own reading to match
up the numbers generated on the computer
charts, which was derived from Cellmark's
underlying scientific processes. What
Lambatos failed to testify to during her
examination was what occurred at Cellmark
beginning from when Cellmark received the
package containing the victim's vaginal
swabs and blood sample to when Cellmark
analysts performed the extraction and
amplification procedures. Instead, she
speculated that because Cellmark was
accredited, "they would have to meet certain
guidelines to perform DNA analysis for the
Illinois State Police so all those calibrations
and internal proficiencies and controls
would have had to have been in place for
them to perform the DNA analysis."

Lambatos' testimony on this point is
insufficient. First, with respect to the fact of
accreditation, Lambatos did not identify
when or by whom Cellmark received its
accreditation. Whether a laboratory is
accredited is a fact that can be established
without the need of an expert witness. Here,
Lamb ato s ' testimony does not establish that
Cellmark was accredited; rather, it was her
opinion that the laboratory was accredited at
the time it ran the tests. Further, Lambatos
did not base her assumption that "certain
guidelines * * * would have had to have
been in place" on sources such as the report
of another expert, i.e., the written report of
the technicians who generated the profile or
even the lab's logbook at the time the profile
was generated. Lambatos' opinion regarding
whether
Cellmark
followed
proper
guidelines at the time the DNA material was
extracted and amplified was not based on
anything other than her rank speculation that
it "had to have been done" solely because
Cellmark was an accredited lab.
While I do not believe that Lambatos IS
required to personally verify the protocols
used by Cellmark· to generate the DNA
profile from the swab, she, at the very least,
should be able to point to something
concrete in order to give her opinion as to
what protocols were used at the time the
profile was generated. She did not. There
was no testimony on which protocols were
used. In fact, Lambatos admitted that
Cellmark used procedures and standards that
were different from those used by her own
employer, the Illinois State Police Crime
Laboratory. Although Lambatos stated that
she personally "helped develop line
proficiency tests to be administered to
analysts at Cel[l]mark," nothing in her
testimony revealed that the analysts who
performed the DNA extraction and
amplification in this case had taken, let
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alone passed, the tests she had developed or
that, when the tests wexe run, they were run
according to the standards prefelTed by the
Illinois State Police Lab.
The lack of any information regarding
Cellmark's generation of the male DNA
profile from the victim's vaginal swabs
contrasts sharply with the testimony. the
State produced with respect to the DNA
profile generated from defendant's blood
sample by Karen Kooi, upon which·
Lambatos also relied to read and match up
the numbers on her chart. .Kooi, an
employee of the Illinois State Police Crime
Lab at the time, testified as to the protocols
she used to generate the DNA profile taken
from defendant's blood. Kooi further stated
that she utilized "clean lab" techniques when
she generated the profile.
. This case, therefore, differs from People v.
Sutherland, 223 Il1.2d 187, 307 Ill.Dec. 524,
860 N.E.2d 178 (2006), upon which the
court primarily relies in reaching its
conclusion today. There, the witness in
question was an employee of the laboratory
which did the DNA analysis, who not only
testified at trial, but who had also testified at
the Frye hearing. Moreover, the defendant
had received from the State, pursuant to
Rule
417(b),
extensive
information
including records reflecting compliance with
quality control guidelines. In fact, even the
defendant's own DNA expert was able to
testify from the records produced that the
lab's results were "clean." These facts
render Sutherland distinguishable.
Two cases from our appellate court support
my point regarding foundation. In People v.
Johnson, a panel of the First Division of the
First District held that a sufficient
foundation was established where the DNA
expert, an actual employee of Cellmark,
testified that although she did not personally

perform any of the testing used to generate
the male DNA profile from the sexual
assault kit, she based her opinion on records
used in the ordinaTY course of business.
People v. Johnson, 389 Ill.AppJd 618, 329
Ill.Dec. 225, 906 N.E.2d 70 (2009). In
particular, the witness relied on a written
Cellmark report, which indicated that 10
Cellmark analysts had been involved in the
lab work in the case and that all the methods
used, conclusions and results reached were
to a reasonable degree of scientific celtainty.
Another witness, who like Lambatos was
employed by Illinois State Police, testified
that he compared the Cellmark-generated
male DNA profile to the DNA panel he had
generated from saliva obtained from the
defendant and concluded that they were a
match. Like Lambatos, he testified as to the
statistical probabilities of the match. In
holding that an adequate foundation for
CellmaTk's work had been established for
the Cellmark witness, the court found it
significant that the witness actually worked
for Cellmark, which was the lab that
generated the DNA profile from the victim's
samples. She also performed an independent
review of the work to make sure all of the
procedures done at the lab were followed
cOlTectly, which the court held was
sufficient foundation upon which to partially
base her assessment and conclusion. I note
that the court stressed, in reaching its
conclusion, that the foul1dational testimony
was stronger than that in this case,
specifically citing the Third Division's
opinion in this case.
SimilaTly, in People v. Johnson, 394
Ill.App.3d 1027, 333 Ill.Dec. 774, 915
N.E.2d 845 (2009), a panel from the Sixth
Division of the First District held that a
sufficient foundation was established where
the DNA expert, again an actual employee
of Cellmark, testified not only about the
proper procedures that were expected to be
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utilized at her lab, but that the case file
indicated that those procedures had been
followed with respect to the DNA profile in
question. To reach this conclusion, the
witness relied on the records of other
Cellmark employees, which indicated that
the proper procedures had been followed.
Therefore, . although the witness did not
perform any' of the testing, her testimony
showed a sufficient foundation of
Cellmark's procedures and specifications
upon which to partially base her assessment
and conclusion. The court stressed that the
foundation in the case was stronger than that
found sufficient by the appellate court in this
case.
Lambatos' testimony is demonstrably
different from the testimony in either of the
Johnson
opinions.
Lambatos'
direct
testimony was based on two documents
offered into evidence by the State, which
consisted of two shipping manifests from
FedEx. One manifest showed that the
victim's vaginal swabs and blood standards
were sent to Cellmark from the Illinois State
Police Crime Laboratory on November 28,
2000, and were received by Cellmark on
November 29, 2000. The second manifest
showed that the victim's samples were "sent
back from Celmark [sic ]" on April 3, 2001,
along with samples from "other cases" that
had nothing to do with the present case.
Lambatos testified that she relied on these
two pieces of evidence when she did the
work in this case. I submit that these
shipping manifests are not the kind of "facts
or data" contemplated by this court in
Wilson. Unlike the witnesses in the Johnson
cases, Lambatos. was not a Cellmark
employee. She did not rely on the detailed
type of reports that those witnesses relied
upon. She did not know who performed the
tests at Cellmark nor could she testify as to
what protocols, if any, they followed. The
shipping manifests, which are not enough to

even establish a proper chain of custody
once the samples reached their destination at
Cellmark, certainly cannot establish whether
a laboratory was "clean" or whether
Lambatos' protocols were actually followed.
By accepting Lambatos' assumption that
because Cellmark was accredited, the
protocols she had personally developed for
the lab to use were, in fact, used to generate
the DNA profile, the court errs in finding
that an adequate foundation was laid. The
court relies on the fact that Lambatos used
her expertise and professional judgment to
compare the DNA profiles in this case. But
the problem with this is that there was no
foundation established for the DNA profile
generated by Cellmark. Lambatos' opinion
that the DNA profile generated there
matched defendant's DNA profile does not
change that fact. It is certainly the law that
alleged infirmities in the performance of a
test usually go to the weight of the evidence,
not to its admissibility. Courts should not
automatically exclude scientific evide1).ce
whenever a forensic analyst deviates from a
correct test protocol in minor respects;
instead, . the deviation would have to
materially affect the outcome in order to
warrant exclusion. Here, however, Lambatos
could not offer any testimony to· establish
any protocol. Contrary to what the court
rests its analysis upon, there is simply no
foundational evidence to "weigh."
Last, and of equal importance, the court
today implies that the scientific process
involved In DNA analysis is "not
comparable"
. to
narcotics
Gas
Chromotography
Mass
Spectrometer
(GCMS) testing because Lambatos did not
"regurgitate" the results from Cellmark as
experts do with respect to GCMS test
results. Lambatos took on faith the DNA
profile generated by Cellmark from the
victim's samples, assuming that because the
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lab was accredited all quality controls were
in place when the profile was created. This·
seems no different from how expert
witnesses in drug cases view the results
from the GeMS machine. Unfortunately, it
has been well-documented in DNA cases
that "[q]uality control and quality assurances
procedures that are followed religiously in
some labs are ignored or followed
intermittently in others." The failure to
employ quality control and quality assurance
procedures can result in DNA matches in
criminal cases that are wrong because of
sample contamination or misconduct on the
part of the technician. This explains why an
adequate foundation is as essential in DNA
cases as it is in drug cases. Given the impact
a DNA match has on the trier of fact, courts
must be vigilant in ensuring that DNA
evidence is admitted with proper foundation.
This is particularly so in jury cases where
lay people might not be able to appreciate
arguments which go to weight once they
hear of a match that is one in a billion.
Based on the foregoing, I would hold that
the foundation for Lamb ato s ' testimony was
insufficient, and the circuit court abused its
discretion in admitting it. Based on my
resolution of defendant's foundational
challenge, I need not reach defendant's sixth
amendment confrontation clause argument.

Although I believe the circuit court abused
its discretion by admitting Lambatos'
testimony without proper foundation, the
error does not require a new trial. The
testimony of a single witness, if it is positive
and the witness credible, is sufficient to
convict a defendant. In this case, the trial
judge specifically found defendant guilty on
the basis of the victim's testimony, which he
characterized as "highly credible." The trial
judge also commented specifically on the
strength of the victim's lineup identification
and her in-court identification. The judge
found the victim to be "an outstanding
witness" and believed her testimony "a
hundred percent." These findings indicate to
me that the error in admitting Lambatos'
testimony was harmless. On that basis, I
would affirm the convictions.
Justice BURKE, concumng m part and
dissenting in part:
I join the part of Justice Freeman's special
concurrence that concludes that the circuit
court abused its discretion in admitting
Lambatos' testimony. I write separately
because I disagree with the majority's
resolution of the consecutive-sentencing
issue ....
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"Two More Cases Granted"
SCOTUSblog
June 28, 2011
Lyle Denniston

The Supreme Court, in its final orders on
Tuesday, showed its continued interest in
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation
Clause, taking on a new case on whether an
expert witness can be called as a stand-in for
a lab analyst who actually did a test on
criminal evidence, but did not appear at the
trial. That question was close to one that had
been raised last week by Justice Sonia
Sotomayor as the Court ruled in the case of
Bullcoming v. New Mexico (09-10876) ....

***
The new Confrontation Clause case is
Williams v. Illinois (10-8505). In that case,
the Illinois. Supreme Court ruled that
prosecutors could introduce the substance of
a forensic analyst's report on a DNA test of
evidence by putting an expert witness on the
stand and having her analyze the results,
which showed a DNA match in a rape and
kidnapping case; The lab analyst was called
to testify, and the actual lab report itself was
not admitted. The expert witness had had no
part in making the analysis, and no personal
knowledge of how the test was done. The
state Supreme Court nevertheless concluded
that there was no violation of the suspect's
confrontation right, because the findings of
the lab report were being admitted not for

their truth, but oply to explain the expert's
opinion about the results.
That was similar. to a scenario mentioned by
Justice Sotomayor on June 23, in her
concurrence in the Bullcoming case. In that
case, the Court had ruled that a lab
supervisor could not be a surrogate witness
in place of a lab technician who prepared a
report but did not appear, so the lab test was
not admissible. Sotomayor sought to show
that the decision was a narrow one, and 'she
listed several factual scenarios that she said
were not covered. One of them . was a
situation in which "an expert witness was
asked for his independent opinion about
underlying testimonial reports that were not
themselves admitted into evidence."
In the Sotomayor suggestion, the lab report
would not have been admitted, but she
intimated that the expert might be allowed to
. take the stand anyway and give an
independent opinion about it. That appeared
to be what had OCCUlTed in the Williams
case. The Court apparently granted the case
to determine whether this scenario would
satisfy the line of cases beginning with
Crawford v. Washington (2004).

***
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"Independence Day, Take 3: Why I Think That The
Supreme Court Will Find No Gonfrontation Clause
Violation in Williams v. Illinois"
EvidenceProfBlog
June 29, 2011
Colin Miller

Yesterday, I noted that the Supreme Court
granted cert in Williams v. Illinois (108505) to address a question left unanswered
by Bullcoming v. New Mexico: Is the
Confrontation Clause violated when an
. expert witness for the prosecution relies
upon a testimonial report· prepared by an
analyst who does not' testify at trial, butthe
report itself is not admitted into evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted? This
was different from the question resolved by
Bullcoming, in which the Court held that the
Confrontation Clause is violated when such
a testimonial report is actually admitted into
evidence. Indeed, Justice Sotomayor made
this distinction clear in her concurring
opinion in Bullcoming, which I wrote about
yesterday. In that post about Sotomayor's
concurring opinion, I mused about whether
the Bullcoming dissent would be able to
create a 5-4 majority finding no
Confrontation Clause violation in a case
where a testimonial report is relied upon but
not actually admitted into evidence to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. And, based
upon the facts of Williams v. Illinois, 939
N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 2010), I think the dissent
will achieve this result.
Williams v. Illinois
In Williams, L.J. was allegedly sexually
assaulted, kidnapped, and robbed by the
defendant Sandy Williams on February 10,
2000. Thereafter,
Dr. Nancy Schubert conducted a
vaginal exam of LJ. and took

vaginal swabs, which were then
sealed and placed into a criminal
sexual assault evidence collection kit
along with LJ.'s blood sample. The
kit was sent to the Illinois State
Police (ISP) Crime Lab for testing
and analysis.
On February 15, 2000, forensic
biologist Brian Hapack with the ISp·
Crime Lab received LJ.'s sexual
assault evidence collection kit and
performed tests that confirmed the
presence of semen. Hapack placed
the swabs in a coin envelope, sealed
the envelope, and placed the
evidence in a secure freezer. ...
On August 3, 2000, police arrested
the defendant for an unrelated
offense and, pursuant to a court
order, drew a blood sample from the
defendant. On August 24, 2000,
forensic scientist Karen Kooi
performed an analysis on the sample
that consisted of four quarter-sized
bloodstains on a filter card. Kooi
extracted a deoxyribonucleic acid
(DNA) profile and entered it into the
database at the ISP Crime Lab.
Meanwhile, the samples from L.J.'s
sexual assault kit were sent to
Cellmark Diagnostic Laboratory in
Germantown, Maryland, for DNA
analysis on November 29, 2000.
Cellmark returned LJ.'s vaginal
swabs and blood standard to the ISP
Crime Lab on April 3, 2001.
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Cellmark derived a DNA profile for
the person whose semen was
recovered from 1.J. According to
ISP forensic biologist Sandra
DNA
profile
Lambatos, ... the
received from Cellmark matched the
defendant's DNA profile from the
blood sample in the ISP database.
At trial,
Lambatos began her testimony with
a brief explanation of polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) testing. PCR
testing, according to Lambatos, is
one of the most modem types of
DNA analysis available and is
generally accepted in the scientific
community. Lambatos explained
how PCR analysis can be used to
identify a male profile from a semen
sample. First, an analyst conducts a
procedure that isolates and extracts
DNA from a sample that may.
include a mixture from a pmiicular
defendant and the victim. The DNA
is not lm'ge enough to test at this
point, and requires amplification to
form a more workable sample. After
amplification, an analyst can
measure the length of an individual
specific strand through a process
called electrophoresis. A computer
translates this measurement onto a .
graph called an electropherogram.
is
a
The
electropherogram
representation of the individual's
specified DNA data into a line with
peaks representing the lengths of the
DNA strands of the 13 STR regions.
Reports generally also provide a
"table of alleles" showing the DNA
profile of each sample. She also
stated that the statistical probability
of a match can also be determined by
entering the alleles into a frequency

database to learn how common they
are in the general popUlation.
Lambatos further testified that it is a
commonly accepted practice in the
scientific community for one DNA
expert to rely on· the records ~f
another DNA analyst to complete her
work. As mentioned, she used the
DNA profile from Cellmark to match
the DNA profile from the
defendant's blood sample, which
ISP
was
contained in
the
database .... Cellmark's testing and
analysis methods were generally
accepted in the scientific community
according to Lambatos.
When the prosecutor then asked Lambatos
for her expert opinion regarding the DNA
match, "[d]efense counsel objected and
asserted that Lambatos could not rely upon
the testing performed by another lab." The
trial judge deferred his ruling on the issue,
and
Lambatos then testified that a match
was generated of the male DNA
profile found in the semen from
LJ.'s. vaginal swabs to the
defendant's male DNA profile from
the defendant's blood standard. In
response to' defense questioning,
Lamb~tos restated her interpretation
of the alleles at each of the 13
locations. She testified about several
locations where she visually filtered
out spurious alleles and "background
noise" and· distinguished the
defendant's
profile.
Lambatos
concluded that in her expert opinion,
the semen from LJ.' s vaginal swab
was a match to the defendant.
Lambatos
testified
that
the
probability of this profile occurring
in the general population was one in
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8.7 quadrillion black, one in 390
quadrillion white, and one in 109
quadrillion
Hispanic
unrelated
individuals. She did not observe any
degradation or irregularities in the
sample from LJ.'s vaginal swab.
She stated that, in general, if "there
was a question of a match, then we
would investigate that further by
looking at the eiectropherograms·
from all the cases involved and do
some more comparisons on that."
She explained that in looking at
Cellmark's report, she interpreted it
and "I did review their data, .and I
did make my own interpretations so I
looked at what * * * they sent to me
and did make my own determination,
my own opinion." While Lambatos
testified to her conclusion informed
by Cellmark's report, Cellmark's
report itself was not introduced into
evidence. Also, while Lambatos
referenced documents she reviewed
in forming her own opinion, she did
not read the contents of the Cellmark
report into evidence.
Defense counsel then repeated his objection,
claiming, inter alia, that Lambatos' use of
Cellmark's report violated the Confrontation
Clause. The trial court disagreed, stating,
"I don't think this is a Cravl'ford
scenario, and I agree with the State
that the evidence is-·the issue is,·
you know, what weight do you give
the test, not do you exclude it and
accordingly your motion to exclude
or strike the testimony of the last
witness or opinions based on her
own independent testing of the data
received from Cellmark will be
denied."

After he was convicted, Williams appealed,
claiming, inter alia, "that his sixth
amendment right was violated by Lambatos'
testimony concerning Cellmark's report,"
and his appeal eventually reached the
Supreme Court of Illinois. The Illinois
Supremes .initially noted that it "has long
held that prohibitions against the admission
of hearsay do not apply when an expert
testifies to underlying facts and data, not
admitted into evidence, for the purpose of·
explaining the basis of his opinion." The
court then rejected Williams' "suggestion
that Lambatos was merely a 'conduit' for
Cellmark's repOli and that the report was
entirely dispositive of Lambatos' opinion,"
instead finding that
Her testimony consisted of her
expeli comparison of the DNA
profile in the 1SP database with the
DNA profile from the kit prepared
by Cellmark. She used her own
expeliise to compare the two profiles
before her: the blood sample
prepared by Kooi and the semen
sample prepared by Cellmark. She
also did not observe any problems in
the chain of custody or any signs of
contamination or degradation of the
evidence.
Lambatos
ultimately
agreed with Cellmark's results
regarding the male DNA profile. But
Lambatos additionally made her own
visual and interpretive comparisons
of the peaks on the electropherogram
and the table of alleles to make a
conclusion on the critical issue: that
there was a match to the defendant's
genetic
profile.
Accordingly,
Cellmark's report was not used for
the truth of the matter asselied and
was not hearsay (emphasis added).
The court also rejected Williams' contention
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that his case was '''directly analogous' to the
United States Supreme Court's recent
of
Melendez-Diaz
v.
holding
Massachusetts," concluding that
Lambatos testified about· her own
expertise, judgment, and skill at
interpretation of the specific alleles
at the 13 loci, and confirmed her
general knowledge of the protocols
and procedures of Cellmark.
Lambatos also conducted her own
statistical analysis of the DNA
match. She did not simply read to the
judge, sitting as a fact finder, from
Cellmark's report. This is in contrast
to Cellmark's report, which did not
include any comparative analysis of
the electropherograms or DNA.
profiles and was not introduced into
evidence.
Cellmark's
electropherogram, rather, was part of
the process used by Lambatos in
rendering her opinion concluding
that the profiles matched. Thus,
Lambatos' opinion is categorically
different from the certificate m
Melendez-Diaz (emphasis added).
Justice Sotomayor
As I noted in my post yesterday, Justice
Sotomayor held in her· Bullcoming .
concurrence that the Court was not
presented with four factual circumstances in
Bullcoming, including the circumstance "in
which an expert witness was asked for his
independent opmlOn about underlying
testimonial reports that were not themselves
admitted into evidence."· I then concluded
that based upon the language used by Justice
Sotomator, it was likely that she would find
no Confrontation Clause problem with an
expert witness offering opinion testimony
pursuant to Rule 703 based upon a

testimonial report prepared by an analyst
who does not testify at trial.
My main question involved the issue of the
circumstances
under
which
Justice
Sotomayor would find. that a testifying
expert's opinion was tmly an "independent
opinion" rather than an opinion dependent
upon a testimonial report. For instance, I
cited to the opinion of the Court of Appeals
of North Carolina in State v. Hough, 2010
WL 702458 (N.C.App. 2010), in which a
chemist weighed dmgs and prepared a report
but did not testify, and a second chemist
used the report as the basis for expert
testimony on the weight of the dmgs without
herself testing the dmgs. I argued that under
this circumstance, Justice Sotomayor should
(but might not) find that the testifying
chemist's opinion was not tmly independent,
meaning that there was a Confrontation
Clause violation.
In Williams, however, Lambatos' opinion
seemingly was tmly "independent." Indeed,
the trial court noted that Lambatos
conducted "independent testing." Moreover,
as the Supreme Court of Illinois noted,
Lamb ato s "made her own visual and
interpretive comparisons" and "conducted
her own statistical analysis of the DNA
match." Given these findings, I think it is .
clear that Justice Sotomayor will find that
Lamb atos, opinion was tmly "independent"
and will thus join the four Bullcoming
dissenters to form a five Justice majority
concluding that there was no Confrontation
Clause violation in Williams.

be

Now, will this
the conect mling, and
what will it tell us about cases like Hough in
which there is not independent testing by the
testifying expeli? I'm not sure yet, but I will
have more thoughts over the course of the
summer..
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"Initial Thoughts on Williams"
The Confrontation Blog
July 09,2011
Richard Friedman

In Williams lv. Illinois], the state presented
the testimony of a DNA expert that in her
opinion, based on a Cellmark repOli on
DNA found in a crime scene sample and on
a report by the Illinois State Police on DNA
found in a swab taken from the accused, that
the accused. was the source of the DNA
found in the crime scene sample. No one
from Cellmark testified at trial.
1. The Cellmark report was testimonial. As I
understand it, this was a report on a crime
scene sample refened to Cellmark by the
Illinois State Police. I don't think that there
is much doubt that the primary purpose of
the repOli, however one might analyze it,
was to create evidence for use in
prosecution. (That is more rigorous than the
test I think ought to be applied, but that's
another issue.)
I think it's important to bear in mind that the
other issues raised by Williams come into
play only if the underlying statement is
testimonial. That may be obvious, but it is
worth emphasizing for a couple of reasons.
First, this fact should relieve much of the
concern about costs, financial and in terms
of lost evidence. No confrontation problem
arises unless the repOli is made in
anticipation of evidentiary use. For example,
.if a lab tech does a blood test without the
anticipation of evidentiary use, it will not be
testimonial, and there is no confrontation
issue. Second, if the statement is testimonial,
then that means that the statement was made
in anticipation of evidentiary use-and in
fact under cunent law it would mean that it
was made with the primary purpose of
creating evidence for use in prosecution.
That, I believe, should raise alarm bells for a

court considering creation of a doctrine that
would allow use of the statement without the
live testimony of a competent witness.
2. The statement was not formally admitted,
but a crucial part of the substance was made
known to the jury. The prosecutor asked
Sandra Lambatos, the in-court witness,
"Was there a computer match generated of
the male DNA profile [repOlied by
Cellmark] found in semen from the vaginal
swabs of [the victim] to a male DNA profile
[repOlied by another analyst in the state
police lab] that had been identified as having
originated from Sandy Williams?" She
answered in the affirmative. The prosecutor
.then asked whether she had compared the
two profiles. She said she had. He asked
what the frequency of such a match would
be if someone other than Williams were the
source, and she answered with very low
numbers. Finally, the prosecutor asked, "In
your expert opinion, can you call this a
match to Sandy Williams?" and she
responded simply, "Yes."
Formal admission of an out-of-court
statement is not necessary to invoke the
. Confrontation Clause. When a statement is a
writing, it is of course often admitted as an
exhibit. When it is unrecorded, then no
tangible exhibit of it can be offered. We
necessarily rely on another witness's
account of the statement-but the Clause
.may be brought into play without that
account being purpOliedly verbatim. It
should be enough if the prosecution is
effectively asking the jury to infer that the
in-court witness is communicating some or
all of the substance of an out-of-court
testimonial statement, and that this
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substance is true. See my recent post,.
["]When is a statement presented for
purposes of the Confrontation Clause?["] .
In considering application of this principle
to this case, note first that the existence of
the statement was made clear to the jury. In
other words, this is not a case in which an
expert assembles information from one or
more sources and then draws an inference
based on that information without disclosing
what it is or what its sources are. (I 'don't
believe that if that were so it would per se
render
the
Confrontation
Clause
inapplicable; it still might that the jury
would likely infer that the expert's opinion
was based on a statement to a certain effect,
and even if not there would be a concern
that the expert's opinion is being used to
repackage the information contained in an
undisclosed testimonial statement. But,
,whatever the ramifications may be of that
situation, the COUli need not address them in
the Williams case.) The testimony explicitly
referred
to
the
Cellmark
report.
Furthermore, it was clear what the substance
of the statement was: It indicated that the
vaginal swab taken from the crime scene
reflected the same DNA profile as the swab
taken from Williams. It is as if an in-court
witness reports, "Somebody at the scene
described the person she saw commit the
crime, and the description closely matched
Williams." So far as the Confrontation
Clause is concerned, the report was
presented to the jury.
3. The argument that the statement was in
any event presented to the jury not for the
truth of a matter that it asserted but rather in
support of the expert's opinion seems
willfully wrong-headed to me in this
context. In prior posts on this blog,
including one discussing the fine opinion in
People v. Goldstein, 6 N.Y.3d 119, 843

N.E.2d 727, 810 N.Y.S.2d 100 (by a former
boss of mine, Judge Robert Smith), I have
emphasized the simple point that if a
statement supports the expert's opinion orily
if it is true then it is a sham to say that it is
being presented to support the opinion but
not for its truth; see also The Not-for-theTruth End Run. And in Williams, the
application of this principle is perfectly
clear: If the profile revealed by the vaginal
swab was not what the Cellmark report said
it was, then that report provided no support
.
whatsoever for the expert's opinion.
4. This analysis should not be affected by
concluding that the expeli's opmlOn
conveyed additional information not
contained in the original report-an
argument not available to the prosecution in
Bullcoming, where the in-court witness did
nothing more than transmit the information
repOlied by the absent analyst. The question
is not whether the in-court witness's
testimony had added value; but whether the
out-of-court report was presented for its
truth. This is simply an ordinary instance of
a prosecution case depending on multiple
links in a chain-and each link must comply
with the Confrontation Clause. We
wouldn't, for example, tolerate a witness
testifying that a given sample contained
cocaine without the prosecution also
presenting proper evidence tying the sample
to the case. This is no different. If the
expert's opmlOn does indeed convey
additional information, that is something
more that the prosecution has to prove; it
does not ease the burden on the prosecution.
Indeed, the "expert value added" theory
would be an invitation to manipulation by
the prosecution and its witnesses. That is,
the prosecution would have an incentive to
manufacture needs for its in-court witnesses
to add value over the other information
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presented to the jury.
For example, suppose a lab analyst reports
results from which a qualified chemist could
easily infer the presence of cocaine-but
that the report does not include this bottom
line.. If the "expert value added" theory
governed, a chemist could, so far as the
Confrontation Clause is concerned, testify at
trial against an accused, "In my opinion,
cocaine was present in that sample." (As
discussed below, evidence law in most
jurisdictions would require the expert to
satisfy the court that the information on
which she based her opinioll was "of a type
reasonably relied upon by experts" in her
field, but that is a standard easily met.) The
lab analyst, who by hypothesis knew that her
report was intended for prosecutorial use,
would not have to corne to court, and the
report would not even have to be introduced
or otherwise presented to the jury.
5. Fed. R. Evid. 703, copied by most of the
states (now including Illinois), provides:
If of a type reasonably relied upon
by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data [on
which a testifying expert bases an
opinion] need not be admissible in
evidence in order for the opinion or
inference to be admitted ..
A 2000 amendment to the Federal Rule
adds:
Facts or data that are otherwise
inadmissible shall not be disclosed to
the jury by the proponent of the
opinion or inference unless the court
determines that their probative value
in assisting the jury to evaluate the
OpInIOn
substantially
expert's
outweighs their prejudicial effect.

A few points. This Rule does not purport to
state a constitutional principle. Nor does it
state an evidentiary principle of long
standing; it was developed and adopted in
the third quarter of the 20th century. There
is no constitutional problem with the Rule so
long as the information provided to the
expert is not a testimonial statement. But if
the expert does base an opinion on a
testimonial statement, then I think there are
potential constitutional problems.
First, if the statement is presented to the jury
. for the truth of what it asserts-and I have
argued above that in Williams these
conditioris were met for purposes of the .
Confrontation Clause-then there is a
violation of the Clause, assuming the author
of the statement (or someone else who can
endorse its substance from first-hand
knowledge) does not testify at trial. The last
sentence of Fed. R. Evid. 703, if it were
applicable, would relieve the statement of
objection to admissibility under ordinary
evidentiary rules, but of course it cannot
provide .relief from a constitutional
objection-and note that it is based on a set
of considerations, a weighing of probative
value and prejudice, having nothing to do
with the Clause. This sentence as adopted,
as I recall, because cOUlis were in conflict
about how to handle the situation in which
an expert was allowed to offer an opinion
based in part on a statement otherwise
inadmissible and the proponent sought to
use the opinion as a lever to gain
admissibility of the statement. Some courts,
I believe, without quite recognizing the
nature of the Confrontation Clause
problem-this was before CraYl1ordnevertheless had a sense that in at least some
cases there was something fishy. about
letting an otherwise inadmissible statement
in on the basis that it supported the expert's
opinion. But the rulemakers couldn't
atiiculate the circumstances in which this .
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created a problem-the answer, I think, is
that it's a problem when the statement is
testimonial-and so they responded with a
rather clumsy compromise, simply putting
some extra weight on the prejudice side of
the scale prescribed by Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Now, what if the out of court statement is
testimonial but it is not presented to the
jury? Is there a Confrontation Clause
problem with allowing the expert to give an
opinion based in part on the undisclosed
statement, as Fed. R. Evid. 703 purpOlis to
allow? That, as I have said, is a question not
presented in Williams, and there is no need
for the Supreme Court to resolve it in
deciding Williams. But a couple of
comments., First, even if the statement is not
explicitly disclosed to the jury, it may be

that enough is disclosed that the jury will
likely infer the substance of the statement.
Second, even apart from that, I think there
may be a substantial Confrontation Clause
problem. Recall, that by hypothesis, the
statement made to the expert is testimonial.
The expeli therefore may essentially be
repackaging information provided by an outof-court witness who does not corne to
court. Again, an example would be a
chemist who offers an "opinion" in court
that a substance was cocaine, based on a lab
report giving information that strongly
implies that conclusion to chemists.
In short, I worry that if the Supreme Court
holds for the state in Williams, it will invite
subterfuges and manipulations that will
substantially impair the confrontation right.
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Greene v. Fisher
10-637
Ruling Below: Greene v. Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85 (3rd Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 1813
(U.S. 2011).
Defendant Eric Greene was convicted of second degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy. Before
trial, an agreement was reached whereby statements from some of Greene's )lon-testifying
codefendants would be redacted, replacing individual names with generic pronouns such as "we"
or "someone." Greene filed a direct appeal with the Pennsylvania Superior Court which affirmed
the trial court and addressed Greene's claim under Bruton v. United States on the merits on
December 16, 1997. Greene then filed for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme
court. While that petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided Gray v. Maryland holding
that redactions similar to the ones at issue in Greene's case were similar enough to those at issue
in Bruton to warrant the same legal results. The Pennsylvania first granted a limited version of
Greene's petition· then dismissed his appeal as improvidently granted. Greene's conviction
became final on July 28, 1999 .
. Greene was denied post-conviCtion relief at all state court levels and he proceeded to seek federal
habeas relief. The Magistrate Jude determined the controlling date for determining "clearly
established federal law" was the date of Greene's last state-court decision and thus Gray did not
apply to Greene's case. Accordingly, the Magistrate Judge applied Bruton and Richardson v.
Marsh and recommended the District Court deny Greene's petition for habeas relief. The District
Court adopted this recommendation and the Third circuit affirmed.
Question Presented: For purposes of adjudicating a state prisoner's petition for federal habeas
relief, what is the temporal cutoff for whether a decision from this Court qualifies as "clearly
established Federal law" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996?
Eric GREENE also known as Jarmaine Q. Trice,

v.
John A. PALAKOVICH; The District Attorney of The Philadelphia County; The Attorney
General of the State of Pennsylvania
Eric Greene, Appeliant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed May 28,2010. As Amended July 22,2010.
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
SMITH, Circuit Judge ..
Eric Greene petitioned for relief under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 from his state court

convictions for second degree murder,
robbery, and conspiracy. This appeal
requires us to resolve the thomy question of
what the temporal cutoff is for determining
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"clearly established Federal law" for
purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")
standard of review, set forth in 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1). Based on the statute's text and
Supreme Court precedent, we now hold that
"clearly established Federal law" should be
determined as of the date of the relevant
state-court decision. Because the Supreme
Court decision: that Greene wishes to rely
upon in his habeas petition, Gray v.
}vfaryland, 523' U.S. 185, 118 S.Ct. 1151,
140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998), had not yet been
decided at the time of the relevant statecourt decision, he cannot show that his state
In
an
court
proceedings
resulted
unreasonable application of "clearly
established Federal law, as determined by
the Supreme Court of the United States[.]"
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(I). Thus, we will affirm
the judgment of the District Court denying
Greene's habeas petition.
1.
The Crime

In early December of 1993, three or four
men robbed a small family owned grocery
'store in North Philadelphia, and its owner,
Francisco Azcona, died after being shot at
point-blank range ....
The Investigation

[Investigators
collected
conflicting
. statements from Greene's codefendants that
identified Greene and the other codefendants
as taking part in the crime.]
The Trial

Greene filed a pretrial motion seeking
severance on several grounds. In that
motion, he argued, inter alia, that a joint

trial with his codefendants would be .
prejudicial because of the incriminating
statements they had made to authorities
During a pretrial hearing, Greene urged the
trial court, the Court of Common Pleas of
Philadelphia, to sever the trials because the
statements of some of his non-testifying
codefendants implicated him and identified
him as the person who carried the cash
register out of the grocery, store. The trial
court, recognizeEed] that the statements
might be inadmissible at a joint trial, but
also notEed] that redaction might resolve any
problem ofprejudice[.] ... '
. ',' The Court [determined] that "it seems to
me ,that the fair way to redact these
[statements] is to refer to three different
people." Greene's counsel responded: "As
long as I would be allowed to argue in my
closing speech that you heard what you
heard and you heard that there were
different people, then I would have no
problem with [it].'~ The prosecutor offered to
redact the statements so that "not one
specific person carries out the cash register."
Greene's counsel agreed that, under Bruton,
such a redaction would remove any
prejudice from the statements .. , .

***
The Commonwealth also called. Detectives
Gross and Walsh to testify about the
statements they obtained from Finney and
Womack. Neither Greene nor his
codefendants objected .to the reading of
those statements in redacted form. Detective
Gross read FiOOey's redacted statement,
which substituted the nicknames or proper
names of Finney's codefendants with the
phrases "this guy," "other guys," and "two
guys." The redacted statement also used the
neutral pronouns "we" or "someone" in
certain instances ....
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· . . During Detective Gross's reading of the
redacted statement, the trial court instructed
the jury that Finney's statement could only
be considered as evidence against him and
not as evidence against any other defendant.
Detective Walsh, during his testimony, read
a redacted version of Womack's statement. .

Although the redacted statement utilized
neutral references such as "guy," "another
guy," "someone," "someone else," "one,"
and "others," it replaced the names of some
of the codefendants with the word "blank"
on three occasions. The trial court did not
give a limiting instruction following the
reading of Womack's redacted statement,
and neither Greene· nor any of his
codefendants requested such an instruction.
After closing arguments, the trial court
issued a limiting instruction directing the
jurors not to consider either redacted
statement as evidence against any defendant
other than the declarant. The jury found
Greene guilty of second degree murder,
three counts of robbery, and one count of
conspiracy. The trial court sentenced him to
life imprisonment.
Subsequent Procedural History

Greene filed a direct appeal with the
Pennsylvania Superior Court. Citing Bruton,
Greene argued that his trial should have
been severed from that of his codefendants
because the statements implicating him
"were not suitable for redaction.". On
December 16, 1997, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court affirmed the judgment
against Greene, addressing his Bruton claim
on the merits. The Court observed that the
statements that were admitted into evidence
"were redacted to remove any reference to

the other defendants in the case" and "[t]he
trial court instructed the jury on more than
one occasion that such statements could only
be considered as evidence against the
defendants who made them." In light of
these observations, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court concluded that Bruton was
not violated and that Greene was not
deprived of his right to confrontation.
Greene filed a timely petition for allowance
of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court. His petition argued, inter alia, that he
had been deprived of his rights under the
Confrontation Clause by the introduction of
Womack's and Finney's statements. As
support for his position, Greene again cited
Bruton. While Greene's petition for
allowance of appeal was pending with the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the United
States Supreme Court issued its decision in
Gray. In Gray, the Supreme Court stated
that "considered as a class, redactiops that
replace a proper name with an obvious
blank, the word 'delete,' a symbol, or
similarly notify the jury that a name has
been deleted are similar enough to Bruton's
unredacted confessions as to warrant the
same legal results." 523 US. at 195, 118
S.Ct. 1151. Thereafter, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court granted Greene's petition for
allocatur "limited to the issue of whether the
common pleas court erred by denying the
motion for severance thereby resulting in the
violation of [Greene]'s Sixth Amendment
right of confrontation upon the admission of
statements given by his nontestifying
codefendants." Commonwealth v. Trice, 552
Pa. 201,. 713 A.2d 1144 (1998). After
granting the petition for allocatur, however,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court dismissed
Greene's appeal as improvidently granted.
Commonwealth· v. Trice, 556 Pa. 265, 727
A.2d 1113 (1999). Greene's conviction
became final ninety days later, on July 28,
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1999, when the time period for filing a
petition for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court expired.
In early August of 1999, Greene sought
relief from his conviction based on
Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act
("PCRA"). In his PCRA petition, Greene
argued that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the severance motion,
and cited, inter alia, the prosecutor's
summation, which allegedly improperly
informed the jury that Finney's statement
corroborated that the others on trial were
implicated in the commission of the crime.
The PCRA petition did not assert a
Confrontation Clause claim as it failed to
. reference the redacted statements or to cite
the Supreme Court's decisions in Bruton,
Marsh, or Gray. The trial court dismissed
Greene's PCRA petition as frivolous.
Greene, acting pro se, appealed the denial of
his PCRA petition to the Pennsylvania
Superior Court, asserting that the trial court
erred by refusing to grant a severance. His
argument cited only Pennsylvania authority
regarding motions to sever multiple criminal
charges. He did not refer to the
Confrontation Clause, Bruton, Marsh or
Gray. On December 31, 2003, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the
dismissal of Greene's PCRA petition, noting
that the severance claim had been finally
litigated and could not afford him collateral
relief. Greene filed another petition for
allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, which denied allocatur.
This timely § 2254 petition followed. In his
petition, Greene asserted, inter alia, that his
trial should have been severed "due to
antagonistic defenses, due to the fact a
codefendant was subjected to the death
penalty even though petitioner was not, and
particularly due to the fact that effective
redaction of the codefendant's [sicl

statements, though attempted, was polluted
by gross prosecutorial misconduct." In a
comprehensive report, the Magistrate Judge
to whom the petition had been referred
recommended that Greene's petition be
dismissed, but that a certificate of
appealability
be
granted . on
the
Confrontation Clause claim arising out of
the introduction of Womack's and Finney's
redacted statements at trial.
The Magistrate Judge struggled with
whether to
determine the "clearly
~stablished Federal law" under § 2254(d)(1)
as of the date of the relevant state-court .
decision, as. instructed by Justice O'Connor
in her portion of the majority decision in
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403-412,
120 S.Ct. 149.5, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), or
by the date Greene's conviction became
final, as instructed by Justice Stevens in his
portion of the majority decision in Williams,
id. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495. This issue was
significant because it determined whether
"clearly established Federal law" for
purposes of Greene's § 2254 petition
included the Supreme Court's decision in
Gray. If the cutoff date was the date of the
relevant state-court decision, i. e., the
Pennsylvania Superior Court's December
16, 1997 decision affirming Greene's
convictions on direct appeal, that date
preceded the Supreme Court's decision in
Gray, and Gray would not be part of the
"clearly established Federal law" applicable
to this habeas petition. But if the date
Greene's convictions became final, July 28,
1999, was the pertinent cutoff date, Gray,
which was issued more than a year earlier on
March . 9, 1998, would be "clearly
established Federal law."
The Magistrate Judge ultimately determined
.that the controlling date for ascertaining the
"clearly established Federal law" for
Greene's habeas petition was the date of the
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relevant state-court decision. Accordingly,
the Magistrate Judge applied the Supreme
Court law existing at the time of the
Pennsylvania Superior Court's December.
16, 1997 decision, Bruton and Marsh, to
determine whether Greene's § 2254 petition
merited relief. He concluded that the
Pennsylvania Superior Court did not
unreasonably apply Bruton and Marsh in
concluding that the redacted statements did
not violate the Confrontation Clause and
recommended that the District Court deny
the § 2254 petition.
The Commonwealth objected to the
Magistrate Judge's report, arguing that
Greene had not procedurally exhausted his
Confrontation Clause claim. The District
Court overruled the Commonwealth's
objections, noting that Greene presented a
general claim regarding the redacted
confessions and·. relied upon relevant
Supreme Court authority, Bruton and
Marsh. The District Court a~opted the
Magistrate
Judge's
report
and
recommendation. The Court denied the
petition, but also granted a celiificate of
appealability
limited
to
Greene's
Confrontation Clause claim.

II.
[Fair presentation of Confrontation Clause
claim.]

III.
Having determined that Greene fairly
presented his Confrontation Clause claim in
. the Pennsylvania state courts, we tum to a
vexing issue that has, for the most part,
evaded analytical discussion by the Supreme
COUli and the Courts of Appeals. That is,
whether "clearly established Federal law"
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is determined
based on the "time of the relevant state-court

decision," Williams, 529 U.S. at 412, 120
S.Ct. 1495 (O'Connor, 1, for the Court), the
"time [the] state-court conviction became
final," id. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (Stevens,
1, for the Court), or some combination
thereof, e.g., Horn v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266,
272, 122 S.Ct. 2147, 153 L.Ed.2d 301
(2002) (per curiam) (holding that "in
addition to performing any· analysis required
by AEDP A, a federal court considering a
habeas petition must conduct a threshold
Teague [v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct.
1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989),] analysis
when the issue is properly raised by the
state"). The Supreme Court, until recently,
appeared to have settled on the date of the
relevant state-court decision. But the use of
the date the petitioner's conviction became
final has refused to quietly exit the stage. In
recent months, the Supreme Court has noted
the "uncertainty" surrounding the meaning
of "clearly established Federal law" for the
purposes of § 2254(d) (1 ).
After careful consideration of the divergent
approaches to determining what constitutes
"clearly established Federal law" under §
2254(d)(l), we now hold that the date of the
relevant state-court decision is the
controlling date. After surveying the
questions that arise from the Supreme
Court's Williams decision, and considering
the statutory text and post-Williams
Supreme Court precedent, our view is that
using the date of the relevant state-court
decision to determine "clearly established
Federal law" is the most logical approach to
applying § 2254(d) (1 ).

A.
It is understandable that confusion surrounds
what constitutes "clearly established Federal
law." In discussing the meaning of the
AEDP A amendments, the Supreme Court
has held that the "statutory phrase ['clearly
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established Federal law'] refer[red] to the
holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [its]
decisions as of the time of the relevant statecourt decision." .It has also held that all
Supreme Court jurisprudence that would
"qualify as an old rule under [its] Teague
jurisprudence w[ ould] constitute 'clearly
established Federal law . . .' under §
2254(d)(l)."
These statements from Justice O'Connor
present the first area of confusion in
Williams. The most logical meaning for the
term "old rule," a term that lacks any
meaningful discussion post- Williams, is any
rule which is not "new" under Teague. If
that is the case, then an "old rule" is any rule
that was "dictated by the governing
precedent existing at the time when [the
petitioner's] conviction became final[.]"In
that event, the inclusion of old rules under
Teague as "clearly established Federal law"
would include Supreme Court decisions
issued after the relevant state-court decision
but before the petitioner's conviction
became final. Such an outcome, in our view,
contradicts Justice 0' Connor's initial
declaration that "clearly established Federal
law" should be determined based on the date
of the relevant state-court decision.
To further complicate Williams, the
Supreme Court also held that the "threshold
question under AEDPA is whether [a
petitioner] seeks to apply a rule of law that
was clearly established at the time his statecourt conviction became final." Williams,
529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (Stevens, J.,
for the Court) (emphasis added). Thus, the
maj ority opinions of the Court, on their
faces, offered differing interpretations of the
"clearly established Federal law" language.
Supreme Court precedent after Williams has
also raised questions. At least some postWilliams authority suggests that the Teague

test and § 2254(d)(l) are distinct inquiries.
The instances where both tests must be met,
however, are unclear. More importantly, it is
.also unclear whether the distinct nature of
the two inquiries has any impact on how we
approach the meaning of "clearly
established Federal law" for the purposes of
. § 2254(d) (1 ).
In sum, we have (1) Justice O'Connor's
majority opinion in Williams, which seems
to contradict itself by stating that the date of
the relevant state-court decision is the
operative date for determining "clearly
established
Federal
. law"
while
simultaneously stating that Supreme Court
jurisprudence that would qualify as "old
rules" under Teague (which relies on the
date the petitioner's conviction became
final) is also "clearly established Federal
law," (2) Justice Stevens's majority opinion
in Williams, which contradicts Justice
O'Connor's directive that we should look to
the date of the relevant state-court decision,
and (3) post-Williams Supreme Court
authority suggesting that Teague and §
2254(d)(l) are distinct inquiries subject to
independent
analysis
under
certain
circumstances.
While many courts have managed to avoid
confronting these issues, this case presents
us with the inescapable obligation to decide
the cutoff date for determining "clearly
established Federal law." Greene's petition
turns on whether he may invoke Gray;
without that decision he cannot obtain relief.
See infra Section IV. Gray was decided on
March 9, 1998. Thus, using the date of the
relevant
state-court
decision,
the
Pennsylvania Superior Court's December
16, 1997 decision, Gray would not be
"clearly established Federal law." But using
the date Greene's conviction became final,
July 28, 1999, Gray would be "clearly
established Federal law." Indeed, Greene's
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case is the perfect storm of facts for
resolving the issue of which date-the date of
the relevant state-court decision or the date
the state-coUli conviction became finalshould be used for determining "clearly
established Federal law" for the purposes of
§ 2254(d)(I).
B.

The text of § 2254(d)(I) supports using the
date of the relevant state-coUli decision for
determining "clearly established Federal
law." Section 2254(d)(I) is concerned with
"decision[s]" that were "contrary to" or
"umeasonable application [s]" of "clearly
established Federal law":
An application for a writ of habeas
corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of
a State court. shall not be granted
with respect to any claim that was
adjudicated on the merits in State .
court proceedings
unless the
adjudication of the claim(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an
umeasonable application of, clearly
established
Federal
law,
as
determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States[.]

fd.
The statute indicates that a "decision" results
from a state court's adjudication "on the
merits" of a claim. In other words, the
decision occurs when the state court has
acted on the substance of a petitioner's
claim. Thus, it is the state court's resolution
of the petitioner's claim that must be
"contrary to" or an "umeasonable
application" of existing Federal law to
justify granting habeas relief.

Given that AEDP A is concerned with the
review of the state court's decision on the
merits of the petitioner's claim, the statute,
read in the most straightforward fashion,
requires that the relevant Federal law be
"clearly established" at the time of that
state-court decision. Reading the language
plainly, "clearly established" contemplates
that the law or precedent existed at the time
of the state court's substantive resolution of
the petitioner's claim. A state court cannot
umeasonably apply a Supreme Court
decision that did not exist at the time of its
decision. The same is true for the "contrary
to" prong of the statute.
C.

Supreme Court decisions after Williams
further bolster our conclusion. In Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155
L.Ed.2d 144 (2003), the Supreme Court
stated
unequivocally
that
"'clearly
establlshedFederal Law' under § 2254(d)(I)
is the governing legal principle or principles
set forth by the Supreme Court at the time
the state court renders its decision." ...
The date .the conviction became final, on the
other hand, has not gained much traction in
the Supreme Court. Aside from stating that
Teague and § 2254( d)(I) are distinct
inquiries, and that in certain circumstances
both Teague and § 2254(d)(1) must be
satisfied, the Supreme Court has not
suggested that the date the conviction
became final has any import in determining
"clearly established Federal law" for the
purposes of § 2254(d)(1). In fact, it appears
that Justice Stevens's majority opinion
language from Williams stating that the
"threshold question". is whether the
petitioner seeks to apply a rule that was
clearly established at the time his state-coUli
conviction became final, has been
supplanted by Lockyer, where the Supreme
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Court agreed that the "threshold matter" was
to decide what constituted "clearly
established Federal law," but then used the
relevant state-comi decision date to
determine that law. The most telling
observation regarding the use of the date the
conviction became final is that the strongest
authorities we have found for that approach
are the recent Supreme Court opinions
expressing uncertainty on which date is
appropriate. Mere uncertainty cannot
counterbalance the numerous Supreme
Court decisions that have unequivocally,
albeit without analysis, taken the other
approach. As an inferior federal court, we
are not free to ignore the numerosity of these
pronouncements.
Moreover, it appears that Justice Stevens's
primary concern with Justice O'Connor's
formulation of the "clearly established
Federal law" inquiry is her view that the
phrase "refers to the holdings, as opposed to
the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's]
decisions[.]" In Carey, Justice Stevens
explained that he took· issue with Justice
O'Connor's
formulation
because
it
discouraged state courts from seeking
guidance from the Supreme Court's decision
on the grounds that such guidance was dicta:
Virtually everyone of the Court's
opinions
announcing
a
new
application of a constitutional
principle contains some explanatory
language that is intended to provide
guidance to lawyers and judges in
future cases. It is quite wrong to
invite state court judges to discount
the impOliance of such guidance on
the ground that it may not have been
strictly necessary as an explanation
of the Court's specific holding in the
case. The text of [AEDPA] itself
provides sufficient obstacles .to
obtaining habeas relief without

placing a judicial thumb on the
warden's side of the scales.
Carey, 549 U.S. at 79, 127 S.Ct. 649
(Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
This concern exists independent of the date
upon which "clearly established Federal
law" is determined and is not implicated in
the issue we decide today. The decisions
preceding
Gray-Bruton
and
Marshexplicitly refused to provide guidance on
whether the teachings of Bruton applied to
redactions like the ones made in this case.
See infra Section IV.
In conclusion, we hold that the cutoff date
for determining "clearly established Federal
law" for purposes of § 2254(d)(1) is the date
of the relevant state-court decision. Both the
natural reading of the statutory text and
post- Williams Supreme Court precedent
support this conclusion. As such, Gray was
not "clearly established Federal law" for the
purposes of Greene's habeas petition.

D.
Before applying our holding to the facts in
this case, a brief segue is needed to address
our dissenting colleague's spirited defense
of the use of the date the petitioner's
conviction became final to determine
"clearly established Federal law." While we
recognize that the issue confronted today is
one over which reasonable jurists may
disagree, there are some notable deficiencies
in the dissent's proposed adjudication of this
case. The dissent (1) would sub silentio
codify Teague, including its retroactivity
exceptions, as pali of § 2254 without any
reasoned justification for doing so,. (2)
elToneously asserts that Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d
649 (1987), applies to cases on collateral
review, and (3) incorrectly asserts that our
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approach to § 2254(d) (1 ) creates a "twilight
zone," preventing a petitioner from relying
on Supreme. Court decisions issued after the
date of his last relevant state-court decision,
but before his conviction becomes final.

required for a petitioner to receive habeas
relief:
While it is of course a necessary
prerequisite to federal habeas relief
. that a prisoner satisfy the AEDPA
standard of review set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d) ("an application ...
shall not be granted ... unless " the
AEDP A standard of review is
satisfied (emphasis added)), none of .
our post-AEDPA cases have
suggested that a writ of habeas
corpus should automatically issue if
a prisoner satisfies the AEDPA
standard, or that AEDP A relieves
courts from the responsibility of
addressing properly raised Teague
arguments.

1.
As already explained in Section III(A), there
is direct Supreme Court precedent
supporting the view that "whatever would
qualify as an old rule under [the Supreme
Court's]
Teague
jurisprudence
will
constitute 'clearly established Federal law, .
. .' under § 2254(d)(1)." But the dissent
appears to go one step fmiher. It alludes, at
times, to the retroactive application of new
rules that fall within the Teague exceptions
for retroactivity as "clearly established
Federal law" for purposes of § 2254.

ld.
As a preliminary observation, this case does
not raise a Teague new rules retroactivity
issue. Under Teague, Gray would be an old
rule since it was issued before Greene's
conviction became final. Thus, comments on
the supposed benefits of Teague's new rule
retroactivity exceptions would be dicta even
if we were to take the dissent's approach.
That being said, we caution that the use of
Teague's new rule retroactivity exceptions
for purposes of § 2254, while not
implausible, has yet to gain support from the
Supreme Court. In fact, in Horn, the
Supreme Court explained that the "AEDPA
and Teague inquiries are distinct." As
distinct inquiries, it is unclear whether
Teague's new rule retroactivity exceptions
should be incorporated into § 2254 even if
we were to adopt the use of the date the
petitioner's conviction became final for.
determining "clearly established Federal
law."
Indeed, the Horn decision recognized that
satisfaction of § 2254(d) is the minimum

Thus, under Horn, if Teague is in play at all,
it is as an additional concern on top of
AEDPA's requirements codified in §
2254(d). As such, it seems a leap to assume
that new rules that are deemed retroactive
under Teague would be automatically
deemed "clearly established Federal law"
. for purposes of § 2254(d)(1).
2.
The dissent's assertion that Griffith applies
on collateral review cannot be reconciled
with that decision's holding. In Griffith, the
Supreme Court considered whether a certain
decision "applie[d] retroactively to a federal
conviction then pending on direct review." It
held that a newly declared rule "for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases, state or
federal, pending on direct review or not yet
final[.]" The principles animating Griffith
were the ideas that "failure to apply a newly
declared constitutional rule to criminal cases
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pending on direct review violates basic
· norms of constitutional adjudication," and
that courts should treat like cases alike,
The dissent, citing· Whorton, seeks to take
a· decision
animated
by
Griffith,
constitutional principles pertaining to
treating like cases alike on direct review,
and apply it to collateral review. It sees
Whorton as "explicitly" recognizing that
Griffith applies to collateral review. Neither
Whorton nor subsequent Supreme Court
precedent support this view.
The language from Whorton upon which the
dissent relies is far from explicit. The sole
citation of Griffith was for the proposition
that under the "Teague framework, an old
rule applies both on direct and collateral
review, but a new rule is generally
applicable only to cases that are still on
direct review." Before assuming that the
Supreme Court sought, without any
additional discussion, to extend Griffith to .
collateral review, as the dissent suggests, a
less novel understanding of the Whorton
Court's reliance on Griffith should be
considered. Namely, that Griffith was
probably .cited as general support for the
propositions that "an old rule applies . . . on
direct ... review [and that] a new rule is
generally applicable only to cases that are
still on direct review." The sentence
following . the Griffith citation in the
Whorton decision further confirms this
understanding by explaining how new rules
apply in collateral proceedings through
citation to Teague, not Griffith.
Subsequent Supreme Court precedent also
belies the dissent's view that Griffith applies
on collateral review. Approximately a year
after Whorton, the Supreme Court, in
Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 128
S.Ct. 1029, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008), stated
that Griffith "defined the scope of

constitutional violations that would be
remedied on direct appeaL" It did so in the
context of determining whether "Teague
constrains the authority of state courts to
give broader effect to new rules of criminal
procedure than is required by that opinion."
Rather than holding that Teague applied to
the state courts; like Griffith, 479 U.S. at
328, 107 S.Ct. 708, the Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion. It held that
the Teague decision did not control a state
court's decisions on retroactivity. According
to the Danforth Court, the Teague decision
"limits the kinds of constitutional violations
. that will entitle an individual to relief· on
federal habeas, but does not in any way limit
the authority of a state court, when
reviewing its own state criminal convictions,
to provide a remedy for a violation that is
deemed 'nometroactive' under Teague."
The Supreme Court emphasized that
Teague, unlike Griffith, was based on the
Court's "power to interpret the federal
habeas statute." Because "Teague is based
on statutory authority that extends only to
federal courts applying a federal statute; it
cannot be read as imposing a binding
obligation on state courts." While Griffith is
concerned with affording individuals on
direct review their right to adjudication in
accord with the Constitution, Teague is
derived from language in the habeas statute
pemitting disposal of habeas petitions "as
law and justice require[.]" Because their
sources of authority are different-Griffith,
the Constitution, and Teague, 28 U.S.C. §
2243-and their motivations are different,
Griffith cannot be imported wholesale into
Teague without discussion. In short, we do
not dispute that Griffith may somehow
inform the Supreme Court's approach in
applying Teague. We also do not dispute
that a § 2254 petition may invoke Griffith
where a petitioner was denied the
application of relevant Supreme Court
precedent on direct review. But Griffith,
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independently, does not control retroactivity
for cases on collateral review.

3.
The dissent also asserts that our approach
creates a twilight zone for any petitioner
who seeks to invoke Supreme Court
decisions that fall between the date of the.
last relevant state-court decision and the date
the petitioner's conviction became final.
This assertion is incorrect. Our holding does
not create a categorical bar to a petitioner's
reliance on Supreme Court decisions issued
during any twilight zone period. Instead, we
set fOlih a simple rule: the universe of
"clearly established Federal· law" that may
be applied to a particular petitioner's § 2254
appeal is tied to the date of his last relevant
state-court decision.
In this case, it was Greene's decision not to
the Confrontation Clause claim in his
PCRA petition that established December
16, 1997, as the date of the last relevant
state-court decision on the. merits: This, in
tum, shrank the universe of "clearly
established Federal law" available to him for
his § 2254 petition, relative to what that
universe would have been had he pursued
the Confrontation Clause claim at the PCRA
stage and obtained a later, post-Gray statecourt decision on the merits. It is unfortunate
for Greene that the body of "clearly
established Federal law" as ofD"ecember 16,
1997, did not include the Gray decision. Yet
this is an outcome he could easily have
avoided by raising the Confrontation Clause
claim in his PCRA petition. Doing so would
have pushed the date of the last relevant
state-court decision on the merits forward,
thereby expanding the universe of "clearly
established Federal law" to include Gray.
rais~

U sing the date of the last relevant state-court

decision to determine" "clearly established
Federal law" gives defendants incentive to
pursue all colorable claims based on
"Federal law" as far as possible in the state
courts because doing so will give them the
best chance of success in federal habeas
proceedings, not to mention the underlying
state proceedings. This is a salutary effect
that serves Congress's goals in passing"
AEDPA.
IV.

[The Court discussed and applied Bruton
and Marsh holding they were reasonably"
applied by the state courts.]
V.

This case presents a vexing conundrum that
cannot, no matter how one views the facts or
law, be avoided. While we cannot predict
with absolute certainty what date the
Supreme Comi would use to determine
"clearly established Federal law" for
purposes of § 2254(d) (1 ), our decision today
represents a careful consideration of the
pertinent, conflicting authorities, and we
believe that we have reached the best
conclusion given the guidance we have to
date. Ultimately, only the Supreme Court
can resolve such uncertainty as exists. For
now, we hold that "clearly established
Federal law"" for purposes of § 2254(d)(1)
should be determined as of the date of the
relevant state-court decision. In this case,
because the Pennsylvania Superior Court's
December 16, 1997 decision did not
unreasonably apply the "clearly established
Federal law" that existed at that time, Bruton
and Marsh, we will affirm the judgment of
the District Court.
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
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Although I agree with my colleagues that
Greene's claim is not proceduraUy defaulted
and join Part II of the majority opinion in
full, I respectfully disagree with their
determination of the controlling date for
"clearly established Federal law" under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). As my colleagues
recognize, the. authority on this question is
conflicting and, save for a First Circuit
Court opinion, unreasoned. But choosing the
date of the relevant state-court decision, as
our Court does today, leaves a twilight zone
between the cutoff set by the majority here
and the retroactivity analysis of the Supreme
Court's decisions in Griffith v. Kentucky,
479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct.. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d
649 (1987), and Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334
(1989) (plurality). The consequence of the
majority's opinion today is that a criminal
defendant who is denied the right under
Griffith to apply a new constitutional rule to
his or her· case on direct appeal is left
without later recourse to federal habeas
review to correct that error.
I. Background

***
II. Analysis
This is not a situation where Greene is
seeking to take belated advantage of a rule
to which he is not entitled.
is asking us to
apply a case that should have been applied
on direct review. Under the Supreme
Court's Griffith jurisprudence, he was
entitled to the benefit of Gray. It is only
because the Pennsylvania state courts failed
to apply it to his case that we are evaluating
it in the first instance on habeas review.

He

My analysis differs from that of the
majority.
In a nutshell, subsection
2254(d)(1) does not choosy any cutoff date.

Thus, we are left with the retroactivity
jurisprudence of Griffith and Teague.
Because Gray was decided prior to the date
Greene's conviction became final, I believe
Griffith requires its application to this case. I
would therefore reverse the judgment of the
District Comi and remand for. consideration
of Gray.
A. As noted, the question of whether §
2254(d)(l) sets a cutoff date is unresolved.
I agree with the majority that "clearly
established Federal law" did not have any
special meaning prior to AEDP A and. the
text of28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). See Maj. Op.
at 98 n. 10. Nor does the text of 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(l) have an express time cutoff for
"clearly established Federal law." My
colleagues read the· statute implicitly to
require that any Supreme Court decision
handed down after the relevant state-comi
decision on the merits is to be ignored for
purposes of habeas relief. I disagree that
"[r]eading the language plainly," or in a
"straightforward" way, as my colleagues
suggest, requires that the Supreme Court
decision exist at the time of the state court's
substantive resolution. If § 2254(d)(1) were
so plain or straightforward, why does the
Supreme Court say it is uncertain? And why
are my colleagues of the view that "there is
no clear answer to the issue we face"? Maj.
. Op. at 96 n. 7. In the face of such
uncertainty, I find it difficult to conclude
that there is a "natural reading" of §
2254(d)(l) dictating a cutoff date.
A primary reason for the Supreme Court's
unceliainty as to whether the text of §
2254(d)(l) provides a clear cutoff date is its
own decision in Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389
(2000). Inadvertently (no doubt), the Court
had two different majorities identifying two
different cutoffs. Justice Stevens, writing for
six members of the Court in Part III of his
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opmlOn, stated that the applicable date for
purposes of determining whether federal law
is established is "the time [the habeas
petitioner's] state-court conviction became
fina1." Justice O'Connor, writing for five
members of the Court in Part II of her
opinion, stated that "'clearly established
Federal law' ... refers to the holdings, as
opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme]
Court's decisions as of the time of the
relevant state-court decision." Neither
Justice Stevens nor Justice O'Connor
appears to have chosen a cutoff based on the
text of the statute, and they did not
acknowledge the discrepancy in their
respective opinions. Indeed, in Williams the
choice of cutoff would not have mattered .
because the case focused on Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), a case decided prior
to both the 1985 crime and the 1986
conviction in Williams, making the
discussion of cutoff dicta because under
both cutoffs Strickland was undoubtedly
"clearly established Federal law."
Our task is to reconcile the conflicting
majorities in Williams regarding the cutoff
for "clearly established Federal law" under
AEDPA while maintaining consistency with
the Court's controlling decisions in Griffith
and Teague. Recently, the Supreme Court
recognized the "uncertainty" in temporal
cutoff for "clearly established Federal law,"
and declined to resolve it at that time.

"clearly established" cutoff for AEbP A. Id.
at 96-97. Though the Supreme Court has
used the relevant state-comi decision as the
temporal cutoff in cases after Williams, I do
not find this dispositive. Like our own
checkered jurisprudence, it is not clear from
the Supreme Court's cases whether it
recognized these divergent approaches
inasmuch as it was not required in those
cases to resolve whether the cutoff date was
the relevant state-comi decision date or the
date the conviction became fina1.
If, as the maj ority suggests, the clear answer
is the date of the relevant state-court
decision, the Spisak Court would not have
noted the uncertainty, nor would it have
assumed the date of finality. The Court is
not in the business of offering advisory
opinions, and if it were clear that its prior
cases had selected the .date of the relevant
state-court decision, it would not have
issued the opinion in Spisak. It would have
held instead that, because Mills was decided
after the final state-court decision on the
merits, AEDP A did not permit consideration
of the case.· It would have stopped its
analysis there instead of going on at great
length to evaluate the Mills claim on the
merits. Thus, post- Williams Supreme Court
precedent offers little to clarify the temporal
cutoff for "clearly established Federal law"
under AEDPA.
B. The Supreme Court has not abandoned its

retroactivity jurisprudence post-AEDPA.
Recognizing the Court's statement in Spisak
as the "most telling observation regarding
the use of the date the conviction became
final," my colleagues dismiss it in a single
sentence as "mere uncertainty [that] cannot
counterbalance" the cases that select the date
of the relevant state-court decision. Maj. Op.
at 99. Moreover, they do so even though we
agree that Supreme Court has never
conducted a thorough analysis of the

AEDPA's concern over whether a state
court ruling in a criminal case was contrary
to, or an umeasonable application of,
"clearly established Federal law" sterns from
the desire to avoid disturbing final criminal
jUdgments through collateral review. In
particular, the use of the past tense
("established") means that AEDP A is
concerned with the law that should have
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been applied at the' time of the state court
proceedings. Where I diverge from my
colleagues is how we determine what that
body of law is.
Even though at first it seems conceptually
difficult to say that a court unreasonably
applied Supreme Court precedent that did
not yet exist, retroactivity analysis becomes
the tool for deciding. When a Supreme
Court holding is retroactively applied to a
prior proceeding, it is as if it existed at the
time ofthat prior proceeding. The majority's
view ignores controlling Supreme Court
cetiain
precedent that
allows,
in
circmnstances,
for
the
retroactive
application of constitutional rules to
criminal cases even' though they are
announced after a state court ruling on the
merits.
Paramount to understanding the Supreme
Court's retroactivity jurisprudence is
discerning its decisions in Griffith and
Teague. They provide a distinction between
"old
rules" and "new rules"
.
, terms that have
a clear. meaning only when used in relation
to a given criminal conviction. Unhelpfully,
the Supreme Court has used "new rule" to
rriean different things in the Griffith and
Teague context.
A "new rule" for Griffith' is one that is
announced after a state court ruling on the
merits. A "new rule" for Teague is one that
is announced after a conviction becomes
final. This means that in the application of
Gray to Greene's conviction, Gray is a "new
rule" for Griffith pmlJoses but is an "old
rule" for Teague purposes. We are
principally concerned with the Teague
distinction between "old rules" and "new
rules." ...
[Table provided for clarity omitted.]

C. The Supreme Court has a developed
jurisprudence governing the application to
cases on collateral review of its cases
decided pre-finality' and those decided postfinality.
The retroactive application of newly
announced constitutional rules in criminal
cases has long troubled the Supreme Court.
As noted, retroactivity takes that rule and
transports it back in time to a proceeding
that pre-dated the announcement of the rule,
treating the rule as if it existed at the time of
the prior proceeding. Because this fiction
has the potential to upset settled
proceedings, especially in the criminal
context, over the years the Court came to
adopt a bright line that splits the application
of these rules into two domains of review.
Whether a new rule applies retroactively
depends on whether a criminal conviction is
on direct review or collateral review at the
time of the Supreme Court decision
announcing the new rule. If the conviction is
on direct review when the new rule is
announced, Griffith allows the retroactive
application of the new rule to all criminal
cases pending on direct review as a "basic
norm [ ] of constitutional adjudication." If
the conviction is on collateral review when
the new rule is announced (i.e., convictions
that became final before the new rule is
announced), Teague restricts the application
of that new rule to nan-ow exceptions
discussed below. This bright-line distinction
was made due to the differing considerations
between the two domains of review.
1. Griffith

The Griffith Court held that the "failure to
apply a newly declared constitutional rule to
criminal cases pending on direct review
.violates basic norms of constitutional
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adjudication." It was the very "integrity of
judicial review" that required application of
a new constitutional rule "to all similar cases
pending on direct review." Two principles
guided this decision. First, the· Court
. recognized that
[a]s a practical matter, of course, we
cannot hear each case pending on
direct review and apply the new rule.
But we fulfill our judicial
responsibility by instructing the
lower courts to apply the new rule
retroactively to cases not yet fina1.
Thus, it is the nature of judicial
review that precludes us from
"[s]imply fishing one case from the
stream of appellate review, using it
as a vehicle for pronouncing new
constitutional standards, and then
permitting a stream of similar cases
subsequently to flow by unaffected
by that new rule."

Id. (citation omitted).

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
The Court therefore held "that a new rule for
the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be
applied retroactively to all cases, state or
federal, pending on direct review or not yet
final, with no exception for cases in which
the new rule constitutes a 'clear break' with
the past." I note that "pending on direct
review" is slightly different from "not yet
fina1." A case that has already exhausted the
direct appeal as of right resulting in a statecourt decision on the merits, but is not yet
final, is still within the purview of Griffith.
Finality is the key date.
The Griffith Court "instruct [ed] the lower
courts," state and federal, "to apply the new
rule retroactively to cases not yet final." It
did not merely advise those courts to
consider applying the rule subject to their
discretion, but mandated application of the
new rule. It was only through this mandate
that "actual inequity " between "many
similarly situated defendants" would be
avoided.

Second, the Court recognized that
2. Teague

selective application of new rules
violates the principle of treating
similarly situated defendants the
same. As we pointed out in United
States v. Johnson, [457 U.S. 537,
102 S.Ct. 2579, 73 L.Ed.2d 202
(1982) ] the problem with not
applying new rules to cases pending
on direct review is "the actual
inequity that results .when the Court
chooses which of many similarly
situated defendants should be the
chance beneficimy" of a new rule.
Although the Court had tolerated this
inequity for a time by not applying
new rules retroactively to cases on
direct review, we noted: "The time
for toleration has come to an end."

In Teague, the Supreme Court dealt with the
other side of the retroactivity question.
Collateral attacks such as habeas corpus are
not meant to be a substitute for direct
review, and the Court has recognized an
interest in leaving concluded litigation in a
state of repose. Quoting the second Justice
Harlan, the Court noted that it was
'''sounder, in adjudicating habeas petitions,
generally to apply the law prevailing at the
time a conviction became final than it is to
seek to dispose of [habeas] cases on the
of
intervening
changes
in
basis
constitutional interpretation. '" The Court
identified only two exceptions to the general
prohibition
against
the
retroactive
application of new post-finalIty rules to
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cases on collateral review: (1) new rules that
place certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe;
and (2) new "watershed rules of ·criminal
procedure ... [that] 'alter our understanding
of the bedrock procedural elements that
must be found to vitiate the fairness of a
particular conviction[.]'"
In deciding Griffith and Teague, the
Supreme Court has carefully set out the
different concerns in the pre-finality (direct
appeal) and post-finality (collateral attack)
application of new rules. In the context of
retroactivity for federal habeas review, the
Teague Court focused on the distinction
between intermediate judgments subject to
appeal and final judgments subject only to
. collateral attack:
Application of constitutional rules
not in existence at the time a
conviction became final seriously
undermines the principle of finality
which is essential to the operation of
our criminal justice system. Without
finality, the criminal law is deprived
of much of its deterrent effect. The
fact that life and liberty are at stake
in criminal prosecutions "shows only
that' conventional notions of finality'
should not have as much place in
criminal as in civil litigation, not that
they should have none."

Id. at 309, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (emphases
original) (citation omitted).

finality, not the date of the relevant statecourt decision, as the inflection point
between Griffith and Teague.
D. Section 2254(d)(1) does not discard
Griffith and Teague.
In a unanimous post-AEDPA and postWilliams decision, Whorton v. Bockting, 549
U.S. 406, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 167 L.Ed.2d 1
(2007), the Supreme Court held that Griffith
and Teague
laid out the framework to be used in
determining
whether
a
rule
announced in one of [the Comi's]
opIlllOns
should
be . applied
retroactively to judgments in
criminal cases that are already final
on direct review. Under the Teague
framework, an old· rule applies both
on direct and collateral review, but a
new rule is generally applicable only
to cases that are still on direct
review. See Griffith, 479 U.S. 314
[107 S.Ct. 708]. A new rule applies
retroactively
in
a
collateral
proceeding only if [the Teague
requirements are met].
549 U.S. at 416,127 S.Ct. 1173.

III

With this view of finality, the Court held
that "[u]nless they fall within an exception
to the general rule, new constitutional rules
of criminal procedure will not be applicable
to those cases which have become final
before the new rules are announced," using

Though Whorton dealt with an application
of Teague, it explicitly recognized that
Griffith requires that "old rules" be applied
both on direct and collateral.review. To me
this means . that the Whorton Court
unanimously endorsed Griffith and the idea
that a Supreme Court decision handed down
. after the last state court ruling on the merits,
but before finality, is an old rule that is
applicable even under AEDPA and even if it
is not a "watershed" ruling or does not place
conduct beyond the power of the state to
proscribe.
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Given the Court's retroactivity concerns, I
believe the better reading of § 2254(d)(1) is
that it does not set a definitive cutoff date
for "clearly established Federal law." It is
the
Supreme
Court's
retroactivity
jurisprudence of Griffith or Teague that
determines applicability on collateral
review, not AEDP A.
My colleagues' reading of § 2254(d)(1)
conflicts with Whorton. They refuse to
include all "old rules" as "clearly established
Federal law." This reading contradicts the
unanimous holding in Williams that all "old
rules" for Teague purposes are "clearly
established Federal law." My colleagues
recognize this contradiction, but they choose
to ignore Griffith and Teague and adopt
Justice O'Connor's initial unreasoned
declaration (that chose the date of the
relevant state-court decision and cited no
case) and not her later reasoned one (that
referred to "old rules" under Teague .and
cited Supreme Court precedent). It is unclear
to me why we would choose her statement
of the law (a dictum, no less) in conflict with
the Supreme Court's decisions in Griffith
and Teague instead of her statement of the
law in harmony with those Supreme Court
holdings and Whorton (and that actually
invokes the controlling Supreme Court
precedent of Teague ).
E. The majority's cutoff creates a twilight
zone
If the relevant cutoff date is the date of the
last state-court decision on the merits, we
would create a twilight zone for criminal
defendants. Consider the possible times
relative to a state court conviction when a
decision by the Supreme Court is
announced: (1) prior to the last state-court
decision on the merits; (2) between the last
state-court decision on the merits and
finality; and (3) after the conviction is final.

If it were decided in the first period (prior to
the last state-court decision on the merits), a
state court would have to apply it to be
consistent with Griffith. If it were decided in
the third period (after finality)? habeas relief
would be available as a "new rule" under
Teague if the decision announced· a
"watershed" rule or placed certain conduct
beyond the power of the state to proscribe.
However, if it were decided in the second
period (the twilight zone between the last
state-court decision on the merits and before
finality), the majority's time cutoff would
nonetheless consider it not to be "clearly
established Federal law" and would bar
habeas relief because the rule did not exist
at the time of the last state-court decision on
the merits. The majority reaches this
conclusion even though, as discussed above,
a rule announced pre-finality is an "old rule"
for Teague purposes and Griffith requires its
application on direct and collateral review.
So inflexible is the "plain reading" the
majority adopts that even "new rules" that
pass the Teague test for retroactive
application would not entitle a petitioner to
habeas relief. "New rules" for Teague
purposes are always decided after the date of
the relevant. state-court decision, as they
come into being after finality. Yet the
majority would not consider the "new rule"
to be "clearly established Federal law"
because the "new rule" did not yet exist, and
no relief could be granted. Such a Catch-22
reading of· § 2254(d) (1 ) effectively
disregards Griffith and Teague even as the
Supreme Court has maintained that both
decisions remain viable.
As discussed above, even though at first it
seems conceptually difficult to say that a
state court unreasonably applied Supreme
Court precedent that did not· yet exist, the
Supreme COUli's retroactivity analysis treats
the precedent as if it existed at the time of
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that prior state court proceeding. Under
Griffith, . Supreme Court decisions are
retroactively applied to those convictions
not yet final at the time of the decision.
Furthermore, if the state court neglects to
apply the rule retroactively to convictions
not yet final, this can be still corrected after
finality on collateral review. Under Teague,
Supreme Court decisions are retroactively
applicable even to convictions that were
already final at the time of the decision if it
announces a "watershed" rule or places
certain conduct beyond the power of the
state to proscribe. We know from Whorton
that § 2254(d) (1 ) does not overrule Griffith
and Teague, but by deeming irrelevant any
case that post-dates the relevant state-court
decision, the majority implicitly disregards
both Griffith and Teague.
While another Circuit Court.has rejected the
majority's cutoff on fears of the potential for
"state court . . . subver[sion] . . . by the
simple expedient of summarily affirming a
lower court's decision," its reasoning does
not depend on a distrust of the judicial
integrity of state courts. A well-meaning
state court system could innocently neglect
to apply Griffith after its final decision on
the merits, but before the conviction
becomes final. If a state court were to ignore
the mandate to apply the new rule to all
cases still pending. on direct appeal or not
yet final, it would similarly undermine the
integrity of judicial review. That would
leave collateral review by habeas C01pUS as
the only remedy to correct the mistake.
Surely a criminal defendant is entitled to
recourse if the state courts simply forget to
check for new, relevant Supreme Court
precedent prior to finality. This helps to
avoid the situatiqn where similarly situated
defendants receive disparate treatment based
on the happenstance of state court attention
(or inattention).

Yet, under the majority's selection of
temporal cutoff, even that remedy would be
foreclosed whenever the state courts
declined to apply the rule without
explanation. This would leave affected
habeas petitioners as unfairly treated
relative to
other similarly situated
individuals who were lucky enough to have
the state courts apply the new rule.

It is not our place to second-guess the
Supreme Court when it has held that: (1)
Supreme Court decisions handed down prior
to finality must be applied on both direct and
collateral review under Griffith; (2) Teague
and Griffith have continuing vitality after
AEDPA; (3) all nine Justices in Williams
agreed that an "old rule" under Teague
qualifies as "clearly established Federal
law"; and (4) its decisions since Williams
have not definitively set a temporal cutoff.
In the absence of an express statement to the
contrary by the Supreme Court (and there is
none), we are bound to apply the clearly
expressed
(and
still
controlling)
jurisprudence of Griffith and Teague. The
Court may wish, in the AEDPA context, to
cut back on Griffith and Teague, but it, not
us, possesses the power to overrule its
precedent.
I would hold that the cutoff date for "clearly
established Federal law" is not prescribed by
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The retroactive
application of constitutional rules to
criminal cases is governed by Griffith and
Teague, and I would look first to whether
Gray was decided before or after finality to
determine which rule applies. As here Gray
was decided prior to finality, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should have
considered it in the course of fulfilling its
responsibilities under Griffith. When it did
not do so, the District Court on habeas
review needed to correct this failure to
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consider Gray. Accordingly, I would vacate
its judgment and remand for application of
Gray to Greene's Confrontation Clause

claim. For these reasons, I respectfully
dissent from all but Part II of the majority
opinion.
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"Supreme Court Grants Two Clinic Cert Petitions"
Stanford Law School Blog
AprilS, 2011
Jeffrey Fisher

regime that the Supreme Court announced in
1989 in Teague v. Lane remains good law
after the enactment of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDP A). Clinic law students Thomas Scott
('11), Andrew Zahn ('11), and Kathryn
McCann (' 12) prepared the petition under
the supervision of the clinic's co-director,
Jeffrey Fisher.

On April 4, 2011, the Supl:eme Court
grap.ted only two certiorari petitions, and
both are from the Supreme Court Litigation
Clinic's docket.
In ... Greene v. Fishel', the clinic represents
a state prisoner arguing that he may obtain
federal habeas corpus relief based on a
violation of a United States Supreme Court
decision announced after the last state-court
decision on the merits of his direct appeal
but before that appeal became final. In other
words, petitioner argues that the retroactivi~y

The clinic will now proceed to brief both
cases on the merits and to present oral
argument next fall.
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"Thorny Habeas Rule Will Get
High Court Road Map"
Courthouse News Service
Apri14, 2011

The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
review the appeal of a man sentenced to life
in prison for second-degree murder and
other charges.

his trial had been' prejudiced by the.
admission of his alleged co-conspirators'
Under
the
redacted
statements.
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDP A), federal courts may grant
.habeas relief if a .state court's consideration
of a federal constitutional claim "resulted in .
a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court."

Its decision of the case is expected to shed
light on a disputed. element of habeas
procedure: whether judges can consider
Supreme COUli decisions' as "clearly
established Federal law" under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 if the decision was published
before a state prisoner's conviction becomes
final but after his last state-court decision on
the merits ..

Greene's conviction became final in 1999,
but the last state-court decision on the merits
of his case predated Gray. A magistrate
judge and federal judge decided that Gray
was not "clearly established Federal law" for
Greene and dismissed his appeals. A divided
3rd Circuit panel affirmed in May 2010.

In March 1998, the Supreme Court decided
in KevinD. Gray v. Maryland that
prosecutors cannot use redactions to ~kirt a
law that forbids' them from using one
defendant's confession as evidence if it
implicates a co-conspirator.

"As the Third Circuit itself strongly
suggested in this very case, this Court
should resolve this conflict of authority,"
.Greene's attorneys in their brief to the
Supreme COUli. "This basic procedural issue
has already confronted numerous federal
courts, and it will continue to arise in the
context of an array of substantive
constitutional claims. The question is
outcome determinative in this case. Finally,
the Third Circuit's holding that AEDPA
changed longstanding retroactivity law is
incorrect. "

This case was decided while Eric Greene
(aka Jarmalne Q. Trice) was appealing his
conviction of second-degree murder,
robbery and conspiracy. Greene had been
tried alongside four co-conspirators, one of
whom was facing first-degree murder
. charges. At trial, prosecutors read the
confessions of the co-conspirators who
spoke with police when they were arrested
but would not be testifying in the trial.
The jury was instructed not to consider the
confessions as evidence against any of the
other defendants.

Greene is represented by Jeffrey Fisher of
the Stanford Law School Supreme Court
Litigation Clinic, Isabel McGinty of
Highstown, N.J., and Goldstein, Howe &
Russell of Bethesda, Md.

When Gray was decided, Greene argued that
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"Clearly Established Federal Law is Determined as of
the Date of the Relevant State-Court Decision
SUbject to Habeas Review"
Third Circuit Blog
June 2, 2010
Melinda Ghilardi

decision became the final state cOUli
decision for purposes of habeas review.
Greene's conviction became final on July
28, 1999. In the meantime, however, the
Supreme Court decided Gray v. Maryland,
523 U.S. 185 (1998), on March 9, 1998,
which supported Greene's claim. The issue
befote the Third Circuit was whether the
Gray case was to be considered "clearly
established Federal law." The court held that
it was not because the relevant state court
decision was issued before Gray. One judge
dissented opining that the relevant time
frame should be the time that the conviction
became final.

A split panel of the Third Circuit held that
for purposes of the standard of review for a
federal habeas claim set forth in AEDP A,28
U.S.C. §2254(d)(1),' "clearly established
Federal law" should be determined as of the
date of the relevant state-court decision
subject to habeas review. Greene was
convicted of second degree murder, robbery
and conspiracy and sentenced to life
On
appeal
to
the
imprisonment.
Pennsylvania Superior Court, Green argued,
inter alia, that the admission at trial of
redacted statements of his co-defendants
violated the Confrontation Clause. The
Superior Court rejected that claim in a
decision dated December 16, 1997. That
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